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Framework Paper
As the title suggests, the aim of this dissertation is to test a number of economic the-
ories by analyzing human behavior observed in sports-related settings. More specifi-
cally, the three articles in this dissertation provide important insights into the behavior
of three different groups of economic agents—television viewers, professional sports
players, and betting traders—using tennis as a research laboratory.
This dissertation contributes to a growing body of literature in the field of sports
economics. Compared to other research fields like labor and health economics, sports
economics is a relatively newer field within the broader discipline of economics (Santos
& García, 2011). The first study using sports data that was published in a well-known
economics journal appeared in the mid-1950s, when Rottenberg (1956) wrote an article
about the characteristics of the labor market for baseball players. Some years went by
before Neale (1964) published an influential article describing the peculiar economics
of professional sports in another recognized journal.
In recent decades, the field of sports economics has significantly expanded its re-
search agenda and has become more widely recognized. For example, the works of
Wooders (2010), Pope and Schweitzer (2011), and Ertug and Castellucci (2013) have
been published in leading scientific journals in economics and management sciences.
Even if the reasons behind this expansion are manifold, sports economists recurrently
mention two. First, the rapid growth in the demand for live sports events, for sports
broadcasts, and for sporting goods and activities—which began in the 1970s in North
America and in the 1980s in Europe—has resulted in an increased economic impor-
tance of the sports industry in modern society. Concurrent with this development,
the interest of researchers and the research opportunities in this subject have rapidly
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expanded. By applying a “dose of economic thinking to the business of sports” (Fort,
2006), economists are actively contributing to a better understanding of the sports
labor market, the competition for media rights, sporting governance, the demand and
supply for sports products and services, and many other topics.
Second, researchers have realized that the scientific analysis of sports data can also
contribute to the disciplines of economics, management science, and finance (Rosen
& Sanderson, 2001). For example, economists view spectator sports as an ideal lab-
oratory for empirical investigations because the outcomes are easily observable and
measurable, the subjects are experienced professional players who have clear goals
and incentives, the rules of the game are clearly defined, and the data are good and
abundant (Palacios-Huerta, 2014). Furthermore, sports-related industries like bet-
ting, video gaming, and broadcasting have also grown, opening up interesting new
areas of interdisciplinary research.
In line with the second perspective, the broad objective of this dissertation is to
contribute to a better understanding of economics by analyzing sports and sports-
related data using economic methods. This dissertation analyzes detailed tennis data
combined with betting and TV audience data. Even though the sport of tennis is the
common thread in all of the three articles presented below, it is not the focal point
of this dissertation; rather, tennis serves as a research laboratory for studying human
behavior in a real setting. Therefore, the reader of this dissertation does not need any
specific knowledge of tennis to understand its content—specific tennis terminology
will be explained when employed. Overall, our data give us the rare opportunity
to explore a number of carefully selected economic questions, which are individually
addressed in three empirical papers.
The first paper, The importance of suspense and surprise in entertainment de-
mand: Evidence from Wimbledon (see Appendix A.1—a version of this article has
been published in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization), investigates
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the behavior of TV spectators while watching live tennis and asks how the amount of
suspense and surprise at each moment of the match affect the entertainment value of
the match.
Even though we frequently face or witness situations that are suspenseful (waiting
for an important email) or surprising (receiving an unexpected gift), the empirical
and formal economic literature on the topic is, at best, scarce. However, Ely, Frankel,
and Kamenica (2015) recently contributed to filling the gap in the formal literature
by introducing a theoretical framework in which a Bayesian audience derives enter-
tainment utility (enjoyment) from anticipated changes in beliefs (suspense) and actual
changes in beliefs (surprise).1
Our article contributes to filling the gap in the empirical literature by drawing on
the model of Ely et al. and providing a novel setting in which we can measure the
amount of suspense and surprise and link these measures to live TV audience figures.
Tennis is an ideal laboratory because the level of suspense and surprise can drastically
fluctuate throughout the match. For example, important points, comebacks, and
spectacular rallies can make any moment more entertaining to watch. As viewers can
easily and at no cost switch channels to maximize their utility from viewing, short-
term variations in TV audience figures should reflect whether the audience is enjoying
a given match (Alavy, Gaskell, Leach, & Szymanski, 2010).
Our tennis-related data facilitate our empirical analysis in two ways. First, we can
operationalize suspense and surprise by using the in-play (during the match) betting
odds originating from Betfair, one of the largest online betting exchanges worldwide.
From the odds, we can derive the aggregate audience’s belief at each point in the
match about a given player’s probability of winning the match by computing the
inverse of the odds: for example, odds of 2.0 imply a 50% probability of winning
the match. In our setting, higher suspense is attributed to greater variance in the
1In a Bayesian framework, probabilities quantify personal beliefs: people form hypotheses about the occurrence of
specific events (e.g., “it will rain tomorrow”) and attach probabilities to them based on their subjective levels of belief
in these hypotheses (“with a 90% probability”).
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next period’s belief, whereas greater surprise results from the occurrence of an event
that strongly contradicts the audience’s belief. Second, we can measure the demand
for entertainment using live TV audience figures (ratings), which we match with the
suspense and surprise measures.
We use over 8,500 minute-by-minute observations from 80 men’s singles profes-
sional matches played at the Wimbledon Championships between 2009 and 2014.
Our high-frequency panel data allow us to control for time-invariant factors that
might jointly affect the audience level—like the stage of the competition, the day of
the week, or the quality of the players—by using within-match variation. Importantly,
our match fixed effects estimates show that both suspense and surprise are drivers
of media entertainment demand, confirming the general intuition that both suspense
and surprise are enjoyable features of entertainment content. Subsequent regression
analyses reveal that surprise is more important in this regard than suspense and that
both factors generate larger audiences during the later moments of a match. Finally,
we show that these results are equally valid for male and female viewers.
Overall, our results are the first that provide empirical evidence that suspense
and surprise drive media entertainment demand. Furthermore, our results have two
important implications for the entertainment industry. First, entertainment content
could be rigorously designed to increase suspense and surprise. Possible applications
include, but are not limited to, movies, TV shows and series, and video games. The
challenge remains in measuring people’s beliefs in such contexts. Nonetheless, even
for settings in which prediction markets are unavailable or where theoretical modeling
is problematic, the measurement of beliefs is feasible. For example, one might analyze
users’ posts on social media platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter, using big data
text analysis tools. Second, the timing and selling of TV advertisements could be im-
proved. As suspense and surprise enhance entertainment and simultaneously attract
human attention, commercials will be more effective following very suspenseful or
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surprising moments, thereby increasing the advertisement’s effectiveness. Therefore,
as an example, the price of a commercial during a TV broadcast like the Superbowl
(the final game of the American football season, which in 2015 had 114 million U.S.
viewers) could include a premium if shown just following a surprising moment like a
touchdown.
Finally, there are plenty of open research questions to address in this subject.
For example, using individual-level data, one could investigate how different types
of consumers react to suspense and surprise; or, using longer time-series data, one
could investigate how specific time patterns of suspense and surprise affect media
consumption.
The second paper, When do professionals play minimax? Evidence from the tennis
court (see Appendix A.2), analyzes the behavior of professional tennis players when
playing at one of the most prestigious tennis tournaments worldwide, the Wimbledon
Championships, and asks whether and when (under what conditions) professionals
play as predicted using John von Neumann’s minimax, a fundamental game theory
theorem.
In a seminal paper, O’Neill (1987) stresses the importance of testing the empirical
validity of the minimax theorem because many economic models are based on it or
its generalization, the Nash equilibrium. In general, in experimental studies, students
who played simple games such as matching pennies or card games do not play as pre-
dicted by the minimax: they do not play according to the equilibrium mixtures and
their choices are not serially independent (e.g., Rapoport & Boebel, 1992; Binmore,
Swierzbinski, & Proulx, 2001; Camerer, 2003; Levitt, List, & Reiley, 2010). In con-
trast, previous investigations have established that the strategic behavior of players
who are both experienced and have high incentives (like professional sport players) is
somewhat closer to that predicted by the minimax theorem (Palacios-Huerta & Volij,
2008).
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Tennis data provide a valuable opportunity for empirically testing the minimax
theorem. We use professional tennis and model the tennis serve as a two-person zero-
sum simultaneous mixed-strategy game: in this game, the server aims to maximize
the expected probability of scoring a point on the serve, and the receiver aims to
minimize this probability. Both the server and the receiver have two strategies: to
play left or right. Even though this model simplifies the available strategies that both
players have—like the serve speed, depth, and type (slice, topspin, etc.)—it provides
an important opportunity to test the two minimax predictions in a real setting.
Walker and Wooders (2001) analyze 10 men’s matches and find that the players’
behavior is consistent only with prediction (1), i.e., that the winning probabilities
across choices are equal, whereas Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007) analyze 10 different
men’s matches and show that the players’ behavior is consistent with prediction (1)
and prediction (2), i.e., that players’ choices are random. In contrast to these studies,
we use a larger and significantly more heterogeneous sample of tennis matches and
show that the players’ behavior is consistent only with prediction (2).
A common property of Walker and Wooders (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007) is that
these studies both focus only on testing whether the observed behavior of professional
athletes is “close enough” to the theoretical predictions to be considered consistent
with minimax. However, they do not address the important question as to when—
under which conditions—players deviate more (or less) from the minimax predictions.
Such an investigation is important for understanding how the players’ behavior differs
under, for example, stress or fatigue, or when playing against opponents with different
skills.
This article contributes to filling this gap by showing that professionals have a
tendency to play toward minimax in matches between right-handed players (versus
matches with a left-handed player), in the later sets of a match, in shorter matches,
and especially in unbalanced matches (between players with different skills). Most
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importantly, further analyses show that the behavior of top-ranked servers is less
consistent with minimax when they face non-top-ranked receivers. While this result
appears surprising at first glance, we can show that top servers would decrease their
likelihood of winning a match by playing closer to minimax against non-top receivers;
therefore, deviating is a rational response.
Taken together, our article makes three contributions. First, we provide a more
powerful test of the predictions of the minimax theorem using a significantly larger
and more heterogeneous sample than previous studies. Second, we show under which
specific conditions the players’ behavior is closer to minimax. Here, further research
is needed to clarify how the specific conditions of tennis are generalizable: for exam-
ple, how do our results for the “later sets of a match” subsample apply to general
situations under pressure? Third, our results underline the importance of controlling
for differences in the players’ skill levels. Therefore, future lab experiments should
determine whether the participants have similar or different skill levels for the games
that are played.
The third paper, What is the effect of insider trading on price efficiency? Evidence
from a betting exchange (see Appendix A.3), studies the behavior of a group of betting
traders who have a fleeting informational advantage with respect to other traders, so-
called insider traders. This paper asks to what extent insider trading affects the
efficiency of security prices on a betting exchange.
Researchers and regulators have long debated about both the fairness and the
economic implications of insider trading. Concerning the latter, which is the focus of
our article, the key issue involves the assessment of the impact of insider trading on
price efficiency. However, little empirical evidence has been collected because insider
trading on material, pricing-relevant information is illegal in most financial markets.
The only exceptions are the works of Cornell and Sirri (1992), Meulbroek (1992), and
Chakravarty and McConnell (1997), which analyze the market’s reaction to illegal
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insider trades (the data originate from criminal and civil litigation reports) and show
that insider trades lead to more rapid price discovery. However, Chakravarty and
McConnell (1999) disputed these studies by showing, using a refined methodology to
re-analyze the data of those previous studies, that the effect of insider trades on prices
is not discernibly different from that of non-insider trades. Thus, the evidence on the
topic is generally limited and mixed. Our paper’s contribution is that it provides a
simpler setting that allows us to overcome the difficulties of previous investigations.
One key advantage of our in-play tennis-betting setting comes from the inevitable
technical delay in the transmission of match information from the stadium to end
receivers. Media studies, bettors, and Betfair indicate that the “live” TV images and
internet scoreboards are delayed by at least five seconds. Insider traders sitting in
the stadium, so-called courtsiders, have an informational advantage as they observe
important information at least five seconds before outsiders. Therefore, any price
movement observed within five seconds after an important informational event can be
attributed to insider trading activity.
To quantify the impact of insider trading activity on the price discovery after
important news events, we use detailed second-by-second data from two major tennis
tournaments, the French Open and the Wimbledon Championships, over the 2009–
2014 period. An important event in tennis is the end of a set because winning a set
constitutes a decisive step toward victory. Knowing which player wins the set earlier
than the public means holding an informational advantage since that information is
material.
Using event study methods, we find that the cumulative abnormal returns averaged
across the 365 event observations start increasing immediately after the set event time,
which demonstrates the existence of insider traders, and stabilizes after approximately
seven seconds. Most importantly, we show that the cumulative abnormal return
during the first five insider trading seconds following the set events—when the TV
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and other slower traders have not yet seen the event—is more than 60% of the full
price reaction observed once the public receives the new information. Furthermore,
we show that the the impact of insider trading is even larger for unanticipated news
events, like tie-break set events, when inside information is more valuable. Finally, we
estimate that a simple dynamic back-lay trading strategy implemented in the seconds
after the event yields large risk-free profits to insiders, varying between 5% and 7%.
Overall, our results are important because they provide empirical evidence from a
simple but advantageous setting that insider trading significantly contributes to higher
price efficiency and thus market quality. Insider traders have large financial incentives
to rapidly integrate new information into the market. Overall, when debating the
effects of insider trading on a betting exchange as well as on any financial market,
the negative externalities from the adverse selection costs to slower traders should be
weighed against the positive externalities from greater price efficiency.
In conclusion, this dissertation shows—in addition to the individual contributions
of the three papers—how the economic analysis of sports and sports-related data can
contribute novel scientific knowledge. Whenever appropriate data in classical eco-
nomic, financial, or managerial areas are difficult to find or are unsuitable, researchers
should look at the world of sports because of the availability of abundant high-quality
data. The following three articles contribute to the emerging strand of literature on
sports economics whose goal is to broaden our understanding of economics through
the analysis of human behavior in sports and sports-related areas. The papers also
put forwards a number of opportunities for further research in the hope that more
researchers will join this exciting field.
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Appendix: Papers included in this dissertation

A.1
The importance of suspense and surprise in
entertainment demand:
Evidence from Wimbledon†
Paolo Bizzozero, Raphael Flepp, Egon Franck
Abstract
This paper empirically examines how suspense and surprise affect the de-
mand for entertainment. We use a tennis tournament, the Wimbledon Cham-
pionships, as a natural laboratory. This setting allows us to both operationalize
suspense and surprise by using the audience’s beliefs regarding the outcome of
the match and observe the demand for live entertainment using TV audience
figures. Our match fixed effects estimates of 8,563 minute-by-minute observa-
tions from 80 men’s singles matches between 2009 and 2014 show that both
suspense and surprise are drivers of media entertainment demand. In general,
surprise seems to be more important in this regard than suspense, and both
factors matter more during a match’s later moments. We discuss important
implications for the design of entertainment content to maximize entertainment
demand.
JEL Classification: D83, L82, L83
Keywords: Suspense, surprise, entertainment, TV audience, betting odds, tennis
†Reprinted from Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 130, Bizzozero, P., Flepp, R., & Franck, E., The
importance of suspense and surprise in entertainment demand: Evidence from Wimbledon, 47–63, Copyright (2016),
with permission from Elsevier. 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.006
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1 Introduction
Media entertainment plays an important role in people’s daily lives. Vorderer, Klimmt,
and Ritterfeld (2004) describe media entertainment as enjoyment from consuming
media content, whether at home or at an outside venue. Given that entertainment
providers are facing stiffer competition in the entertainment market, understanding
precisely what factors drive the demand for entertainment content is of critical im-
portance.
Previous studies have identified suspense and surprise as two major determinants
of enjoyment associated with media consumption (e.g., Zillmann, 1991, 1996; Vorderer
et al., 2004). The online Cambridge English Dictionary defines suspense as “a feel-
ing of excitement or anxiety while waiting for something uncertain to happen” and
surprise as “an unexpected event, or the feeling caused when something unexpected
happens.” Importantly, both occur exclusively in situations in which there is concern
over uncertain outcomes (Comisky & Bryant, 1982).
Suspense and surprise are best understood and modeled in a Bayesian setting
(Ely et al., 2015). In this setting, probabilities quantify personal beliefs: people
form hypotheses about the occurrence of specific events (e.g., “it will rain tomorrow”)
and attach probabilities to them based on their subjective levels of belief in these
hypotheses (“with a 90% probability”). In the Bayesian view, people will transform
their prior beliefs into posterior beliefs when new and relevant information arrives
(Itti & Baldi, 2009). This continuous process of forming and updating beliefs leads to
entertainment based on the experience of suspense and surprise, where suspense and
surprise are the forward- and backward-looking emotions, respectively.
Suspense evolves through the assessment of future events, with a moment carrying
more suspense when some crucial uncertainty is soon to be resolved (Vorderer et al.,
2013), such as a researcher opening a letter with the committee’s decision on his or
her research grant application. By contrast, surprise evolves by assessing past events,
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with a moment carrying more surprise immediately after an unexpected event occurs
(Itti & Baldi, 2009), such as after an underdog soccer team scoring the winning goal.
Although it is intuitive that suspense and surprise matter in the context of en-
tertainment, empirical tests are difficult to design because people’s beliefs and their
enjoyment are hard to observe. Moreover, little is known about the importance of
suspense relative to surprise or about their importance with respect to the passage
of time. In this paper, we address these questions by employing high-frequency data
from a tennis tournament, the Wimbledon Championships, which offers our research
two unique advantages.
The first advantage is that we can quantify the audience’s beliefs because modeling
tennis situations is possible. In tennis, a Bayesian audience forms beliefs about the
final outcome of the match, i.e., about the likelihood that a particular player will
win a particular match.1 We estimate the relevant beliefs at the point-by-point level
in two ways: first, we use a Markov model that requires the player’s probability of
winning a service point and the current score as inputs; second, we use in-play betting
odds.
The second advantage that tennis offers is that the demand for entertainment is
observed using high-frequency minute-by-minute live TV audience figures (ratings)
during the matches. As viewers can easily—and at no cost—switch channels or turn
off the TV to maximize their utility from viewing, short-term variations in TV audi-
ence figures reflect whether the audience is enjoying a given match (Alavy, Gaskell,
Leach, & Szymanski, 2010). By using minute-by-minute information regarding ag-
gregate viewers’ behavior, we can uncover an audience’s underlying preferences for
entertainment in a real-world environment.2
1The same idea can be applied in other settings. For example, people assign probabilities to the hypothesis that a
president will be reelected, that a mission will succeed, or that a company’s earnings will beat analysts’ consen-
sus estimates. What differentiates tennis from other settings is the frequency with which events happen and new
information is revealed.
2TV remains the central provider of entertainment content despite the increasing supply of entertainment available
on the Internet. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, individuals aged 15 and over watched TV for 2.8
hours per day on average in 2013, accounting for more than half of their leisure time.
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This paper contributes to the literature by presenting an analysis of unique and
naturally occurring field data that provide a rare opportunity to empirically investi-
gate the importance of suspense and surprise when consuming a media entertainment
product. Our empirical analyses reveal that both suspense and surprise have a posi-
tive effect on entertainment demand. Using 8,563 minute-by-minute observations from
80 men’s singles matches between 2009 and 2014, our match fixed effects estimates
reveal that minutes with more surprise and suspense have significantly higher live TV
ratings. This result indicates that suspense and surprise are complementary and that
demand for entertainment is stronger for higher levels of suspense and surprise. In
particular, a one standard deviation increase in suspense (surprise) is associated with
an audience increase of approximately 1,200 (2,200) viewers per minute. For some
perspective, the minute-level effect of a one standard deviation increase in suspense
and surprise combined corresponds roughly to a 3% audience increase (based on an av-
erage audience of approximately 100,000 viewers in our sample). Although we cannot
compare our results with those from previous studies, our estimates suggest that the
impact of suspense and surprise on TV audience figures is economically non-trivial.
Moreover, we find that the audience impact of surprise is consistently greater
than that for suspense: depending on the model used for computing the audience’s
beliefs, the estimated effects for surprise are between two and five times greater than
those for suspense. Hence, surprise appears to be more important than suspense in
entertainment demand. In addition, over the course of a match, the impact of both
suspense and surprise clearly increases. This implies that the entertainment effect of
suspense and surprise is larger when the stakes are higher.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to test Bayesian theory on
suspense jointly with surprise under natural conditions. We provide a framework that
entertainment industry managers can use to measure an audience’s beliefs, which can
then be used to measure entertainment from suspense and surprise. Although in
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tennis there is not much room for artificially increasing suspense and surprise, the
implications of our study are far more important for other entertainment settings in
which content can be designed ad hoc to increase the public’s enjoyment. Designers
of films, TV series, TV shows, online videos, novels, or gambling games should be
aware of people’s preferences for suspense and surprise, their increasing significance
towards the end of a media event, and the greater importance of surprise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture. Section 3 describes our setting and data. Section 4 outlines the operationaliza-
tion of suspense and surprise and our empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the
empirical results and various robustness checks. Section 6 discusses several implica-
tions and concludes.
2 Literature review
The theoretical literature on suspense and surprise is limited. Yet Ely et al. (2015) re-
cently filled this gap by introducing a framework in which a Bayesian audience derives
entertainment utility (enjoyment) from anticipated changes in beliefs (suspense) and
actual changes in beliefs (surprise). In the model developed by these authors, higher
suspense results from greater variance in the next period’s beliefs—what is currently
happening versus what is expected to happen next—and higher surprise results from
greater distance between previous and current beliefs.
However, no study has yet empirically investigated the relationship between sus-
pense, surprise and enjoyment. Most of the relevant studies are laboratory experi-
ments that focus either on suspense or surprise. For example, Bryant et al. (1994)
recorded a football match and manipulated its commentary to create a high-suspense
version and a low-suspense version. After having watched one of these two versions,
participants were given a questionnaire and asked to rate their enjoyment on a scale
from 0 to 10. The results from Bryant et al. (1994) show that viewing the high-
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suspense version was significantly more enjoyable and exciting. Su-lin et al. (1997)
and Peterson and Raney (2008), using students as participants, examine suspense as
a factor in the enjoyment of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) men’s
basketball games. Both studies operationalize suspense as the final point differential
in a game and enjoyment as the average of seven different items (e.g., “the game
excited me” or “I enjoyed the game”) that are rated on a scale from 0 to 10. Their
results show that higher suspense leads to greater enjoyment.
In an experimental setting, Itti and Baldi (2009) test whether surprise attracts the
attention of participants when watching one of several videoclips, including television
broadcasts, such as news, sports, commercials, and outdoor scenes. They define sur-
prise in Bayesian terms as the distance between the prior and posterior distributions of
beliefs, and they employ eye-tracking technology to measure attention. Their results
demonstrate that surprise explains the greatest portion of human eye movements,
indicating that humans are attracted to surprising elements in video displays.3 More-
over, in a laboratory setting, Alwitt (2002) finds that viewers perceive suspenseful
TV commercials as shorter, attributing this effect to the viewers’ intensified attention
and interest.
In the sports economics literature, in particular, suspense has been often associ-
ated with “uncertainty of outcome.” The uncertainty of outcome hypothesis posits
that more uncertainty about the final winner of a sports competition leads to more
suspense (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). Alavy et al. (2010) use minute-by-minute
audience figures from 248 English Premier League matches to measure the effect of
outcome uncertainty on entertainment demand. They find that matches with less
probability of ending in a draw—but also with less score differential between teams—
generate more viewers. In a sports-related article, Olson and Stone (2014) model
viewers’ entertainment as a function of suspense to evaluate whether the introduction
3Baldi and Itti (2010) build on these results and provide further evidence of this relationship. For a recent review of
studies on the surprise-attention link, see Horstmann (2015).
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of post-season playoffs in U.S. college football would be an improvement over the
current system. Using match-level Nielsen ratings over 2011–2013 for 70 football and
basketball matches, they show that the level of viewers’ entertainment significantly
increases with the championship’s suspense level.
3 Setting and data
Clearly, a tennis match provides many moments of various levels of suspense and
surprise: comebacks, break points, tie-breaks, injuries, and spectacular rallies can
make any moment entertaining, whereas unimportant points can make any moment
less entertaining to watch.4 We use the 2009 Wimbledon men’s final between Andy
Roddick and Roger Federer as our illustrative example. After winning the first set,
Roddick had four set points in the second set, putting him only one set away from the
championship. However, supported by his strong service, Federer won all of Roddick’s
set points and eventually won the set. Because the audience had to strongly readjust
its beliefs about Federer’s chances of winning, we describe such circumstances as
surprising. In the final set, which is played until one player wins at least six games by
at least a two-game spread, Federer finally won 16–14 in a set that lasted more than
90 minutes. Because each point could potentially bring a player’s winning probability
very close to either zero or one, we describe such circumstances as suspenseful.
Our definition of suspense and surprise is best understood in a Bayesian framework.
Simply put, a Bayesian audience has some current beliefs, based on the information
currently available, about a specific uncertain outcome. Upon the arrival of new, rele-
vant information, the audience will update its beliefs, which are then called posterior
beliefs. In tennis, viewers form and continuously update their beliefs about the “hy-
pothesis” that a given player might win the match. To quantify moments of various
4In the Appendix A.1, Part I briefly describes the rules of tennis and its jargon.
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levels of suspense and surprise, we must therefore estimate the relevant beliefs at the
point-by-point level. We do this using two methods.
In the Markov chain method, we rely on the explicit structure of the data-generating
process in tennis. In tennis, points are linked to games, games to sets, and sets to
matches; thus, a match can be modeled as a binary Markov chain (Newton & Aslam,
2009; O’Malley, 2008).5 We estimate the unique belief path for each match using
a computer program that computes the likelihood of winning the match for a given
player point-by-point over the match.6 The only input for this simple model is the
score and the probability of winning a point on serve. Detailed match data at the
point level are provided by IBM, the official supplier of information technology to the
Wimbledon Championships. Beyond general information about the match, such as
the players, courts, start and end match times, these data also contain point-by-point
information on the current score, time (exact to the second), server, and winner.
In the betting odds method, we rely on the information content of in-play betting
odds from in-play betting markets. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that betting
odds provide valuable estimates of average, aggregate beliefs about the probability
that an event will occur. The odds originate from Betfair, one of the largest online
betting markets, and are provided by Fracsoft, a data vendor.7 Betfair’s online plat-
form provides a market for opinions and for participants to bet against one another
by offering and accepting odds under which they are willing to buy or sell a certain
bet. Bettors mostly follow the match live on TV or on other electronic devices and
continuously place their bets during the match: whenever new information becomes
observable, they update their beliefs, and the odds change accordingly.
5Walker et al. (2011, p. 490) illustrate the binary Markov scoring rule for a game of tennis. Moreover, Liu (2001) and
Barnett and Clarke (2005) propose similar ways of modeling the probability of winning a match.
6The software program, described in Klaassen and Magnus (2014), is called “Richard” and is freely available online at
http://www.janmagnus.nl/misc/wimbledon.pdf with detailed instructions.
7Trading volumes on Betfair are very large. For example, 1.2 billion bets were placed in 2014, resulting in a total
trading value of roughly $92 billion. Croxson and Reade (2014) estimate that the daily trading intensity on Betfair
during the 2005–2007 period was greater than the daily trading intensity on all the major European Stock Exchanges
combined. With regard to our sample, we observe an average total trading volume of $28.5 million per match, 70%
of which was placed in-play. Approximately $78 million worth of bets were placed on the 2014 Wimbledon men’s
final alone, and 92% of that amount was placed in-play.
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Importantly, as the Markov belief is based on the actual score and on the server’s
probability of winning a point, the in-play betting odds belief should be more accurate.
In fact, odds would reflect not only the newest information, such as a player’s injury,
but also a number of historical factors, such as a player’s performance record on grass
courts or previous head-to-head records between the players. In this sense, we consider
the betting odds method as the main specification.8 The odds enable us to derive the
aggregate market’s belief at each point in the match about a given player’s probability
of winning the match. Indeed, the inverse of the odds on the expected match winner
can be interpreted as the aggregate current belief about a player’s match winning
probability (Hasbrouck, 1991).
To measure entertainment demand, we gather high-frequency TV audience rat-
ings over the 2009–2014 period on all Wimbledon men’s singles matches that were
transmitted live on the Swiss national German-language channels Schweizer Fernse-
hen Zwei (SRF2) and Schweizer Fernsehen Info (SRFinfo), two of the largest Swiss
broadcaster’s free channels.9 In Switzerland, Wimbledon—and tennis as a whole—
enjoys good TV coverage. Overall, SRF broadcasted 108 Wimbledon men’s singles
matches between 2009 and 2014. In our analysis, we exclude 28 matches: three
matches are excluded because no betting data is available, whereas 25 partially and
shortly transmitted matches are excluded because of potential spillover effects in the
audience ratings caused by the preceding and following TV programs.10
Mediapulse, a Swiss ratings firm essentially equivalent to Nielsen, generates audi-
ence statistics using survey data from a panel encompassing 1,870 households across
8We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
9Whereas SRF2 focuses on either live or recorded sports programming, SRFinfo chiefly rebroadcasts programs from
SRF1 (the first national channel) and SRF2. However, it also occasionally acts as a complementary channel for live
sportscasts in the event of programming conflicts. On average, in our sample, SRF2 has 112, 515 viewers, whereas
SRFinfo has 45, 853 viewers.
10Although the average duration of the excluded matches is only 14 minutes, one might worry that the exclusion of
25 matches introduces a selection bias because the broadcaster might stop broadcasting matches with low suspense,
low surprise, or both. As we cannot compute the levels of suspense and surprise due to IBM data unavailability,
we examine the TV channel content description (the list is available upon request) and also directly asked the
broadcaster. We discovered that the broadcaster cannot observe live audience figures: as a result, programming
decisions do not depend on such live audience figures. It rather appears that the broadcaster filled programming
“gaps” with some scenes from these 25 matches.
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Switzerland, which contains approximately 4,200 people three years of age and over.
As the advertising industry also uses Mediapulse’s data, the panel must meet strict
requirements to reflect the Swiss population as accurately and representatively as
possible (see Appendix A.2 for further details). TV audience ratings measure the
total number of single viewers watching the channel at each moment. For example, a
rating of 122,500 indicates that 122,500 single viewers were tuned into the program
on average during a particular minute. For any minute when more people tune into
the tennis match (either from another channel or by turning on the TV) than turn
off the match, the rating will increase.
Our final data set consists of roughly 8,500 minute-by-minute observations on
detailed match statistics, in-play betting odds, and live TV ratings. In Table 1, Panel
A reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variable audience on the 80 matches
in the final sample. An average match has an audience of slightly more than 106,000
spectators, corresponding to a market share of 16.9%. Panel B additionally shows
that audience is larger at later tournament stages. Our sample is heterogeneous,
containing matches from the first stage up to the finals and a total of 58 unique
players. An average match lasts 150 minutes, consists of 220 points and 3.6 sets, and
each set consists of 10 games. Late tournament matches are longer, as they typically
are more balanced.
4 Estimation approach
4.1 Suspense and surprise
The Markov method
The construction of suspense and surprise closely follows the work of Ely et al. (2015),
in which the entertainment utility of the Bayesian audience is a function of the Markov
belief path. First, we model suspense in the form of an expectation, where higher
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the audience and sample characteristics.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable Description N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
audience TV Rating 8,563 106.47 136.81 1.77 1,083.7












1st stage 12 117 186 3.2 9.4 44.0
2nd stage 14 121 189 3.2 9.6 55.2
3rd stage 12 147 223 3.7 9.4 75.8
4th stage 10 155 220 3.6 9.9 83.2
Quarterfinal 14 167 240 3.8 10.2 87.4
Semifinal 12 169 236 3.7 10.5 89.1
Final 6 202 274 4.0 11.3 362.8
Full sample 80 150 220 3.6 10.0 106.4
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the 80 men’s singles matches played at Wimbledon between 2009
and 2014. Panel A describes the TV audience ratings (in thousands, except for N), whereas Panel B provides the
means of additional match characteristics (by tournament stage and for the full sample).





(µωp+1 − µp)2]1/2, (1)
where µp refers to the current player’s probability of winning the match (the current
belief) at the moment when point p is scored and µωp+1 refers to the anticipated
posterior probability of a player’s winning the match. The posterior belief depends
on the realization of state ω, which in this setting is a binary variable: ω = 1 when
the server i wins the point (with probability Si) or ω = 0 when he loses it (with
probability 1 − Si). Thus, we can rewrite Eq. (1) as follows:
SUSMarkovp = [Si · (E[µ1p+1] − µp)2 + (1 − Si) · (E[µ0p+1] − µp)2]1/2. (2)
Because only one state occurs in reality, we also estimate the counterfactual posterior
belief, defined as the probability of winning the match for the unobserved state. To
do so, we replace the actual score with the counterfactual score in the Markov model.
For example, if player i actually serves and wins the first point of the match (ω = 1),
11In the Appendix A.3, Part I illustrates how we compute SUSMarkovp and SUR
Markov
p with a numerical example.
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the counterfactual belief is computed by assuming that he lost the first point.12 The
player’s probability of winning a service point (Si) is computed for each player in our
sample based on historical data from the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP)
website.13 To obtain accurate predictions from the model, we set µ0, i.e., the winning
probability at the beginning of the match (p = 0), equal to the corresponding odds-
implied probability.14
Second, we model surprise in the form of the Euclidean distance between the prior
belief and the current belief, where greater surprise results from the occurrence of
an event that strongly contradicts the audience’s belief, constraining the audience to
change its beliefs (Itti & Baldi, 2009). For the point p:
SURMarkovp = |µp − µp−1|, (3)
where µp−1 refers to the probability of winning the match for a player one point earlier.
The betting odds method
The construction of suspense and surprise based on betting odds is straightforward
and similar to the Markov method. Following Hasbrouck (1991), we compute the
average mid-odds from the best buy oddsbackip and sell odds
lay
ip for player i for each







from which we derive the implied winning probability for player i:




13In the Appendix A.1, Part II provides further details regarding how we compute Si.






Although the sum of the winning market probability for player i and player j (ν̃ip+ν̃jp)
should sum up to one in a frictionless market, in practice it rarely does so because
of transaction costs. Following the standard approach to eliminating this overround
(e.g., Forrest et al., 2005), we adjust the implied winning probability to obtain the





As the change in the implied winning probability is symmetric, the choice of which
player’s probability of winning to consider is irrelevant, so we can drop the player
subscript i.
First, we define surprise for point p as follows:
SURoddsp = |νp − νp−1|, (7)
where νp refers to the current player’s probability of winning the match (the odds-
implied current belief) at point p and νp−1 refers to the odds-implied prior belief at
the point p − 1. The only difference from Eq. (3) involves the type of data used.
Second, as we cannot implement the baseline metric of suspense by relying entirely
on betting odds, we redefine the baseline suspense measure, but only slightly. By
definition, betting odds reflect bettors’ current beliefs at any point in the match,
based on a given information set. However, we do not know which value the odds
would have taken had the next point gone differently, i.e., the counterfactual posterior
belief. Therefore, we come up with a “hybrid” implementation of the baseline suspense
measure in which we use the Markov chain model only to determine the counterfactual
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posterior belief (E[µωp+1]) for the unobserved state. Because the audience must also
estimate the counterfactual probability, this procedure is suitable for our purposes.











[Si · (νp+1 − νp)2 + (1 − Si) · (E[µ0p+1] − νp)2]1/2 if ω = 1,
[Si · (E[µ1p+1] − νp)2 + (1 − Si) · (νp+1 − νp)2]1/2 if ω = 0.
(8)
Against the backdrop of Eq. (2), we now substitute the Markov current belief µp
with the odds-implied current belief νp. Concerning the posterior beliefs, we must
distinguish between the states ω: when the server wins the service point (ω = 1),
we substitute E[µ1p+1] with the actual odds-implied posterior belief νp+1, and we use
the Markov posterior belief for the counterfactual (E[µ0p+1]); when the server loses the
service point (ω = 0), we substitute E[µ0p+1] with the actual odds-implied posterior
belief νp+1, while we use the Markov posterior belief for the counterfactual (E[µ
1
p+1]).
Finally, because we observe minute-by-minute variation in the TV audience, we
translate suspense and surprise from point level to minute level by computing the
average suspense or surprise over the minute during which more than one point is
scored within a minute.15
A comparison of the Markov and the betting odds beliefs
Fig. 1 shows the belief paths regarding Novak Djokovic’s chance to win the match
he played against Roger Federer on 7th June, 2014. The black line shows the belief
path computed using the betting odds, whereas the grey line shows the Markov belief
path. Both beliefs start at 60%, the implied probability of winning from the in-play
betting odds—apparently, the bettors thought Djokovic was the favorite—and end at
100% for Djokovic, who won the final in five sets.
Notably, the belief path from the Markov model highly correlates (0.991) with the be-
15We also test an alternative method that considers only the last point scored in any minute when more than one


































Displayed are the belief paths about Novak Djokovic’s chance to win his 7th June, 2014 match against Roger Federer.
Djokovic won in five sets with the score: 6–7; 6–4; 7–6; 5–7; 6–4. A total of $72 million was bet in-play on this
Wimbledon final.
lief path extracted from the betting odds. Allegedly, professional bettors also strongly
rely on computer programs to estimate the underlying player’s winning probability
during a match (Hutchins, 2014). Nonetheless, the Markov and betting odds belief
paths might slightly diverge due to the arrival of new, relevant information beyond
server and score, such as the signs of an injury, weather changes, or the stadium at-
mosphere.16 However, because suspense and surprise are computed from changes in
beliefs, the size of the vertical gap between the odds belief and the Markov belief is
irrelevant—it is much more important that the beliefs are positively correlated.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the suspense and surprise variables. Means
16Another cause might rely on match-fixing. In January 2016, BBC and BuzzFeed News uncovered evidence of
widespread suspected match-fixing in tennis, including some matches at Wimbledon (see, for example, the article of
Simon Cox at www.bbc.co.uk/sport/tennis/35319202). Because match-fixing could bias the betting odds, it could
also bias the odds-derived belief of a player’s winning probability. However, we believe that our results are not
systematically affected for two main reasons: first, the report refers to events from approximately ten years earlier
(two matches listed in the report are from 27 June 2006 and 26 June 2007), i.e., a period not covered by our sample,
and second, although some of our matches may have been the subject of match-fixing without our knowledge, our
suspense and surprise measures are based on changes in the winning probability, not on absolute levels.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of suspense and surprise.
Variable Description N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
SUSMarkov Suspense based on Markov 8,563 0.0149 0.0410 1.93e-07 0.2121
SURMarkov Surprise based on Markov 8,563 0.0122 0.0179 0 0.2717
SUSodds Suspense based on betting odds 8,563 0.0233 0.0256 4.99e-07 0.2601
SURodds Surprise based on betting odds 8,563 0.0129 0.0197 0 0.3097
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the 80 men’s singles matches played at Wimbledon between 2009
and 2014, for a total of 8,563 minutes of live tennis.
and standard deviations of suspense and surprise are comparable between models,
although both are slightly higher when computed with the odds-derived belief. The
correlation between suspense and surprise is 0.36 (0.38) for the Markov chain (betting
odds) method. Finally, we observe that suspense and surprise increase over the stages
of the tournament.17
4.2 Empirical methodology
The type of data used in this study presents two advantages with respect to the
estimation methods. First, our panel data allow us to control for time-invariant factors
that might jointly affect the audience level by using within-match variation. Those
factors might be the stage of the competition, the day of the week, or the quality of
the players.18 Second, as opposed to stadium attendance, short-term TV audience
variation is not affected by factors such as supply capacity, gate price, location, or
weather conditions (Borland & MacDonald, 2003; Alavy et al., 2010).
Simultaneously, to account for other characteristics that are subject to change
during a match that might affect the minute-by-minute TV ratings, we use several
control variables. To begin with, we introduce time dummies that correspond to the
elapsed time (in minutes) from the start of the match. This allows us to control for any
time-related audience differences in a flexible manner. Because all channels offer their
17Descriptive statistics of the main variables at the tournament-stage level are provided in the Appendix A.3, Part II.
18Rodríguez et al. (2015) illustrate the importance of including a large set of control variables when examining
aggregate TV audience measures. As their dependent variable is the average TV audience over the length of the
program (they analyze professional cycling races), they also control for, among other things, calendar variables, the
scheduling of rival channels, and the competitive balance before the race.
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best TV content in the evening hours, potentially turning viewers away from tennis,
we introduce a primetime dummy, which takes the value of one for all the minutes
after 8:00 p.m. and zero otherwise.19 Intuitively, the coefficient for primetime should
be negative.
Due to the popular news program on SRF1 (the first national channel), the TV
audience level of SRF2 might drop as viewers switch to the newscast. Therefore, we
construct the news indicator variable, which equals one for any minute between 5:58–
6:06 p.m. and between 7:28–7:56 p.m., indicating the first short newscast (6:00–6:05
p.m.) and the following long one (7:30–7:55 p.m.), respectively, and zero otherwise.
Intuitively, the coefficient for news should be negative. Other programs are not likely
to systematically affect the audience variation, particularly because the matches take
place at various times of the day, from Monday through Sunday. As Alavy et al. (2010)
note, minor variations in audience might be due to channel hoppers. Nonetheless,
these authors argue that any moment providing high entertainment should attract
even channel hoppers and keep them watching, thus reducing the noise from their
behavior.
To allow the players to rest and switch sides of the court, small breaks take place
after odd-numbered games and between sets. As these breaks may cause viewers
to briefly stop watching, we introduce the pause indicator variable, which equals
one during the break and zero otherwise.20 The pause variable is needed only for
the regression based on betting odds. By construction, the suspense and surprise
measures computed with the Markov model are missing during the break because the
score does not change.
Regarding the estimation model, as the Wooldridge test evidenced autocorrelation
19The results are robust to several alternative definitions of primetime, e.g., 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
20TV broadcasters also use certain breaks for showing commercials. However, we do not insert an advertising dummy
because the pause dummy also captures the effect of viewers switching channels to skip the advertising. To identify
time-outs for advertising, we examine the channel content description for SRF2 and SRFinfo, which lists all the
programs broadcast and their exact start and end times. Commercial breaks occur on average on a 35-minute basis
for all non-finals matches and on a 20-minute basis for the finals. As SRF2 is a national public channel, the amount
of advertising is limited by law.
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in the audience ratings, we add four lags of audience into the regression equation
(Wooldridge, 2010). We therefore estimate a dynamic model by applying the Arellano-
Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) technique, as the GMM estimators are
consistent estimators for dynamic panels (Arellano & Bover, 1995).
Our baseline regression model is specified as follows:
audiencei,t = α0 + β1 · SUSi,t + β2 · SURi,t





θk · audiencei,t−k + time dummies + υi + ui,t ,
(9)
where the subscripts i and t denote match and minute, respectively, and υi denote
the match fixed effects. The dependent variable audiencei,t represents the match i’s
average live TV audience level at minute t,
∑4
k=1 audiencei,t−k the four lags of the
dependent variable, and time dummies represent the minutes elapsed since the begin-
ning of the match. The coefficients of interest are β1 for suspense (SUS) and β2 for
surprise (SUR). For all regressions, we use robust standard errors that are clustered




Before we turn to the estimation results of Eq. (9), we report the results of a univari-
ate analysis of our data. Due to programming conflicts, the broadcasting of tennis
is sometimes switched from SRFinfo to SRF2 or vice versa. These switches occur
independently of the standing of the current match and thus independently of the















































Displayed is the evolution of the TV audience ratings around an exogenous channel switch. The match between
Federer and Benneteau was initially broadcasted on SRFinfo and then switched to SRF2 at 9:35 p.m, as indicated by
the vertical dotted line. For about three minutes, both channels showed the same content. The SRF2 and the SRFinfo
are two free Swiss national channels.
third-round match between Roger Federer and Julien Benneteau, initially broadcast
on SRFinfo and then switched to SRF2 at 9:35 p.m. Clearly, the audience switched
channels to follow the match, indicating that the audience was actively following.
However, the relevant question is whether the size of the audience change depends
on the levels of suspense and surprise during the previous minutes. To answer this
question, we identify eight switches that occurred during the broadcast of matches
in our sample. For each switch, we can define the precise moment when the live
broadcast was interrupted and then continued on the other channel. We measure
the jump in ratings on the channel where the broadcast is continued by taking the
difference between the average 15-minute ratings preceding and following the switch.
We sum SUSMarkov and SURMarkov over 15 minutes before the switch, sum the two
totals, and compute the median. We create two groups based on whether suspense
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and surprise were above or below the median. Intuitively, if the 15 minutes before the
switch offered above-median (below-median) entertainment, this should be reflected
in a larger (smaller) jump in the TV audience on the post-switch channel.
We use the Wilcoxon rank sum test to compare differences in TV audience vari-
ation after a broadcaster-initiated channel switch between groups with low and high
suspense and surprise. We find that the group with below-median suspense and
surprise shows an increase in TV audience of 29,900 viewers, while the group with
above-median suspense and surprise shows an increase in TV audience of 99,450 view-
ers (z = 2.309, p < 0.05).21 Overall, this finding provides not only evidence for an
active audience assumption but also preliminary and suggestive evidence supporting
the hypothesis that a TV program’s level of entertainment, measured in terms of
suspense and surprise, affects its performance in terms of audience.
5.2 Regression analysis
Table 3 reports regression estimates for the effects of suspense and surprise on TV
audience ratings. The Arellano-Bond tests for autoregressive errors yield the expected
results (Arellano & Bover, 1995): autocorrelation exists in the first lag but not in the
second. Additionally, the Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions support the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
Overall, the results are in line with the hypothesis that moments that offer more
suspense and surprise generate more entertainment demand. Columns (1)–(3) show
the results for suspense and surprise measures based on the Markov chain model.
Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate that suspense and surprise each have a positive
effect on TV ratings. Column (3) shows that even when we include both variables
together, suspense and surprise remain significant predictors for the TV audience.
This result indicates that suspense and surprise are both driving forces behind media
21The results are similar when using suspense and surprise from the betting odds method.
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Table 3
The effect of suspense and surprise on TV audience.
Dependent variable: audience
Markov Betting odds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SUS 46.542*** 30.803*** 56.867*** 44.512***
(12.883) (10.122) (16.824) (15.472)
SUR 172.861*** 146.984*** 144.051*** 95.404***
(28.570) (29.401) (30.355) (31.081)
primetime 0.463 0.870 1.064 0.871 0.904 1.167
(0.412) (0.687) (0.660) (0.631) (0.751) (0.770)
news -1.692*** -1.511*** -1.448** -1.719*** -1.775*** -1.603**
(0.531) (0.590) (0.614) (0.614) (0.659) (0.665)
pause -4.138*** -3.761*** -3.918***
(0.842) (0.804) (0.799)
Audience lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,332 8,332 8,332 8,387 8,387 8,387
AR(1) z-test -4.59 -4.62 -4.62 -4.44 -4.54 -4.49
P r > z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) z-test 0.35 0.11 -0.05 -0.17 -0.34 0.03
P r > z 0.724 0.910 0.958 0.863 0.734 0.972
Sargan test P r > χ2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The table reports the results of panel regressions using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation method. The
dependent variable is the TV audience rating (in thousands). The main independent variables, suspense and surprise,
are derived from the Markov model (Markov) and in-play betting odds (Betting odds). All estimations also include a
constant (not reported). Time dummies correspond to the elapsed time (in minutes) from the start of the match. The
data are at the minute-level and includes 80 men’s singles matches played at Wimbledon that were broadcast live on
SRF2 and SRFinfo from 2009 to 2014. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the match
level are provided in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
entertainment demand. On average, a one standard deviation increase in suspense
raises the audience by approximately 1,260 viewers per minute, whereas a one standard
deviation increase in surprise raises the audience by approximately 2,630 viewers per
minute. As an illustration, the combined effect of a one standard deviation increase in
both suspense and surprise results in an increase of approximately 3,900 viewers per
minute, corresponding to a 3.65% minute-level increase (with respect to an average
audience per match of 106,000).
Columns (4)–(6) present the results for suspense and surprise measures based on
the in-play betting odds. In all specifications, suspense and surprise have a positive
and significant coefficient. According to column (6), on average, a one standard
deviation increase in suspense raises the audience by approximately 1,140 viewers
per minute, whereas a one standard deviation increase in surprise raises the audience
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by approximately 1,880 viewers per minute. As an illustration, the combined effect
of a one standard deviation increase in suspense and surprise results in an increase
of approximately 3,000 viewers per minute, corresponding to a 2.83% minute-level
increase (with respect to an average match audience of 106,000). Thus, the economic
effects estimated with both methods are comparable.
Moreover, surprise appears to be more important than suspense in entertainment
demand. The t-statistic of the equality of the estimated coefficients for suspense
and surprise is strongly significant for the Markov method (χ2 = 12.39, Pr > χ2 =
0.000) and marginally insignificant for the betting odds (χ2 = 1.76, Pr > χ2 =
0.184). Depending on the model used to estimate the audience’s beliefs, the estimated
coefficients for surprise are from two to five times larger than those for suspense.
The coefficients of the control variables mostly have the signs that are expected.
The coefficient for the first lag of audience is always very close to one, suggesting
some short-term inertia in viewership, whereas the other three lags are small in mag-
nitude and mostly significant. The coefficient for primetime is always positive but
not statistically significant; therefore, there is no clear evidence of an increase in the
competitive mix of TV programs offered during the evening. The coefficient for news
is always negative and significant at the 5% level, thus confirming our hypothesis
that the daily news on SRF1 may attract some viewers away from a tennis match.
The coefficient for pause is always significantly negative, indicating that some viewers
rapidly switch channels during the pauses (after odd-numbered games or between the
sets), possibly to skip the commercials.
To investigate the question regarding whether suspense and surprise become more
important as a match progresses, we introduce two interaction variables. First, we
investigate whether the effects of suspense and surprise are different among sets (set):
playing more sets leads to slower information revelation, which might generate addi-
tional entertainment value from suspense and surprise (Ely et al., 2015). Second, we
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investigate whether the effect of suspense and surprise is different between the third,
fourth, and fifth sets jointly (late_set = 1) and the group constituted by the first two
sets (late_set = 0): as the earliest that matches can be won is in the third set, the
first two sets might be less entertaining.22
Table 4 presents the results. Because our interest is in how these two interaction
variables influence the effects of suspense and surprise on TV audience ratings, the
table reports only the main effects and the coefficients on the interactions, i.e., any
incremental impact that these factors have on the audience ratings. Also included in
the specifications but not shown in the table are the control variables for the main
specification.
Overall, the evidence supports our assumptions: the interaction coefficients for
suspense and surprise with set (Panel A) are positive and significant in both models.
The interaction coefficients are particularly high for surprise. For example, according
to column (2), for each unit change in set (i.e., each additional set) the slope of
the suspense on audience increases by approximately 6,200 viewers and the slope of
surprise on audience increases by approximately 16,900 viewers.
The evidence from the second interaction model (Panel B) corroborates the no-
tion that both suspense and surprise generate even more entertainment value during
a match’s later moments, i.e., when the stakes are higher. Again, the interaction
coefficients are particularly high for surprise. For example, according to column (4),
for each unit change in late_set (i.e., being in a potentially decisive set) the slope of
suspense on audience increases by approximately 22,400 viewers and the slope of sur-
prise on audience increases by approximately 66,420 viewers. Overall, the coefficient
on the interactions appears to be economically non-trivial.
22Differently from the fourth and fifth set, the third set can end a match only when a player leads 2–0 in the third
set. Thus, in a further test, we use a slightly different definition: the variable late_set equals one if the set number














SUS × set 4.241*** 6.285**
(1.443) (3.142)
SUR × set 28.551*** 16.950*
(7.837) (9.416)
Control variables Yes Yes
N 8,332 8,387










SUS × late_set 13.525** 22.412***
(5.132) (7.308)
SUR × late_set 82.920*** 66.425***
(21.734) (23.415)
Control variables Yes Yes
N 8,332 8,387
Notes: The table reports the results of panel regressions with interaction terms. The dependent variable is the TV
audience ratings (in thousands). The main independent variables, suspense and surprise, are derived from the Markov
model (Markov) and in-play betting odds (Betting odds) and interacted with different variables. The variable set
takes discrete values between 1 and 5. The variable late_set equals one if the set number is the 3rd, 4th, or 5th set,
and zero otherwise. The control variables (four audience lags, primetime, news, pause, match fixed effects, and time
dummies) and a constant are included but not reported. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering
at the match level are provided in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
5.3 Robustness checks
Alternative specifications and postestimation tests
In this subsection, we provide the results of further robustness checks. We begin
by discussing alternative specifications and our postestimation analyses (untabulated
results). First, we estimate a panel regression with one lag of audience on the right
hand side of the equation. Although our model contains a lagged dependent variable,
Nickell bias should not be an issue, as we work in a “large T, large N” context (Nickell,
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1981).23 Second, we estimate the model without the lagged audience but allowing the
error term to be first-order autoregressive (ui,t = ρ · ui,t−1 + ηi,t, where |ρ| < 1 and
ηi,t is independent and identically distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ
2
η).
Finally, as the dependent variable (audience) is a nonnegative integer, we also use the
panel Poisson regression and the panel Negative Binomial regression, both with one
lag of audience on the right hand side (Winkelmann, 2013). Overall, the coefficients
of suspense and surprise are always positive and highly statistically significant, with
surprise being consistently larger than suspense throughout all the specifications.
Second, we control in different ways for other time effects. We estimate models
including a linear and quadratic continuous time trend in the form of the elapsed time
during a match and time of the day (at both the minute and hour levels). All the
results are robust to these alternative specifications.
Third, we investigate whether our main results are robust to outliers in the de-
pendent variable. We use two procedures for reducing the effects of the tails: in the
first, we delete the 5% (or 1%) largest and smallest ratings; in the second, we win-
sorize the top and bottom 200 (or 100) observations. Regressions that use trimmed
or winsorized audience figures produce similar results.
Fourth, we also check the data for multicollinearity. As discussed in Ely et al.
(2015), realized suspense and surprise tend to be positively correlated, which conforms
to the “intuition that more suspenseful events also generate more surprise” (Ely et al.,
2015, p. 245). Although multicollinearity would not reduce the reliability of the model
as a whole, it might result in unstable coefficient estimates and wildly inflated standard
errors. The overall sample correlation between suspense and surprise is 0.36 (0.38)
for the Markov chain (betting odds) method, which is relatively low. Nonetheless, we
23“N” represents the number of cross-sectional units and “T” the number of time points.
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compute the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all the dependent variables: based on
the results of this analysis, we can conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem.24
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results with regard to Si, i.e., the player’s
probability of winning a service point. We replicate all analyses using either the
historical S at Wimbledon (0.66) or the average S in our sample (0.69) for all players.
The results are robust to these alternatives.
Swiss players subgroup
In an experimental study on the effects of suspense on enjoyment, Peterson and Raney
(2008) note that the utility from watching a sportscast also depends on the viewer’s
disposition toward the participants. Disposition theory describes this effect in detail
and proposes that “enjoyment derived from witnessing the success and victory of a
competing party increases with positive sentiments and decreases with negative senti-
ments towards that party” (Zillmann, Bryant, & Sapolsky, 1989, p. 162). Because our
data come from Swiss households and because 35 of the matches in the sample include
Roger Federer or Stan Wawrinka, both of whom are Swiss players, the audience might
show an affective disposition toward these players.25 Notably, the mean audience for
these 35 matches is three times higher than for the other 45 matches: 168,000 viewers
(σ = 182, 140) versus 56,733 (σ = 39, 823). Although the overall audience level is not
important to our analysis, it might nonetheless indicate a different minute-level TV
behavior of the audience.
To address disposition theory, we therefore perform another analysis of the TV
audience variation for Swiss and non-Swiss players separately. In Table 5, Panel A
shows that suspense and surprise are important entertainment factors in both sub-
24We check whether the VIF values are below 10, a generally accepted level indicating that multicollinearity exerts
no significant impact. The VIF values for all variables in the Markov (betting odds) models range from 1.03 (1.02)
to 1.55 (1.64), with a mean value of 1.26 (1.28). For running this test, we exclude the time dummies from the main
regression equation specified by Eq. (9), as they all have a VIF of 1.00 and may deflate the mean VIF (in both
models, the mean VIF would be 1.02).
25Overall, Federer played in 30 matches and Wawrinka in six; only one match saw them play against one another.
Regarding the last three stages of the tournament included in our sample, Federer played 3/6 finals, 3/12 semifinals,




Panel A: Swiss players subgroup
Dependent variable: audience
Markov Betting odds
Player group: Swiss=1 Swiss=0 Swiss=1 Swiss=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SUS 21.736*** 11.251*** 30.997** 28.496***
(7.967) (2.932) (13.410) (10.160)
SUR 108.217*** 71.021** 70.748** 47.434***
(36.567) (29.635) (31.954) (15.479)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,664 4,668 3,714 4,673
No. of matches 35 45 35 45
Panel B: Audience by gender
Dependent variables: ♀ audience, ♂ audience
Markov Betting odds
Audience group: ♀ audience ♂ audience ♀ audience ♂ audience
(5) (6) (7) (8)
SUS 11.633*** 21.901*** 18.321*** 24.765***
(4.068) (7.674) (6.956) (9.257)
SUR 38.396*** 114.715*** 24.067** 83.013***
(12.224) (22.706) (12.007) (21.583)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,332 8,332 8,387 8,387
No. of matches 80 80 80 80
Notes: The table reports the results of panel regressions. In Panel A we distinguish between matches with at least
one Swiss player taking part in them (Swiss=1) and no Swiss player (Swiss=0). The dependent variable in Panel A is
the TV audience ratings (in thousands). In Panel B, we distinguish the female audience (♀ audience) from the male
audience (♂ audience) for the dependent variable. The main independent variables, suspense and surprise, are derived
from the Markov model (Markov) and in-play betting odds (Betting odds). The control variables (four audience lags,
primetime, news, pause, match fixed effects, and time dummies) and a constant are included but not reported. Robust
standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the match level are given in parentheses. In all models, *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
samples and that surprise has a larger effect, thus confirming our main results. How-
ever, it appears that surprise has an even larger effect when Swiss players are on the
court. As Federer has regularly been very successful in the Wimbledon Championships
tournament—he holds the record for most singles championships won (eight)—the
entertainment derived from surprising moments seems to be positively amplified. Fi-
nally, the results of a regression with only a subgroup of Federer’s matches are almost
identical to our main results.
Audience by gender
In a study on the relationship between gender and audience experiences with tele-
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vised sports, Gantz and Wenner (1991) note that men are more likely than women to
become emotionally involved in sports contests and are more responsive while watch-
ing. Hence, our results might be driven solely by male viewers. Therefore, we test
the validity of the results for male and female viewers separately. In our sample, the
male audience (59,308 viewers) is on average higher than the female audience (47,177
viewers). In Table 5, Panel B shows the results for the subsample of female viewers
(odd-numbered columns) and the results for the subsample of male viewers (even-
numbered columns). The coefficients of suspense and surprise are highly significant
and positive for both genders. In particular, the male audience appears to be more
responsive to suspense and to surprise, confirming the idea that men are more likely
to enjoy the drama and tension involved. Interestingly, columns (5) and (7) show
that female viewers are also more markedly responsive to surprising moments than
to suspenseful moments. Overall, this evidence suggests that our results are equally
valid for male and female viewers.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Discussion
When designing entertainment content, decision makers should take into account that
both suspense and surprise matter but also that surprise seems to be more important
than suspense. In tennis, as suspense and surprise are exogenously determined by
the rules and the players, we recognize that it would be difficult to increase either
artificially. However, new rules were tested: thus, in 2015, matches without advantage
scoring and with sets of first-of-four games were played (CNN, 2015). As we find that
suspense and surprise are more important during a match’s later moments, such rules
targeted at reducing the length of matches might not be a good idea.
Furthermore, our results can be used to evaluate the format of sports competi-
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tions. Major League Soccer in the U.S., for example, is a closed league that strongly
focuses on high suspense by inducing a fixed number of teams to compete with com-
parable levels of talent that are enforced through uniform salary caps and extensive
revenue redistribution. In contrast, various European soccer leagues allow teams to be
more heterogeneous in expenditures on talent and consequently in playing strength.
However, relegation and promotion of European clubs based on performance merit
ensures that disparities in playing strength cannot exceed certain levels within one
league. Thus, the European setting increases the potential for surprise, as underdogs
regularly encounter clear favorites and occasionally beat them, but does not ignore
the value of suspense. Moreover, parallel European club competitions, such as the
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League, add additional
suspense by matching comparably strong top European clubs.
Most importantly, our findings have implications for the design of entertainment
content, particularly where suspense and surprise can be endogenously determined
through a rigorous design of their contents, such as movies, TV shows and series, or
talent contests. Our methodology can be applied to effectively measure how enter-
taining an audience perceives the product to be. The challenge remains in measuring
people’s beliefs. Nonetheless, even for settings in which prediction markets are un-
available or where theoretical modeling is extremely problematic, measurement of
beliefs can be feasible.
For example, social media analytic tools can be used to analyze users’ posts and
comments on social media platforms such as Facebook. Just as tennis fans talk
about and want to hear about Wimbledon on Twitter, TV series fans do the same.
Alternatively, beliefs might be derived from historical data. For example, to measure
the average audience’s belief that a particular movie will have a happy ending, one
might use as prior belief the historical fraction of movies of a certain genre that have
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a happy ending and compute suspense and surprise using the actual type of movie
ending, i.e., the posterior belief.
Last but not least, the timing and selling of TV advertisements can also be im-
proved. As suspense and surprise enhance entertainment and simultaneously attract
human attention, commercials will be more effective following very suspenseful or sur-
prising moments. A larger and more attentive TV audience can be reached, thereby
increasing the advertisement’s effectiveness. Moreover, the understanding of the ef-
fects of suspense and surprise could be translated into higher advertising revenues.
For instance, broadcasters might auction advertising slots to companies willing to ad-
vertise their products. Hence, it is in the interest of content providers that bidding
firms understand the impact of suspense and surprise on the audience: a slot after
a very surprising moment could be sold for large amounts. Of course, as more and
more entertainment content is available online, including the Wimbledon tournament
at wimbledon.com, these implications are not restricted to TV commercials.
6.2 Conclusion
Understanding how and when enjoyment from suspense and surprise affect entertain-
ment demand is essential for designing entertainment content. Our paper provides
evidence that both suspense and surprise drive entertainment demand, for both men
and women, and become increasingly important over time. Our results also suggest
that surprise matters more than suspense. We draw this inference by estimating audi-
ence beliefs and relating them to high-frequency TV audience figures in the real-world
setting of the Wimbledon Championships tennis tournament.
Based on the results of this paper, we discussed important implications for sports
and for the design of entertainment content in general. However, we recognize that
the issue of suspense and surprise is multifaceted. Specific time patterns and combi-
nations of suspense and surprise may produce different levels of entertainment. For
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example, an audience might better “tolerate” a boring moment when it follows (or
precedes) a very entertaining moment; conversely, an audience might feel anxious if
there are long periods with too much suspense or surprise. Because of data limita-
tions, we were not able to precisely distinguish the effects of suspense and surprise
from other factors that may also determine entertainment demand. Mood manage-
ment, escapism, or learning motivations, for example, might be relevant in contexts
other than sports. Ideally, detailed data at the individual level might also be used
to thoroughly examine individual reactions to various levels of suspense and surprise.




This appendix introduces the basic rules of tennis (Part I) and explains how we
compute the probability of winning a point on service (Part II).
Part I Player 1 begins the match by serving in the first game of the first set. Player
1 wins a point (sometimes referred as “point game”) if player 2 cannot return the ball.
A game is won when one player wins four points with a two-point difference, or when
there is a two-point difference after a deuce, i.e., a score of 40–40 (3 points to 3 points
in a game). The players alternate serving every game, and they change ends after
every odd-numbered game. A set is won when a player either wins six games with
a two game difference, or, in the case of a tie-break when the score for one player
is 7:6. The tie-break begins when the game score is tied at 6:6, and is played until
one player wins seven points with a two-point difference, or until there is a two-point
difference when the point score is 6–6. At Wimbledon, a tennis match is played as
the best of five sets (instead of three), meaning that a player winning three sets wins
the match. The fifth set does not have a tie-break; the set is won when one player has
won six games and two games more than the other. For further details on the rules
of tennis, please consult the official website of the International Tennis Federation
(ITF): http://www.itftennis.com/media/220771/220771.pdf.
Part II To compute the probability of winning a point on service for each player
in our sample using historical data, we download the necessary statistics from the
ATP World Tour website, where official player-level data are available. For all the
160 server-match combinations in our sample (80 matches, two players per match),
we download the player’s average “% 1st service in”, “% of points won if 1st service
in”, and “% of points won if 2nd service in” statistics from the previous year on grass
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courts. For players with no history on grass courts for the previous year, we use
statistics from two years earlier or, when also unavailable, from the previous year but
on hard courts. Then, we apply the formula provided by Klaassen and Magnus (2014,
p. 75):
Si = (% 1
st services in) · (% of points won if 1st service in)
+ (% 1st services not in) · (% of points won if 2nd service in)
(A.1)
The first part of the formula reflects the probability of winning the point on the first
serve, whereas the second part reflects the probability of winning the point on the
second serve when the first serve is faulted. Thus, Si reflects the fact that a player
can win a point on either the first or second service. As an illustration, we report a
numerical example provided in Magnus and Klaassen (1999) using Wimbledon data
on men’s singles from 1992 to 1995: Si = 0.587 ∗ 0.777 + (1 − 0.587) ∗ 0.518 =
0.456 + 0.214 = 0.67. In our sample, Si = 0.69 on average: Federer has the highest
Si (0.787 in 2009), whereas Albert Ramos-Vinolas has the lowest (0.483 in 2012).
Overall, the advantage of this procedure over using a fixed S for all matches is that
we use the same statistics that are also readily available to gamblers.
A.2 Mediapulse TV panel
This appendix provides details on the Mediapulse TV panel. Every household in the
panel is given a small measuring device that is connected to all TV sets in the house
or apartment. This field-tested device is used in almost 25 countries worldwide. It
collects audience information every second. Mediapulse then aggregates these data
for the entire panel and saves it at the minute-by-minute level. For example, the TV
audience corresponding to the minute 15:23:00 indicates the average audience between
15:23:00 and 15:23:59.
Extrapolation: the reporting samples of a panel are extrapolated to the population
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(universe) estimates, which allows the results to be representative of the respective
population, i.e., of the TV panel target audience (Kuonen & Hulliger, 2013). For
extrapolating, Mediapulse uses actual population figures from the Swiss Federal Sta-
tistical Office. The quota attributes used to determine the appearance of a household
in the panel are language area, canton (a member state of Switzerland), district (a
region of a canton), household size, presence of children in the household, and age
of the head of household. To certify that the panel conforms to international quality
standards, it is subject to an annual external verification.
Changes in the panel: over the 2009–2014 period, two changes in the measuring
system have occurred. First, beginning in 2010, daily weighting was introduced, and
the use of Teletext was considered to be TV watching. Second, before 2013, a panel
of 1,918 households was randomly recruited by the phone. This universe comprised
all households with at least an installed TV. However, after 1st January, 2013, the
panel was recruited by either the phone or mail. It now contains 2,000 households, at
least 1,870 of which must provide data daily. For both panels, households watching
TV exclusively from a computer are not included. Mediapulse informed us that for
an audience analysis within a program, like a tennis match, none of these changes has
had an impact on the size of the variation in the measured audiences.
A.3 Markov model and further descriptive statistics
This appendix illustrates how to compute SUSMarkov and SURMarkov (Part I) and
provides further detailed descriptive statistics for the main variables in our model
(Part II).
Part I Using a fictitious example, we illustrate how to compute SUSMarkov and
SURMarkov, i.e., suspense and surprise based on a finite binary Markov chain. An
almost identical procedure applies to computing SUSodds and SURodds. Player W is
49
playing against player L. After the 63rd point, the match is tied at one set apiece,
with player W ahead five games to four (5–4) in the set, and 40 points to zero (40–0)
in the game. Therefore, player W is serving to win the game and, in so doing, also
the set (the expression used is: “Player W has three set points”). From his historical
serving records on grass, we compute server W’s probability of winning the next point,
SW = 0.71 (see Part II of Appendix A.1). As the situation of the players in a tennis
match is always symmetrical, player L’s probability of winning on a return point is
0.29.
Using this information, the model predicts that player W’s match winning proba-
bility is 76.24% (i.e., the current belief µp). If he wins the point (ω = 1), the posterior
belief would rise to 80.50% (+4.26%). However, as there is a 29% chance that he will
lose next point (ω = 0), that loss would bring the posterior belief down to 75.56%








where 80.50% and 75.56% are the posterior beliefs. The possible size of the update
in the beliefs is correctly asymmetric (+4.26% vs. −0.68%), as player W would still
have two set points left to play even if he loses this serve point. Finally, if player
W indeed loses the 64th point (ω = 0), the posterior belief would drop to 75.56%,
making 80.50% the counterfactual probability. Using Eq. (2), we compute suspense
for the 63rd point (p = 63) as the standard deviation of the next point’s beliefs:
SUSMarkov63 = [0.71 · (0.805 − 0.7624)2 + 0.29 · (0.7556 − 0.7624)2]1/2 = 0.036.
Similarly, using Eq. (3) we compute surprise for the 64th point (p = 64) as the
absolute value of change in beliefs from point 63 to 64:
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SURMarkov64 = |0.7556 − 0.7624| = 0.0068.
Thus, the model predicts a suspense of 0.036 and a surprise of 0.0068.
Part II
Table A.1
Descriptive statistics (mean) of the TV audience, suspense, and surprise by tournament stage.
Markov Betting odds
Tournament stage N audience SUS SUR SUS SUR
1st stage 12 44.0 0.0064 0.0061 0.0131 0.0093
(29.23) (0.0121) (0.0110) (0.0231) (0.0175)
2nd stage 14 55.2 0.0096 0.0078 0.0173 0.0098
(44.35) (0.0208) (0.0118) (0.0362) (0.0179)
3rd stage 12 75.8 0.0103 0.0084 0.0193 0.0125
(45.16) (0.0407) (0.0175) (0.0431) (0.0193)
4th stage 10 83.2 0.01284 0.0096 0.0216 0.0127
(84.85) (0.0413) (0.0177) (0.0432) (0.0198)
Quarterfinal 14 87.4 0.0193 0.0154 0.0281 0.0138
(59.84) (0.0477) (0.0195) (0.0475) (0.0204)
Semifinal 12 89.1 0.0209 0.0162 0.0320 0.0162
(54.83) (0.0502) (0.0205) (0.0506) (0.0205)
Final 6 362.8 0.0224 0.0199 0.0348 0.0167
(252.38) (0.0527) (0.0206) (0.0582) (0.0218)
Notes: Displayed are summary statistics for the TV audience ratings (in thousand), suspense, and surprise for the
80 men’s singles matches played at Wimbledon between 2009 and 2014, for a total of 8,563 minutes of live tennis.
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
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When do professionals play minimax?
Evidence from the tennis court
Paolo Bizzozero, Raphael Flepp, Egon Franck
Abstract
This article provides new empirical evidence on von Neumann’s minimax
theorem. We use tennis as a natural laboratory where professional athletes
repeatedly play a two-person zero-sum game: the tennis serve. Using detailed
data from 80 men’s singles matches between 2009 and 2014 at the Wimble-
don Championships tournament, we show that the results are consistent with
only one prediction of the minimax theorem: players’ choices are serially in-
dependent, but their winning probabilities are not statistically identical across
strategies. Most importantly, we investigate under what conditions players de-
viate more from minimax play. In particular, we find that top servers facing
non-top receivers typically do not play near the predictions of minimax but
rather win more. Our findings reveal that the relative skill level of the play-






In 1928, John von Neumann published the minimax theorem, a formalization of a two-
person zero-sum simultaneous mixed-strategy game. The minimax theorem posits
that each player minimizes the maximum payoff possible for the other player. As
the game is zero-sum, i.e., the payoff of one player is the inverse of that of his or
her opponent, each player is also maximizing his or her own minimum payoff. Most
important, the minimax theorem provides two testable predictions about how players
should behave in strategic situations: (1) the players’ winning probabilities are statis-
tically identical across choices, and (2) the players’ choices are random. Accordingly,
by playing minimax, a player ensures that his or her opponent (1) will not profit from
any available pure strategy and (2) will not anticipate his or her actual choice.
O’Neill (1987) argued for the importance of testing the empirical validity of the
minimax theorem because many economic models are based on it or its generalization
to n-player non-zero-sum games, the Nash equilibrium. Over the last two decades,
several laboratory experiments have tested the empirical validity of the minimax the-
orem. In general, the subjects of experimental studies who play simple games, such
as matching pennies or card games, do not behave as predicted by the minimax the-
orem: their win rates across various strategies are not similar and their choices are
not serially independent (e.g., Rapoport & Boebel, 1992; Mookherjee & Sopher, 1997;
Binmore, Swierzbinski, & Proulx, 2001; Shachat, 2002; Rosenthal, Shachat, & Walker,
2003; Levitt, List, & Reiley, 2010).
Sports offer a natural setting that solves some of the issues affecting experimental
studies, which have primarily used students as study participants. First, as rewards
are well defined and clear—e.g., winning in a competition—players are well moti-
vated and incentivized. Second, because professional players dedicate their lives to
the practice of a certain sport, they are experienced in playing strategically. Third,
professional players always choose actions that maximize their prospects for victory;
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thus, researchers do not need to make assumptions about the player’s utility function
for the monetary payoffs.
Walker and Wooders (2001) and Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007) use tennis as a nat-
ural laboratory where professional athletes play a two-person zero-sum simultaneous
mixed-strategy game, the tennis serve. They model the serve game as a simple 2×2
game (both players can play left or right) and assess the empirical validity of the two
minimax predictions. Walker and Wooders (2001) analyze 10 men’s matches and find
that the players’ behavior is consistent only with prediction (1), i.e., that the winning
probabilities across choices are equal, whereas Hsu et al. (2007) analyze 10 different
men’s matches and find that the players’ behavior is consistent with prediction (1)
and prediction (2), i.e., that players’ choices are random.
Despite their somewhat different results, a common property of Walker and Wood-
ers (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007) is that both focus on testing whether the observed
behavior of professional athletes is “close enough” to the theoretical predictions to be
considered consistent with minimax. However, these previous studies do not address
the important question of when (under what conditions) players deviate more or devi-
ate less from the minimax predictions. Such tests are important because the players’
behavior in a real setting may differ under, for example, stress or fatigue, or when
playing against opponents with different skills. In our article, we address exactly this
open question.
To do so, we begin by re-evaluating the studies of Walker and Wooders (2001)
and Hsu et al. (2007) but using a larger and more heterogeneous sample. Our full
sample results stand in contrast to previous studies, showing that the players’ be-
havior is consistent only with prediction (2), i.e., that players’ choices are random.
Then, using a number of subsamples that cover various potential influencing factors,
we investigate under what conditions tennis players deviate more or less from both
minimax predictions. Most importantly, our results show a tendency toward minimax
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play in matches between right-handed players, in the later sets of a match, in shorter
matches, and especially in unbalanced matches. After splitting the matches accord-
ing to the skill level of the server and receiver, we find that top servers’ behavior is
less consistent with minimax play when facing non-top receivers. While this result
appears surprising at first glance, we can show that it is rational for top players to
deviate: top players would decrease by 18% their likelihood of winning a match by
playing closer to minimax against non-top players.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the ap-
plicable literature. Section 3 describes the setting and the hypotheses. Section 4
presents the data and outlines our empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the
results. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes the article.
2 Literature review
The empirical literature on minimax can be broadly divided into experimental and
field studies, with experimental studies predominating. O’Neill (1987) was the first
of a series of original laboratory tests of the minimax predictions. O’Neill matched
25 pairs of students, who then played a card-matching game more than 100 times in
succession, each having four strategies to play. O’Neill’s results at the aggregate level
are very close to minimax play. The results at the aggregate level refer to the results
of the minimax tests for all the games jointly (e.g., for all pairs of players playing
several card games), whereas the results at the individual level refer to the minimax
tests for a single game individually (e.g., for two players playing a card game).1
Later studies revisited O’Neill’s card game experiment by proposing design re-
finements and using different experimental participants; however, these experiments
generally failed to provide consistent evidence supporting minimax. Rapoport and
Boebel (1992) had 20 students playing a slightly more cognitively demanding card
1Section 4 provides further details on this important distinction between the individual and aggregate (or joint) levels.
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game, giving higher rewards to increase the participants’ motivation, but they still
reject minimax play at both the individual and aggregate levels. In Mookherjee and
Sopher (1994), two groups of 10 pairs each played a matching penny game, during
which the experimenters revealed only to one group of players all of the opponent
group’s past choices and earnings. The informed subjects played significantly dif-
ferently from the non-informed subjects, for example by playing somewhat closer to
prediction (2). Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), studying the dynamic pattern of play
of 20 students playing a table game, also refuted minimax.
To overcome some of the problems that adversely affected previous experimen-
tal studies, Shachat (2002) proposes a new method for eliciting mixed strategies.
Nonetheless, his results suggest that the minimax predictions do not thoroughly de-
scribe the behavior of the 60 students who played an adaptation of the O’Neill game.
Rosenthal et al. (2003) propose an even simpler design and, using 40 pairs of stu-
dents as participants, conclude that although the aggregate choice frequencies are
somewhat close to equilibrium, there is excessive serial correlation in the choices.
Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Proulx’s (2001) experiment gives participants both better
incentives and sufficient time for learning, and they find that the players’ choices are
close to being independent. Binmore et al. underline the importance of using the so-
called evolutive interpretation of equilibria, a theory positing that people come closer
to equilibrium by undergoing a trial-and-error adjustment process.
To date, field data from professional sports have provided stronger support for
the empirical validity of the minimax predictions than have laboratory experiments.
Walker and Wooders (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007) focus on the tennis serve: in this
game, the server aims at maximizing the expected probability of scoring a point on
serve, and the receiver aims at minimizing it. Walker and Wooders’ (2001) original
contribution, the first that uses field data to test minimax, analyzes the behavior
of 13 top players at 10 Grand Slam men’s singles matches (mostly finals) between
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1974 and 1997.2 Using point-by-point data collected manually from videotapes, they
find supporting evidence for prediction (1), i.e., that the winning probabilities across
choices are equal, but not for prediction (2), i.e., that players’ choices are random.
Hsu et al. (2007) analyze 10 men’s, nine women’s, and eight juniors’ singles matches
between 1980 and 2003 and find supporting evidence not only for prediction (1) but
also for prediction (2). However, Kovash and Levitt (2009) argue that the tests used
in these two tennis studies have low power to reject the null hypothesis because their
samples are too small.
Complementing the tennis studies, Palacios-Huerta (2003), Chiappori, Levitt, and
Groseclose (2002), and Dohmen and Sonnabend (2016) focus on the penalty kicking
between the most experienced kickers and goalkeepers in professional European soccer,
generally finding support for both minimax predictions. However, penalty kicks are
taken very infrequently, resulting in a bias toward less serial correlation in the players’
choices, and often not against the same goalkeepers, resulting in different payoffs. For
example, Chiappori et al. (2002) admit that their finding of a lack of serial correlation
is “not so surprising since the penalty kicks take place days, weeks, months apart”
(Chiappori et al., 2002, p. 1147). A better test for serial correlation is to compare
the players’ decisions over a relatively short period—e.g., over a match—as we do in
tennis.
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) and Levitt et al. (2010) attempt to reconcile the
conflicting results of experimental and field studies. To do so, both studies compare
the laboratory performance of students to that of professional subjects playing a
simple card game. These authors suspect that the strategic skills of the subjects may
play an important role in their decision or ability to play according to minimax. They
argue that in contrast to the sports athletes in the field studies, students have fewer
strategic skills because they are inexperienced at playing mixed-strategy games. In
2The Grand Slam tournaments are the four most prestigious tennis competitions worldwide: the Wimbledon Cham-
pionships (UK), the French Open, the Australian Open, and the US Open.
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particular, the researchers select professionals who face strategic situations on a daily
basis: Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) use soccer players, whereas Levitt et al. (2010)
use bridge and poker players.
Although both studies consider similar settings, they surprisingly come to strik-
ingly opposite conclusions: in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), both amateur and
professional soccer players, but not students, behave close to minimax, whereas in
Levitt et al. (2010), neither students nor professionals do so. Moreover, Wooders
(2010) reexamines Palacios-Huerta and Volij’s data and comes to the opposite con-
clusion, that professionals do not play consistently with minimax. Levitt et al. (2010)
argue that study subjects, whether students or professionals, might not be able to
systematically transfer the strategic skills learned in their professional activities to
the laboratory games, as minor differences in the context of the game can have deep
behavioral effects.
Overall, the empirical evidence on minimax is mixed. Although the importance of
skills is debated by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) and Levitt et al. (2010), no field
study has yet investigated the role of the relative skill strengths of sports professionals.
Importantly, the skills of professional athletes are generally high but heterogeneous:
for example, Roger Federer and Lionel Messi have skills that few other professional
players have. Previous field studies have investigated a homogeneous group composed
of top-skilled players, i.e., the best tennis players reaching the Grand Slam finals
(Walker & Wooders, 2001; Hsu et al., 2007) or the most experienced soccer players
competing in the best European soccer leagues (Chiappori et al., 2002; Palacios-
Huerta, 2003; Dohmen & Sonnabend, 2016). Therefore, the conclusions of these
articles do not generalize to any players but only to the most skilled ones.
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3 Setting and research hypotheses
Professional sports offer an appropriate setting for studying strategic behavior under
natural conditions because the rules of the game are clearly defined and the data are
accurately collected by specialized IT firms. In comparison to experiment participants
(typically students), professional players are experienced in playing strategically and
are highly motivated. Given that a tennis match takes place over a relatively short
time, between a fixed pair of players, and with a large number of serve points (typically
over 200 in a Grand Slam match), tennis is particularly well suited for studying
strategic interactions.
In the Appendix A.1, we briefly describe the rules of tennis that are relevant to this
article and display the tennis court. Each half of the court is divided into two equal
parts: the left and the right part (when each player faces the court).3 Each game
starts with a player serving from the right court into the cross-court service box. The
match continuously alternates between right-court points and left-court points.
Since two players alternate serving from two courts, we distinguish among four
different situations for each match: (1) player 1’s left-court serves, (2) player 1’s
right-court serves, (3) player 2’s left-court serves, and (4) player 2’s right-court serves.
Distinguishing among left- and right-court serves is important because serving from
different courts requires different abilities and some servers may have preferences for
a certain side (Klaassen & Magnus, 2014). We refer to each of the four situations as
one experiment.4
The server decides whether to direct the ball to the receiver’s left or right. As in
previous tennis studies on minimax, we do not include serves to the receiver’s body
(center).5 To increase his chances of reaching and returning the ball, a receiver has to
instantly guess, perhaps only subconsciously, the direction of the ball. Consequently,
3While the technical tennis terms for the left and right half sides of the court are ad and deuce, respectively, for ease
of reading, this article uses left and right.
4For example, an experiment consists of all of player 1’s left-court serves in one match.
5Serves directed to the center represent 6.66% of the first serves and 14.55% of all serves in our sample.
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he will defend that side more by, for example, being more ready to jump to that side.
As an illustration, Brad Gilbert, a former professional player turned tennis coach,
advises the receiver to “keep mixing [your] position up so your opponent [the server]
has to react to what you’re doing and not the other way round. [...] One time make
your move when they can see you. The next time move just after they make their
toss and cannot see you” (Gilbert & Jamison, 2013, p. 107).
Thus, to derive the theoretical minimax predictions, we model each serve as shown
in Table 1. Each π denotes the probability of winning a point on serve from the server’s
perspective, given both players’ choices; the first subscript indicates the server’s de-
cision to direct the ball to the receiver’s left or right, whereas the second subscript
indicates the receiver’s decision to anticipate and overplay to his own left or right.
Initially, as in the previous tennis studies, we assume that this payoff matrix is the








A unique mixed-strategy equilibrium exists when the following inequalities are
satisfied:
πLL < πLR, πLL < πRL, πRR < πLR, and πRR < πRL. (1)
These inequalities imply that if the receiver correctly anticipates and overplays the
side where the server hits the ball, his payoff will be higher and, since each point is a
zero-sum game, the server’s payoff π will be lower. In tennis, the receiver’s decision
cannot be observed, and thus, we cannot compute these payoffs. Following Walker and
Wooders (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007), we therefore assume that these four conditions
6Fig. 1 in Walker and Wooders (2001) provide a hypothetical numerical example of the payoff matrix.
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are nonetheless satisfied such that a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed probability
strategies exists.
In the first part of this article, we examine the two testable predictions resulting
from the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. First, each player should mix
his actions to make his opponent’s expected payoffs identical across choices. As a
consequence, each player’s probability of winning a point on serve across choices should
be the same (from the same court).
Prediction 1. The server’s winning rate for each pure choice {L,R} is the same.
The intuition is that each player should mix his choices in such proportions that his
opponent cannot exploit him by pursuing any particular pure strategy. Thus, each
player’s probability of winning a point on serve should be the same whether he plays
left or right against his opponent’s mixture.7
Second, each player should generate a sequence of actions that is unpredictable.
As a consequence, each player’s serve direction choices should be serially independent.
Prediction 2. The server’s choices are serially independent.
The intuition is that each player must be concerned with only the current point,
meaning that intertemporal links between points must be absent; at best, a player
should randomize over his choices. If a player chooses not to switch his actions often
enough or if he switches actions more often than predicted by the theory, his choices
will not be serially independent. The same outcome would occur if the player is
learning and memorizing his opponent’s actions in an attempt to gain a strategic
advantage. We include both the first and second services because if we drop the
second serves, we cannot observe the full sequence of the servers’ choices. Walker and
7We emphasize that the first minimax prediction concerns the equality of the serve winning rates, not the equality of
the serve direction frequencies. In other words, equalizing the percentage of left and right serves does not equate to
equalizing the winning rates. For example, both a player serving 90% of the serve-points to the left and 10% to the
right and another serving 50% to both sides may still be playing according to the minimax.
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Wooders (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007) focus only on first serves, probably because of
the difficulty of hand-collecting the data on second serves.
In the main part of this article, we address the question of when tennis professionals
play minimax. To simplify the analysis, we initially assumed that the payoffs and
thus the equilibrium mixtures vary only across player-court combinations. However,
an undetermined set of conditions and factors varying within and across matches
can influence a player’s likelihood of winning the point (the payoffs π) and thus his
strategic behavior. Therefore, we add to the literature by retesting both minimax
predictions by distinguishing not only across player-court combinations but also across
the different situations detailed below.
First, we distinguish between matches with one left-handed player and matches
with only right-handed players—our sample does not include any match between two
lefties. Several individual rejections of Prediction 1 in Walker and Wooders (2001)
result from left points played by lefties. When lefties serve left points, they can hit a
wide shot onto a righty’s backhand, a shot that is very difficult to return. Although
righties can use a similar tactic when serving right-court points, they are usually
less successful because lefties are much more accustomed to hitting backhand shots.
Overall, we expect the players to behave closer to the minimax predictions in righty
matches.
We then distinguish between tournament stages. As the Wimbledon tournament
is played over seven stages, we split the sample between the first five stages and the
last two stages, which include the semifinal and the final. Usually, only the most
experienced players qualify for the last tournament stages; thus, we may observe
different behaviors there than in the first rounds. Moreover, the semifinal and final
subsample permits a comparison of our results with those of previous tennis studies
that focus primarily on finals and find supporting evidence for minimax (Walker &
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Wooders, 2001; Hsu et al., 2007).8 Overall, given the results of previous tennis studies,
we expect the players to behave closer to the minimax predictions in final and semifinal
matches.
Next, we distinguish among sets. Because matches at Wimbledon are played as
the best of five sets, we distinguish between the first two sets and the third, fourth,
and fifth sets jointly. The earliest that matches can be won is in the third set; thus,
in the first two sets, players might feel less pressure and be less nervous. In soccer,
Palacios-Huerta (2003) find a lower scoring rate for penalty shots taken in the last
10 minutes of close matches and argue that this might be due to the negative effects
of pressure. Moreover, players might learn and improve their strategic skills during
the match, which might result in more minimax play (Mookherjee & Sopher, 1994).
González-Díaz, Gossner, and Rogers (2012) show that not all players are equally able
to increase their performance during important moments of a match. Overall, if
the learning effect prevails, we expect the players to behave closer to the minimax
predictions in the later sets.
We also divide our sample into two groups according to whether a match has
more or fewer total points than the sample median (213 points). Davey, Thorpe,
and Williams (2002) show that fatigue plays an important role in tennis, for example
leading to a decline in serve accuracy. According to these findings, we expect the
players to behave closer to the minimax predictions in shorter matches.
Intuitively, playing against an equally skilled player is not the same as playing
against a stronger or weaker player. We retest the minimax predictions across a
subsample of balanced and unbalanced matches. For each player, we derive his ex-
pected probability of winning the match from the betting odds at the beginning of
the match.9 From the difference between the two players’ winning probabilities, we
8Due to the low number of finals in our sample (six), we also include the 12 semifinals to have enough observations
for the tests.
9The inverse of the match-winner betting odds (e.g., 1/1.9=0.52) can be interpreted as the bettors’ underlying prob-
abilistic belief in a player winning the match.
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know how balanced the match is—a larger difference indicates a more unbalanced
match. For example, if at match start the betting market predicts Rafael Nadal to
win with a probability of 60% against Andy Murray, the difference is 20%. We define
balanced matches as those with the 25% smallest difference and unbalanced matches
as those with the 25% largest difference.10 In general, as there is no literature on this
particular subject, we cannot derive a clear prediction.
We further investigate the role of the players’ skills in a match. Our previous
subsample definition does not distinguish a match between two non-top players from
a match between two top players (both are balanced). We now categorize each player
with an Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) ranking above six (the median
player ATP ranking) as a “top” player and a player with an ATP ranking below or
equal to six as a “non-top” player. We retest both minimax predictions for each of the
four possible combinations of top and non-top players. As O’Neill (1987) writes, “Skill
would mean that some of the [skilled] subjects could exploit the other’s deviation from
minimax by estimating the other’s individual moves or noticing statistical tendencies”
(O’Neill, 1987, p. 2108). Thus, we expect significant differences with respect to
minimax play among these four groups.
Finally, in the last part of this article, we ask whether playing minimax leads to
winning more points and thus to higher chances of winning the match. For example,
after having qualified for the 2015 Wimbledon final against Andy Murray, Roger
Federer told a television interviewer that one important factor helping him win was
that he “was able to mix it [the serve] well.” We also analyze whether the relationship
between minimax play and winning depends on the combination of skills of the two
players: deviating from minimax play might be rational only if it leads to an increase
in a player’s likelihood of winning the match.
10Our sample encompasses many matches from the early tournament stages, which can be very unbalanced when a
top player is participating in them. The average of the odds-implied winning probability difference is 0.67, whereas
the median is 0.78. By using 25% as our cutoff, we ensure that the balanced matches are characteristically different
from the unbalanced matches.
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4 Data and methodology
Detailed point-by-point data at the match level come from IBM, which collects data
both directly from the umpires’ computers and from analysts who attend the match
and manually feed the data into the system. Beyond general information about the
match, such as players, court, tournament round, and the start or ending time, the
data also contain detailed point-level information on the score, time (in seconds),
server, winner, and serve speed. Importantly, the dataset contains information about
the serve direction: left, center, or right. In the event of a double fault, when the
ball does not land in a valid area on the opponent’s side for twice in a row, the serve
direction is missing. In addition, we manually collect from the ATP website a player’s
playing hand and his ATP ranking.11 Finally, the betting odds for who will win as of
the beginning of the match originate from Betfair, one of the largest online betting
markets, and are provided by Fracsoft, a data vendor.
Table 2 provides summary statistics.12 The original IBM sample contains 17,626
point-level observations. After dropping all the serves to the body (2,496 observa-
tions) and all the double faults (472 observations), the final sample consists of 14,658
point-level observations from 80 matches. Our sample is heterogeneous, containing an
almost equal proportion of matches from any tournament stage over six consecutive
years and a total of 58 unique players. A match lasts on average 150 minutes and con-
sists of approximately 220 points, 36 games, and 3.6 sets. Overall, 10 players (17.2%
of all players) are left-handed, and the number of matches with one left-handed player
is 24 (30% of all matches).
Similar to Walker and Wooders (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007), the average percent-
age of serve points played to the receiver’s left is 55%. On average, the percentage of
points won when serving to the left (70.3%) is almost identical to that when serving
11The ATP rankings date from the week before the beginning of the tournament. For example, since Wimbledon 2014
started on June 23, the ATP ranking is as of June 17. A lower rating indicates a better player: the No. 1 player is
the best player in the world.




Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: match level
Number of points 220.3 64.6 117 436 80
Number of games 36.4 10.1 20 77 80
Number of sets 3.6 0.7 3 5 80
Duration (in minutes) 150 48.9 69 284 80
Odds-implied winning probability difference 0.67 0.28 0.04 0.98 80
Difference in players’ ATP ranking 41.9 43.9 1 223 80
Panel B: experiment level
Number of points 45.8 14.7 17 97 320
Fraction of points to the receiver’s left 0.55 0.12 0.15 0.87 320
Fraction of points to the receiver’s right 0.44 0.12 0.12 0.85 320
Fraction of points won when played to the left 0.70 0.12 0.26 1 320
Fraction of points won when played to the right 0.70 0.14 0 1 320
Panel C: point level
Number of shots per point 3.72 3.51 1 32 14,658
Serve speed (mph): first and second 111.0 13.02 54 143 14,484
Serve speed (mph): first 116.8 9.08 54 143 10,399
Serve speed (mph): second 96.0 8.87 56 133 4,085
Fraction of first serves 0.717 0.450 0 1 14,658
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics for the 80 men’s singles matches in our sample. An experiment
encompasses all the points played in each of the four distinct player-court combinations. For 174 points, IBM did not
record the serve speed.
the right (70.1%). The result of a mean-comparison t-test confirms that the difference
between these winning rates across choices is not statistically significant (t = 0.301,
p = 0.763).
The difference in the odds-implied players’ winning probabilities at the beginning
of the match averages 67% and has a median of 78.6%. The minimum difference (4%)
results from a quarterfinal match, whereas the maximum difference (98%) results
from a first tournament stage match. Furthermore, the ranking difference for a match
averages nearly 42 ranking points. Both the high average difference in winning prob-
abilities and the high average ranking difference may be explained by the relatively
high percentage (60%) of early tournament (pre-quarterfinal) matches in our sample,
which are matches in which the chances of having a low-ranking player meeting a
high-ranking player are higher. The individual player rankings vary between one and
236, with an average of 25 and a median of six (see Table A.1 for further details).
On average, an experiment consists of 45.8 points. In comparison, Walker and
Wooders (2001) and Hsu et al. (2007) focus on lengthy matches, giving them a partic-
ularly long series of actions to analyze for each experiment: their experiments average
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75.7 and 62.2 points, respectively. However, as both studies select matches from a
period of over 20 years, their samples are affected by the important technological
changes that have been adopted over the years that have altered how tennis is played.
For example, new racket materials allow for faster shots, and new court materials such
as polyester allow for faster rebounding and help to generate topspin (O’Donoghue,
2001). Cross and Pollard (2009) show that since 1998, the average men’s serve speed
significantly increased for all Grand Slam tournaments, finally converging to approx-
imately 115 mph for all tournaments in 2006. In our sample, the average serve speed
is 111 mph, the first serve being faster (117 mph) than the second (96 mph). On
average, the percentage of first serves is roughly 72%.13
To make our results comparable with those of previous studies, we apply the
methodology proposed by Walker and Wooders (2001) and described in Palacios-
Huerta (2014, pp. 22–23). In a first step, we test the null hypothesis of the equality
of a server’s winning probability for each of the pure strategies available (left and right)
by conducting the Pearson’s chi-square goodness-of-fit test, at both the individual and
joint levels, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. Pearson’s test is also known as
a standard proportions test.
In the following equation, for each match, i will denote an experiment, which
includes the series of actions chosen by a server from a certain court (left or right),
i.e., from any player-court combination. In total, we analyze 320 experiments. We
define pji as the likelihood that a server from a given court will win a point when
choosing the pure strategy j ∈ {L, R}, with nji being the number of times that the
server chooses j and N j,Wi and N
j,NW
i being the number of times that the server wins
the serve point (W ) or not (NW ), respectively, when choosing j. Under the null
hypothesis, the server’s probability of winning a point (or “winning rates”) should be





13If we do not drop the 472 double faults, the percentage of first serves decreases to 63.9%.
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(N j,Wi − nji · pi)2
nji · pi
+
(N j,NWi − nji · (1 − pi))2
nji · (1 − pi)
]
, (2)
which under the null hypothesis is distributed asymptotically as a χ2 with one degree
of freedom. Larger values of the Pearson statistic denote a tendency toward less
equality in the winning proportions and, thus, a greater likelihood of rejecting the
minimax prediction for that experiment.
Furthermore, we can also test the aggregate players’ behavior, i.e., test whether
each of the experiments is simultaneously generated by minimax play (Palacios-
Huerta, 2014). Many rejections at the individual level do not necessarily imply a
joint rejection. Importantly, the joint hypothesis that pLi = p
R
i for each of the experi-
ments allows for differences in probabilities pi across experiments (Walker & Wooders,







which under the null hypothesis is distributed asymptotically as a χ2 with 320 degrees
of freedom. Similar to the individual Pearson test, larger values of the chi-square
statistic indicate a greater likelihood of rejecting the joint hypothesis.
Furthermore, Walker and Wooders (2001) note that under the joint null hypoth-
esis that all observations were generated by minimax play, the p−values associated
with the individual Pearson statistics (Eq. 2) should be 320 draws from the uniform
distribution U [0,1]. Using the KS test statistic, we can test the null hypothesis that
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the hypothesized cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Pearson p−values is
uniform on [0,1] (H0 : F (x) = F0(x) = x). The test statistic is:
K =
√
n · supx∈[0,1]|Fn(x) − x)|, (4)
where Fn(x) is the empirical CDF of the 320 p−values. As the KS test cannot be
computed directly, we use the two-step procedure described in footnotes 17 and 18
of Walker and Wooders (2001, p. 1533). This test statistic has a known distribution
(Mood, Graybill, & Boes, 1974, p. 509). Larger values of the KS test statistic (or
smaller p−values) indicate a larger difference between the observed and theoretical
distributions and, thus, a greater likelihood of rejecting the joint null hypothesis that
each individual experiment is simultaneously generated by minimax play. Finally, the
KS test can be visualized by juxtaposing all the 320 observed p−values associated
with the Pearson statistics Pi with the uniform distribution. The larger the vertical
distance between the two CDFs is, the larger the KS statistic and the more likely the
rejection of the null hypothesis will be.
In a second step, we test the null hypothesis of the serial independence of the
servers’ choices, at both the individual and the joint levels, by implementing the runs
test (Wald & Wolfowitz, 1940). We define a run as a succession of one or more identical
actions (the serve direction) that are preceded and followed by a different choice or by
no choice at all. For example, an experiment having the following sequence of actions
{R, R, L, R, L, L} has four runs. In a given service sequence, having too many (few)
runs would suggest that the player is switching serve direction too often (not often
enough), resulting in a series of choices that is negatively (positively) autocorrelated.
In both cases, the test would suggest that the server is not changing direction in a
random matter. A server who is following some sort of pattern could be exploited
by his opponent, because the serve direction choices become predictable. A runs test
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would reject the null hypothesis of randomness if the number of runs is either too
large or too small relative to the theory.
We assume a sequence of n elements of two actions, nL for the serves to the
left and nR for the serves to the right, where nL + nR = n. Then, we compute
for every player-court sequence of choices i the number of runs ri. The probability
distribution of the total amount of runs r in a random sample is known (Gibbons
& Chakraborti, 2011). For large samples (n > 20), however, a good approximation




standard deviation σr =
2nLnR·(2nLnR−nL−nR)
(nL+nR)2·(nL+nR−1)
. The limiting probability function of the
test statistic z = r−µr
σr
is the standard normal density. Using a continuity correction
of 0.5, the left-tail and right-tail critical regions are as follows:
r + 0.5 − 1 − 2nLnR/n
√
2nLnR(2nLnR − n)/[n2(n − 1)]
≤ −zα, (5)
and
r − 0.5 − 1 − 2nLnR/n
√
2nLnR(2nLnR − n)/[n2(n − 1)]
≥ zα, (6)
where zα is 0.025 (0.05) at the 5% (10%) significance level. If the test statistic is greater
than its critical values, we reject the null hypothesis of randomness. Furthermore, we
test the joint null hypothesis that all observations are serially independent in each of
the 320 experiments using the KS test.
In general, when a strategic game is repeated over and over, some deviations
from the equilibrium predictions are expected. To account for these deviations, we
proceed as follows: if the percentage of experiments not consistent with Prediction




5.1 Full sample results
Prediction 1 : Testing for equality of winning probabilities
In Table 3, columns (1) and (2) summarize the full sample results of the individual
Pearson test.14 Given the large number of experiments, we present the individual
results in terms of the percentage of rejections at the standard 10% and 5% signifi-
cance levels. Specifically, column (1) indicates the percentage of experiments in which
the Pearson test p−value is smaller than 10%, whereas column (2) indicates the per-
centage of experiments in which the Pearson test p−value is smaller than 5%. As
we previously explained, we reject Prediction 1 when the actual percentage of the
individual rejections is larger than 10% or, using a stricter cut-off, larger than 5%.
Table 3
Prediction 1 : Full sample analysis.
Pearson test:
% of indiv. rej. Joint statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Exp. N 10% 5% Pearson KS
Full 320 14,658 12.81% 6.87% 407.3 (0.001) 1.769 (0.004)
Notes: The table reports the summary results of the Pearson and KS tests for Prediction 1 using the full sample.
An experiment (Exp.) consists of all the points played in any of the four server-court combinations. N indicates the
total number of points used for testing. Columns (1) and (2) indicate the percentage of the individual events resulting
in a rejection at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report the joint Pearson’s chi-square
goodness-of-fit and KS statistic (p−values in brackets), respectively.
For the full sample, the Pearson statistic is significant at the 10% level in 41
experiments and at the 5% level in 22 experiments, corresponding to 12.81% and
6.87% of the 320 experiments in total, respectively. The expected number of rejections
according to the theory (i.e., when the minimax null hypothesis is true) is 36 at the
10% level and 18 at the 5% level. Thus, there are more rejections than expected under
the null at the individual level.
At the aggregate level, we reject the joint null hypothesis of minimax play because
both the joint Pearson and KS statistics, as reported in column (3) and column (4),
14In the Appendix A.2, Table A.3 presents the results for each experiment.
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Figure 1
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for Prediction 1 (left) and for Prediction 2 (right). In both graphics, the closer the grey
line is to the black 45◦ line, the closer the data are to the minimax predictions.
are large and have associated p−values less than 1%. Additionally, the graphic in the
left part of Fig. 1 shows that the empirical CDF of the p−values associated with the
320 Pearson statistics Pi (represented by the grey line) does not precisely match the
uniform c.d.f (represented by the black 45◦ line). Indeed, a larger vertical distance
between the two lines indicates a larger KS statistic. Thus, we also reject the null
hypothesis that each of the experiments is simultaneously generated by equilibrium
play.
Overall, we do not find evidence supporting Prediction 1. This first result contra-
dicts Hsu et al. (2007) and Walker and Wooders (2001), who find supporting evidence
for Prediction 1.15
Prediction 2 : Testing for serial independence
In Table 4, columns (1) through (4) summarize the results of the individual runs test,
and column (5) shows the results of the joint runs KS test.16 As in the previous
section, we present the individual results in terms of the percentage of rejections
15As a comparison, in Walker and Wooders (2001), the percentage of rejections is 5% (at the 10% significance level)
and 2.5% (at the 5% significance level), the joint Pearson statistic is 30.8 (p−value=0.852), and the KS statistic is
0.67 (p−value=0.76). In Hsu et al. (2007), for the men’s singles sample, the percentage of rejections is 15% (at the
10% significance level) and 5% (at the 5% significance level), the joint Pearson statistic is 54.157 (p−value=0.067),
and the KS statistic is 0.778 (p−value=0.580).
16In the Appendix A.2, Table A.4 presents the results for each experiment.
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Table 4
Prediction 2 : Full sample analysis.
Runs test:
% of individual rejections Joint statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Exp. N 10% +/– 5% +/– KS
Full 320 14,658 10.31% 17/16 4.68% 5/10 1.305 (0.072)
Notes: The table reports the summary results of the runs tests for the Prediction 2 tests using the full sample. An
experiment (Exp.) consists of all the points played of any of the four server-court combinations. N indicates the total
number of points used for testing. The 10% and 5% columns indicate the number of rejections at the 10% and 5%
significance levels, respectively. The “+/–” column indicates the number of experiments for which the null hypothesis
is rejected either due to too many (+) or too few (–) runs.
at the standard 10% and 5% significance levels. Specifically, column (1) reports
the percentage of experiments in which the null hypothesis of serial independence is
rejected at the 10% significance level, whereas column (3) reports the percentage of
rejections at the 5% significance level. Columns (2) and (4) report the number of
individual rejections due to too many (+) or too few (–) runs at the 10% and 5%
levels, respectively.
For the full sample, the individual data are very close to the second minimax
prediction. The null hypothesis of serial independence is rejected at the 10% level for
33 experiments and at the 5% level for 15 experiments, corresponding to 10.31% and
4.68% of the 320 experiments in total, respectively. At the 10% significance level, we
find one rejection more than expected under the null, whereas at the 5% significance
level, we find one fewer than expected. According to column (4), 10 rejections out of
15 are caused by too few runs, i.e., when players do not switch often enough.
Concerning the question of whether the players’ choices are jointly serially inde-
pendent, the KS statistic is 1.305 and not statistically significant at the 5% level; thus,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all observations are serially independent in
each of the 320 experiments. This result is confirmed by the graphic in the right part
of Fig. 1.
Overall, we find evidence supporting Prediction 2. This result is in line with Hsu et
al. (2007) but not with Walker and Wooders (2001), who find that the server’s choices
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are not random but negatively correlated.17 Soccer studies, such as Palacios-Huerta
(2003) and Dohmen and Sonnabend (2016), also find evidence supporting Prediction
2. However, penalty kicks are taken very infrequently, automatically resulting in a
bias toward less serial correlation in the players’ choices.
5.2 Subsample results
In this section, we retest Predictions 1 and 2 with the same methodology but using
various subsamples. Table 5 reports the subsample results for Prediction 1. For the
lefty and righty matches subsamples, column (2) indicates that the percentage of rejec-
tions at the 5% level is almost twice as large for the lefty subsample (10.42%) than for
the righty subsample (5.36%). However, the joint Pearson and KS statistics are larger
for the righty matches. In general, these results confirm the idea that left-handedness
is an important physical characteristic that has to be taken into consideration when
analyzing players’ strategic choices in tennis.
In both the early and late tournament stage subsamples, the percentage of indi-
vidual rejections is higher than predicted by the minimax theorem. The joint Pearson
and KS statistics are significant for both subsamples, leading to a rejection of the null
hypothesis of minimax. Importantly, when comparing the two groups, we note that
the players play closer to the minimax predictions in the early tournament stages.
This result contrasts with that of Walker and Wooders (2001), who analyze mostly
finals and find evidence supporting Prediction 1.
When we compare the early- and late-set subsamples, both the individual and
joint Pearson tests show that players behave very close to the minimax predictions
in the later sets.18 This result is valuable because it suggests that players play closer
17As a comparison, in Walker and Wooders (2001), the percentage of rejections is 20% (at the 10% significance level)
and 12.5% (at the 5% significance level), and the joint KS statistic is 1.948 (p−value=0.001). In Hsu et al. (2007),
for the men’s singles sample, the percentage of rejections is 10% (at the 10% significance level) and 5% (at the 5%
significance level), and the joint KS statistic is 0.778 (5% critical value=1.328).
18All Grand Slam matches are played as the best of five sets. However, unlike the fourth and fifth sets, the third set
can end a match only when a player leads 2–0 after the second set. Thus, in a further test, we include the third set
in the first group only if one player had a 2–0 lead after the second set. The results are similar.
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Table 5
Prediction 1 : Subsample analyses.
Pearson test:
% of indiv. rej. Joint statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Exp. N 10% 5% Pearson KS
Lefty 96 4,139 16.67% 10.42% 133.93 (0.006) 1.18 (0.119)
Righty 224 10,519 11.16% 5.36% 273.35 (0.013) 1.49 (0.023)
Early stages 248 10,872 12.10% 6.05% 299.45 (0.014) 1.53 (0.018)
Late stages 72 3,876 15.28% 9.72% 107.83 (0.003) 1.29 (0.069)
Early sets 320 9,502 15.62% 8.12% 399.95 (0.001) 1.93 (0.001)
Late sets 316 5,156 10.13% 4.11% 327.58 (0.314) 1.41 (0.043)
Short matches 160 5,575 10.00% 6.25% 194.48 (0.032) 1.61 (0.010)
Long matches 160 9,083 15.62% 7.50% 212.80 (0.003) 1.03 (0.234)
Balanced 80 3,806 15.00% 11.25% 130.80 (0.000) 1.53 (0.017)
Unbalanced 80 3,274 5.00% 5.00% 80.88 (0.451) 0.74 (0.634)
Notes: The table reports the summary results of the Pearson and KS tests for Prediction 1 using various subsamples.
An experiment (Exp.) consists of all the points played in any of the four server-court combinations. N indicates the
total number of points used for testing. Columns (1) and (2) indicate the percentage of the individual events resulting
in a rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report the joint Pearson’s chi-square
goodness-of-fit and KS statistic (p−values in brackets), respectively.
to minimax at later and more important moments of the match, possibly indicating
that they cope well with pressure and that they improve their strategic skills over the
match.
Concerning the short and long match subsamples, column (1) indicates that the
percentage of rejections at the 10% level is 15.62% in long matches and 10% in short
matches. At the 5% level, the difference between the two groups is small. In contrast
to the joint Pearson test, the joint KS test does not lead to a rejection of minimax for
the long matches. Overall, it appears that the players play closer to Prediction 1 in
short matches than in long matches. This result may be attributed to fatigue, which
influences the players’ ability to play as intended (Davey et al., 2002).
Perhaps more surprisingly, we find that the percentage of rejections at the 10%
level is three times larger for the balanced matches than for the unbalanced matches.
Column (2) confirms this tendency as well at the 5% level. At the aggregate level,
we reject the joint null hypothesis of minimax for the balanced group at the 1% level
per both the joint Pearson and the KS tests. This finding is particularly interesting
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not only because of the large difference in the percentage of rejections between the
25% most balanced and the 25% most unbalanced matches but also because of the
closeness of the results to the first minimax prediction, both at the individual and
joint level, for the unbalanced matches. We further analyze this interesting finding at
the end of this section.
Overall, we observe a tendency toward accepting Prediction 1, which states that
each player’s probability of winning a point on serve across choices should be the same
in matches between right-handed players, in the early stages of a tournament but in
late sets of a match, and in shorter and unbalanced matches.
Table 6 reports the subsample results for Prediction 2. For the lefty and righty
matches subsamples, columns (1) and (3) indicate that Prediction 2 is rejected at
the individual level only for the matches with a left-handed player. In the righty
matches, the percentage of individual rejections is 9.28% at the 10% significance level
and 4.46% at the 5% significance level. The results at the experiment level for the
lefty matches are slightly higher. However, at the joint level, we reject the joint null
hypothesis only for the righty matches.
At the 5% level, the percentage of rejections of the runs test in the early-stage
matches (5.24%) is almost double that in the late-stage matches. Taken together, our
results suggest that whereas the players play according to Prediction 1 in the early
stages, they play according to Prediction 2 in the later stages.
In contrast to the early- and late-stage subsamples, we find that both Predictions
1 and 2 fare better in later sets than in earlier sets. Thus, by showing that both
minimax predictions describe the players’ behavior better in the later moments of a
match, our findings provide evidence confirming Binmore et al.’s (2001) suggestion
that people come closer to equilibrium by undergoing a trial-and-error adjustment
process.
Fatigue also appears to play a role in the players’ ability to randomize their serves.
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Table 6
Prediction 2 : Subsample analyses.
Runs test:
% of individual rejections Joint statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Exp. N 10% +/– 5% +/– KS
Lefty 96 4,139 11.45% 8/3 5.20% 2/3 1.10 (0.180)
Righty 224 10,519 9.82% 9/13 4.46% 3/7 1.88 (0.002)
Early stages 248 10,872 10.80% 16/11 5.24% 5/8 1.08 (0.202)
Late stages 72 3,786 8.30% 1/5 2.70% 0/2 1.48 (0.026)
Early sets 320 9,502 6.56% 10/11 4.06% 7/6 1.00 (0.273)
Late sets 316 5,156 5.69% 10/8 2.84% 6/3 0.71 (0.685)
Short matches 160 5,575 6.87% 7/4 2.50% 1/3 0.97 (0.309)
Long matches 160 9,083 13.75% 10/12 6.87% 4/7 1.34 (0.059)
Balanced 80 3,806 13.75% 5/6 6.25% 2/3 0.87 (0.437)
Unbalanced 80 3,274 5.00% 3/1 2.50% 1/1 0.67 (0.739)
Notes: The table reports the summary results of the runs tests for Prediction 2 using various subsamples. An
experiment (Exp.) consists of all the points played in any of the four server-court combinations. N indicates the total
number of points used for testing. The 10% and 5% columns indicate the number of rejections at the 10% and 5%
significance levels, respectively. The “+/–” column indicates the number of experiments for which the null hypothesis
is rejected either due to too many (+) or too few (–) runs.
Concerning the short- and long-match subsamples, columns (1) and (3) indicate that
the percentage of rejections both at the 10% level and at the 5% level is more than
twice as large in long matches. Considering the joint statistics, the KS test leads to
a rejection of the joint null hypothesis only for the long matches.
For the balanced and unbalanced matches subsamples, the percentage of individual
rejections in the balanced group (6.25%) is twice as large as in the unbalanced group
(2.50%). The difference in the percentage of individual rejections between subsamples
is even larger at the 10% significance level (8.75%). Although we cannot reject the
null hypothesis in any of the groups according to the joint KS test, the KS statistic
is smaller for the unbalanced group. The players’ behavior is very different between
these two groups for both the first and the second minimax prediction. This finding
confirms the intuition that playing against an equally skilled opponent is not the same
as playing against a less or more skilled opponent.
Overall, we observe a tendency toward accepting Prediction 2, which states that
the server’s choices are serially independent in matches between right-handed players,
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in the late stages of a tournament, in the later sets of a match, and in shorter and
unbalanced matches. When jointly considering the results for Predictions 1 and 2, the
tournament stage subsample is the only subsample that provides contradictory results
concerning minimax play—we find a tendency of playing according to Prediction 1 in
the early stages but a tendency of playing according to Prediction 2 in the late stages.
Thus, to summarize our subsample results, we find a tendency toward minimax play
in matches between right-handed players, in the later sets of a match, in shorter, and
in unbalanced matches.
Since our previous subsample definition of balanced and unbalanced matches does
not account for the relative skill level of each player—for example, a match between
two top players is a balanced match, as is one between two non-top players—we now
define four further subsamples depending on the skills of the server and of the receiver:
top server vs. top receiver, top server vs. non-top receiver, non-top server vs. non-top
receiver, and non-top server vs. top receiver. For each of these four subsamples, Panel
A in Table 7 reports the results for Prediction 1, and Panel B reports the results for
Prediction 2. In general, the percentage of rejections varies considerably across the
four subsamples, confirming the importance of considering the skills of both players.
In particular, the “top server vs. non-top receiver” subsample is the only one for
which Predictions 1 and 2 are consistently rejected, both at the individual and joint
levels. In other words, it appears that top servers do not play near the predictions of
minimax when facing non-top receivers. As this looks surprising, we further analyze
this finding in the following subsection.
5.3 Winning likelihood, minimax, and the players’ skills
To win, it might be rational for a player to deviate when his opponent systematically
deviates or is expected to deviate from minimax play (Levitt et al., 2010; Palacios-
Huerta, 2014). If this is true, we should find that playing minimax in the 124 “top
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Table 7
Predictions 1 and 2 : Relative skills subsample analyses.
Panel A: Prediction 1
Pearson test:
% of indiv. rej. Joint statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Exp. N 10% 5% Pearson KS
Top server vs. top receiver 32 1,699 21.87% 15.62% 61.17 (0.001) 1.19 (0.114)
Top server vs. non-top receiver 124 5,415 11.29% 6.45% 159.29 (0.017) 1.45 (0.029)
Non-top server vs. non-top receiver 44 1,957 15.90% 9.09% 51.59 (0.201) 0.54 (0.923)
Non-top server vs. top receiver 120 5,587 10.83% 4.16% 135.24 (0.161) 0.94 (0.331)
Panel B: Prediction 2
Runs test:
% of individual rejections Joint statistics
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample Exp. N 10% +/– 5% +/– KS
Top server vs. top receiver 32 1,699 9.37% 1/2 6.25% 1/1 1.24 (0.100)
Top server vs. non-top receiver 124 5,415 14.51% 7/11 5.64% 1/6 2.43 (0.000)
Non-top server vs. non-top receiver 44 1,957 6.81% 3/0 2.27% 1/0 0.85 (0.462)
Non-top server vs. top receiver 120 5,587 7.50% 6/3 4.16% 2/3 1.37 (0.051)
Notes: Panel A reports the summary results of the Pearson and KS tests for Prediction 1. Panel B reports the
summary results of the runs tests for Prediction 2. An experiment (Exp.) consists of all the points (N) played by a
given server against a given server from a given court.
server vs. non-top receiver” experiments actually reduces the likelihood of winning a
match for the top player. We analyze this hypothesis in two steps.
We begin by asking whether playing minimax affects, on average, a player’s like-
lihood of winning a match. Formally, we estimate the following regression:
win_matchi = α0 + β1 · minimaxi + β2 · controli + ui , (7)
where i indexes an experiment. The variable win_match equals one when the server
wins the match and is zero otherwise. For each experiment i, we know whether the
individual Pearson and runs tests result in a rejection of Prediction 1 or 2 at the 10%
level. If both Prediction 1 and 2 are satisfied for experiment i, then the minimax
variable equals one and is zero otherwise. To control for other factors influencing
the probability of the server winning the match, we also include the variable control,
corresponding to the odds-implied winning probability of the server at the beginning of
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the match. This is appropriate because the betting odds reflect all public information
available about the two players, such as surface preferences, recent injuries, or current
winning streak (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2006).
We then ask whether it is rational for top servers to play minimax against non-top
receivers, given their goal of winning the match. We interact the minimax variable
with the topbad dummy, which equals one for all the “top server vs. non-top receiver”
experiments. Thus, we estimate the following regression:
win_matchi = α0 + β1 · minimaxi + β2 · topbadi
+ β3 · (minimax · topbadi) + β4 · controli + ui .
(8)
The first two columns of Table 8 report the ordinary least squares regression estimates
for both regression equations.19 Column (1) indicates that on average, playing mini-
max does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of winning. However, column
(2) indicates that a top server decreases his winning likelihood by more than 18% if
he plays minimax against non-top receivers. In other words, this confirms the idea
that more deviations from minimax play do not hurt top servers, possibly because ei-
ther top players have more sophisticated tennis skills that compensate for suboptimal
minimax behavior or non-top players do not have the required skills to readily exploit
that suboptimal behavior.
As a further test, we replace the dependent variable win_match in Eq. 7 and
8 with the total number of points won in each experiment (points_won) by the
server. The advantage of using points_won is that it contains more information than
win_match and varies at the experiment level. Column (4) in Table 8 shows that top
players lose, on average, more than six points when playing minimax against non-top
players.
A limitation of this analysis is that we regress the outcome of the match for the
19As a robustness check, we use logistic regression. The results are similar.
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Table 8
Minimax play and winning.
Dependent variable: win_match Dependent variable: points_won
(1) (2) (3) (4)
minimax -0.008 0.067 -1.714 0.762
(0.038) (0.052) (1.539) (1.917)
topbad 0.068 -0.340
(0.110) (3.727)
minimax × topbad -0.186** -6.229**
(0.075) (3.162)
control 1.020*** 1.105*** 53.668*** 59.226***
(0.053) (0.106) (2.604) (3.951)
Exp. 320 320 320 320
N 14,658 14,658 14,658 14,658
F-stat 188.55 111.71 216.08 116.43
P r > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.560 0.568 0.708 0.714
Notes: The table reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variable in columns (1) and
(2) is a dummy indicating whether the server won the match, and that in columns (3) and (4) is a variable indicating
the total number of points won by the server from a given court. All estimations also include a constant (not reported).
The data are at the experiment level (Exp.=320) and include 80 men’s singles matches played at Wimbledon. Robust
standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the match, and player levels are provided in parentheses. In
all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
server on a behavior that is not determined solely by the server (minimax). In
particular, when testing Prediction 1, we cannot directly observe whether the receiver
is playing to make the server’s payoffs equal across choices. Concerning Prediction
2, where we analyze the randomizing skills of the servers, our analysis should be less
problematic. Although the receiver can attempt to influence the server’s behavior by
moving across the court to incentivize the server to hit the ball in a given direction,
we believe that the decision to play according to Prediction 2 is more in the hands of
the server.
6 Concluding remarks
Earlier field studies have not yet explained when professionals behave according to
minimax and the role of the players’ skills level. Using our full sample, we find that
while players’ choices are serially independent (Prediction 2 ), the winning probabilities
are not statistically identical across choices (Prediction 1 ). Importantly, we show that
players tend toward minimax play in matches between right-handed players, in the
85
later sets of a match, and in shorter and unbalanced matches. Here, further research is
needed to clarify how the specific conditions of tennis are generalizable: for example,
how do our results for the “later sets of a match” subsample apply to general situations
under pressure?
After further investigation of the importance of the skills of the players, we find
that situations involving a top server playing against a non-top receiver persistently
result in more deviations from minimax play. Crucially, our results show that top
servers can significantly increase their likelihood of winning the match and the number
of points won by, at times, deviating from the minimax equilibrium. Thus, future
laboratory studies should take into consideration the experiment participants’ skills




The International Tennis Federation (ITF) describes the tennis serving rules. At
Grand Slam tournaments, matches are played as the best of five sets: the first player
to win three sets wins the match. At the beginning of the match, a coin toss decides
which player starts serving in the first game. In the second game, his opponent will
serve and so forth. The player who loses a set will start serving in the next set.
When serving in a standard game, the server shall stand behind alternate halves
of the court, starting from the right half of the court in every game. The serve shall
pass over the net and hit the service court diagonally opposite, i.e., the left (ad) or
the right (deuce) court, before the receiver returns it. If the first serve is a fault, the
server shall serve again (the second serve) without delay from behind the same half
of the court from which that fault was served.
Fig. A.1 shows the tennis court, which for singles matches is 78 feet (23.77 meters)
long and 27 feet (8.23 meters) wide, and illustrates possible serve directions (excluding
the serve to the center). The server shall stand at rest with both feet behind the
baseline (the black point approximately indicates his position) and put the ball into
the cross-court service box (the grey area). The receiver is free to choose his position.
The court on the left shows the server’s two choices for right (deuce) points, that is,
serving close to the center line (L) toward the receiver’s left or serving wide toward
the receiver’s right (R). The court on the right shows the server’s two choices for left
(ad) points, that is, serving close to the center line toward the receiver’s right (R) or


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.2 Full sample results
Tables A.3 and A.4 present the the full sample results (** indicates a rejection at the
10% level, * indicates a rejection at the 5% level). In Table A.3, “Serves” indicates
the total number of serve points played by a server from a given court; “Mixture” is
computed by dividing the number of serves to the left or right by the total number
of serves; “Won” indicates the total number of serves won, either to the left or right;
“Win rates”, the key variable for testing Prediction 1, is computed by dividing “Won”
by “Serves” (for left or right). For example, Garcia-Lopez served 15 times to the left
from the ad-court and won ten points, yielding a win rate of roughly 67% from that
court. Finally, the Pearson statistic is computed according to Eq. 2.
Table A.3
Prediction 1 : Full sample results.
Serves Mixture Won Win rates Individual test
Year Server Court L R Total L R L R L R Pearson p-value
24-Jun-09 G.Garcia-Lopez Ad 15 11 26 0.58 0.42 10 4 0.67 0.36 2.345 0.125
24-Jun-09 G.Garcia-Lopez Deuce 20 11 31 0.65 0.35 13 10 0.65 0.91 2.488 0.114
24-Jun-09 R.Federer Ad 20 13 33 0.61 0.39 14 12 0.70 0.92 2.346 0.125
24-Jun-09 R.Federer Deuce 21 13 34 0.62 0.38 15 12 0.71 0.92 2.141 0.143
26-Jun-09 P.Kohlschreiber Ad 27 22 49 0.55 0.45 14 11 0.52 0.50 0.017 0.897
26-Jun-09 P.Kohlschreiber Deuce 23 25 48 0.48 0.52 13 14 0.57 0.56 0.001 0.970
26-Jun-09 R.Federer Ad 30 25 55 0.55 0.45 20 16 0.67 0.64 0.043 0.835
26-Jun-09 R.Federer Deuce 31 27 58 0.53 0.47 23 21 0.74 0.78 0.101 0.750
27-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Ad 24 29 53 0.45 0.55 20 16 0.83 0.55 4.780 0.028*
27-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Deuce 16 38 54 0.30 0.70 12 26 0.75 0.68 0.234 0.628
27-Jun-09 J.Levine Ad 37 27 64 0.58 0.42 26 17 0.70 0.63 0.378 0.538
27-Jun-09 J.Levine Deuce 24 45 69 0.35 0.65 15 27 0.63 0.60 0.041 0.839
29-Jun-09 A.Murray Ad 39 22 61 0.64 0.36 27 19 0.69 0.86 2.227 0.135
29-Jun-09 A.Murray Deuce 29 37 66 0.44 0.56 17 25 0.59 0.68 0.562 0.453
29-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Ad 38 34 72 0.53 0.47 22 18 0.58 0.53 0.178 0.672
29-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Deuce 38 38 76 0.50 0.50 28 25 0.74 0.66 0.561 0.453
29-Jun-09 R.Soderling Ad 22 17 39 0.56 0.44 19 11 0.86 0.65 2.534 0.111
29-Jun-09 R.Soderling Deuce 14 20 34 0.41 0.59 12 19 0.86 0.95 0.883 0.347
29-Jun-09 R.Federer Ad 24 20 44 0.55 0.45 22 16 0.92 0.80 1.261 0.261
29-Jun-09 R.Federer Deuce 22 24 46 0.48 0.52 15 19 0.68 0.79 0.718 0.396
01-Jul-09 T.Haas Ad 20 25 45 0.44 0.56 16 18 0.80 0.72 0.385 0.534
01-Jul-09 T.Haas Deuce 33 21 54 0.61 0.39 26 17 0.79 0.81 0.037 0.847
01-Jul-09 N.Djokovic Ad 28 18 46 0.61 0.39 21 14 0.75 0.78 0.046 0.829
01-Jul-09 N.Djokovic Deuce 25 24 49 0.51 0.49 22 15 0.88 0.63 4.306 0.037*
01-Jul-09 L.Hewitt Ad 37 42 79 0.47 0.53 21 26 0.57 0.62 0.216 0.641
01-Jul-09 L.Hewitt Deuce 25 48 73 0.34 0.66 23 37 0.92 0.77 2.499 0.113
01-Jul-09 A.Roddick Ad 44 33 77 0.57 0.43 31 23 0.70 0.70 0.005 0.942
01-Jul-09 A.Roddick Deuce 49 25 74 0.66 0.34 40 17 0.82 0.68 1.739 0.187
01-Jul-09 I.Karlovic Ad 19 15 34 0.56 0.44 15 12 0.79 0.80 0.006 0.939
01-Jul-09 I.Karlovic Deuce 22 16 38 0.58 0.42 16 14 0.73 0.88 1.216 0.270
01-Jul-09 R.Federer Ad 20 15 35 0.57 0.43 17 13 0.85 0.87 0.019 0.889
01-Jul-09 R.Federer Deuce 28 12 40 0.70 0.30 26 12 0.93 1.00 0.902 0.342
03-Jul-09 T.Haas Ad 27 17 44 0.61 0.39 19 11 0.70 0.65 0.154 0.694
03-Jul-09 T.Haas Deuce 37 12 49 0.76 0.24 24 9 0.65 0.75 0.423 0.515
03-Jul-09 R.Federer Ad 25 14 39 0.64 0.36 22 13 0.88 0.93 0.230 0.631
03-Jul-09 R.Federer Deuce 20 18 38 0.53 0.47 19 14 0.95 0.78 2.459 0.116
03-Jul-09 A.Roddick Ad 29 32 61 0.48 0.52 19 25 0.66 0.78 1.203 0.272
03-Jul-09 A.Roddick Deuce 37 25 62 0.60 0.40 29 15 0.78 0.60 2.446 0.117
03-Jul-09 A.Murray Ad 45 18 63 0.71 0.29 34 10 0.76 0.56 2.442 0.118
03-Jul-09 A.Murray Deuce 45 17 62 0.73 0.27 33 14 0.73 0.82 0.547 0.459
05-Jul-09 A.Roddick Ad 41 53 94 0.44 0.56 28 41 0.68 0.77 0.973 0.323
05-Jul-09 A.Roddick Deuce 73 24 97 0.75 0.25 62 15 0.85 0.63 5.553 0.018*
05-Jul-09 R.Federer Ad 47 33 80 0.59 0.41 38 27 0.81 0.82 0.012 0.913
05-Jul-09 R.Federer Deuce 45 42 87 0.52 0.48 36 36 0.80 0.86 0.497 0.480
Continued on next page
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Serves Mixture Won Win rates Individual test
Year Server Court L R Total L R L R L R Pearson p-value
21-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 28 39 67 0.42 0.58 18 29 0.64 0.74 0.790 0.374
21-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 30 39 69 0.43 0.57 20 31 0.67 0.79 1.445 0.229
21-Jun-10 A.Falla Ad 71 12 83 0.86 0.14 42 9 0.59 0.75 1.088 0.296
21-Jun-10 A.Falla Deuce 72 10 82 0.88 0.12 45 5 0.63 0.50 0.577 0.447
23-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 31 26 57 0.54 0.46 24 19 0.77 0.73 0.144 0.704
23-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 32 31 63 0.51 0.49 24 24 0.75 0.77 0.051 0.821
23-Jun-10 I.Bozoljac Ad 31 27 58 0.53 0.47 25 20 0.81 0.74 0.358 0.549
23-Jun-10 I.Bozoljac Deuce 38 23 61 0.62 0.38 28 17 0.74 0.74 0.000 0.984
25-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 17 11 28 0.61 0.39 15 8 0.88 0.73 1.095 0.295
25-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 17 14 31 0.55 0.45 14 13 0.82 0.93 0.754 0.385
25-Jun-10 A.Clement Ad 19 12 31 0.61 0.39 6 9 0.32 0.75 5.552 0.018*
25-Jun-10 A.Clement Deuce 17 17 34 0.50 0.50 10 13 0.59 0.76 1.209 0.271
26-Jun-10 P.Petzschner Ad 24 46 70 0.34 0.66 19 26 0.79 0.57 3.523 0.060**
26-Jun-10 P.Petzschner Deuce 34 44 78 0.44 0.56 25 28 0.74 0.64 0.862 0.353
26-Jun-10 R.Nadal Ad 34 17 51 0.67 0.33 32 15 0.94 0.88 0.543 0.461
26-Jun-10 R.Nadal Deuce 42 12 54 0.78 0.22 28 8 0.67 0.67 0.000 0.999
28-Jun-10 N.Djokovic Ad 23 27 50 0.46 0.54 16 20 0.70 0.74 0.125 0.723
28-Jun-10 N.Djokovic Deuce 27 17 44 0.61 0.39 18 15 0.67 0.88 2.588 0.107
28-Jun-10 L.Hewitt Ad 25 24 49 0.51 0.49 20 16 0.80 0.67 1.117 0.290
28-Jun-10 L.Hewitt Deuce 13 32 45 0.29 0.71 10 22 0.77 0.69 0.301 0.583
28-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 9 17 26 0.35 0.65 7 12 0.78 0.71 0.155 0.694
28-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 14 16 30 0.47 0.53 13 14 0.93 0.88 0.238 0.625
28-Jun-10 J.Melzer Ad 24 11 35 0.69 0.31 14 6 0.58 0.55 0.044 0.833
28-Jun-10 J.Melzer Deuce 27 10 37 0.73 0.27 11 7 0.41 0.70 2.501 0.113
30-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 32 22 54 0.59 0.41 19 13 0.59 0.59 0.000 0.983
30-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 26 30 56 0.46 0.54 18 22 0.69 0.73 0.115 0.734
30-Jun-10 T.Berdych Ad 32 20 52 0.62 0.38 18 16 0.56 0.80 3.067 0.079**
30-Jun-10 T.Berdych Deuce 26 23 49 0.53 0.47 17 17 0.65 0.74 0.418 0.517
30-Jun-10 R.Soderling Ad 18 22 40 0.45 0.55 12 15 0.67 0.68 0.010 0.918
30-Jun-10 R.Soderling Deuce 23 23 46 0.50 0.50 20 16 0.87 0.70 2.044 0.152
30-Jun-10 R.Nadal Ad 19 29 48 0.40 0.60 11 27 0.58 0.93 8.628 0.003*
30-Jun-10 R.Nadal Deuce 32 18 50 0.64 0.36 20 12 0.63 0.67 0.087 0.768
30-Jun-10 J.Tsonga Ad 30 34 64 0.47 0.53 23 21 0.77 0.62 1.647 0.199
30-Jun-10 J.Tsonga Deuce 36 27 63 0.57 0.43 20 19 0.56 0.70 1.436 0.230
30-Jun-10 A.Murray Ad 38 18 56 0.68 0.32 29 14 0.76 0.78 0.015 0.903
30-Jun-10 A.Murray Deuce 35 20 55 0.64 0.36 26 15 0.74 0.75 0.003 0.953
02-Jul-10 A.Murray Ad 11 29 40 0.28 0.73 8 19 0.73 0.66 0.189 0.663
02-Jul-10 A.Murray Deuce 19 25 44 0.43 0.57 15 20 0.79 0.80 0.007 0.931
02-Jul-10 R.Nadal Ad 12 27 39 0.31 0.69 6 22 0.50 0.81 4.066 0.043*
02-Jul-10 R.Nadal Deuce 22 20 42 0.52 0.48 15 15 0.68 0.75 0.239 0.625
02-Jul-10 T.Berdych Ad 23 18 41 0.56 0.44 15 15 0.65 0.83 1.688 0.193
02-Jul-10 T.Berdych Deuce 20 22 42 0.48 0.52 15 17 0.75 0.77 0.030 0.862
02-Jul-10 N.Djokovic Ad 18 13 31 0.58 0.42 13 12 0.72 0.92 1.951 0.162
02-Jul-10 N.Djokovic Deuce 20 16 36 0.56 0.44 15 8 0.75 0.50 2.408 0.120
04-Jul-10 T.Berdych Ad 8 26 34 0.24 0.76 7 15 0.88 0.58 2.380 0.122
04-Jul-10 T.Berdych Deuce 6 34 40 0.15 0.85 4 22 0.67 0.65 0.009 0.926
04-Jul-10 R.Nadal Ad 25 10 35 0.71 0.29 22 9 0.88 0.90 0.028 0.866
04-Jul-10 R.Nadal Deuce 31 9 40 0.78 0.23 18 7 0.58 0.78 1.157 0.282
21-Jun-11 M.Kukushkin Ad 26 13 39 0.67 0.33 12 9 0.46 0.69 1.857 0.172
21-Jun-11 M.Kukushkin Deuce 23 22 45 0.51 0.49 14 17 0.61 0.77 1.412 0.234
21-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 24 13 37 0.65 0.35 21 9 0.88 0.69 1.835 0.175
21-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 17 20 37 0.46 0.54 17 18 1.00 0.90 1.797 0.180
23-Jun-11 A.Mannarino Ad 20 10 30 0.67 0.33 10 6 0.50 0.60 0.268 0.604
23-Jun-11 A.Mannarino Deuce 24 10 34 0.71 0.29 15 4 0.63 0.40 1.449 0.228
23-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 15 16 31 0.48 0.52 13 14 0.87 0.88 0.005 0.944
23-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 15 16 31 0.48 0.52 13 11 0.87 0.69 1.422 0.233
25-Jun-11 M.Baghdatis Ad 27 22 49 0.55 0.45 17 15 0.63 0.68 0.146 0.702
25-Jun-11 M.Baghdatis Deuce 21 31 52 0.40 0.60 12 20 0.57 0.65 0.288 0.591
25-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Ad 19 24 43 0.44 0.56 13 19 0.68 0.79 0.643 0.422
25-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 26 26 52 0.50 0.50 18 20 0.69 0.77 0.391 0.531
25-Jun-11 D.Nalbandian Ad 21 17 38 0.55 0.45 12 10 0.57 0.59 0.011 0.916
25-Jun-11 D.Nalbandian Deuce 19 13 32 0.59 0.41 13 8 0.68 0.62 0.162 0.687
25-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 24 13 37 0.65 0.35 15 9 0.63 0.69 0.168 0.682
25-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 26 13 39 0.67 0.33 23 9 0.88 0.69 2.176 0.140
27-Jun-11 A.Murray Ad 20 15 35 0.57 0.43 17 9 0.85 0.60 2.804 0.094**
27-Jun-11 A.Murray Deuce 21 14 35 0.60 0.40 17 10 0.81 0.71 0.432 0.510
27-Jun-11 R.Gasquet Ad 20 17 37 0.54 0.46 13 11 0.65 0.65 0.000 0.985
27-Jun-11 R.Gasquet Deuce 19 22 41 0.46 0.54 12 16 0.63 0.73 0.431 0.511
27-Jun-11 M.Llodra Ad 20 13 33 0.61 0.39 13 7 0.65 0.54 0.411 0.521
27-Jun-11 M.Llodra Deuce 19 13 32 0.59 0.41 13 10 0.68 0.77 0.276 0.599
27-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Ad 11 19 30 0.37 0.63 9 15 0.82 0.79 0.036 0.849
27-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 12 19 31 0.39 0.61 11 14 0.92 0.74 1.524 0.217
27-Jun-11 M.Youzhny Ad 42 19 61 0.69 0.31 22 11 0.52 0.58 0.160 0.689
27-Jun-11 M.Youzhny Deuce 36 24 60 0.60 0.40 24 15 0.67 0.63 0.110 0.740
27-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 30 18 48 0.63 0.38 26 13 0.87 0.72 1.541 0.214
27-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 19 25 44 0.43 0.57 12 20 0.63 0.80 1.544 0.214
29-Jun-11 R.Nadal Ad 26 12 38 0.68 0.32 18 10 0.69 0.83 0.842 0.358
29-Jun-11 R.Nadal Deuce 18 11 29 0.62 0.38 13 10 0.72 0.91 1.453 0.228
29-Jun-11 M.Fish Ad 28 23 51 0.55 0.45 14 16 0.50 0.70 1.996 0.157
Continued on next page
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29-Jun-11 M.Fish Deuce 25 24 49 0.51 0.49 16 12 0.64 0.50 0.980 0.322
29-Jun-11 J.Tsonga Ad 44 18 62 0.71 0.29 31 15 0.70 0.83 1.107 0.292
29-Jun-11 J.Tsonga Deuce 40 24 64 0.63 0.38 28 16 0.70 0.67 0.078 0.780
29-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 34 22 56 0.61 0.39 25 16 0.74 0.73 0.004 0.947
29-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 30 32 62 0.48 0.52 23 24 0.77 0.75 0.023 0.878
01-Jul-11 R.Nadal Ad 13 22 35 0.37 0.63 10 19 0.77 0.86 0.513 0.473
01-Jul-11 R.Nadal Deuce 28 15 43 0.65 0.35 25 9 0.89 0.60 5.062 0.024*
01-Jul-11 A.Murray Ad 12 36 48 0.25 0.75 8 22 0.67 0.61 0.119 0.730
01-Jul-11 A.Murray Deuce 22 27 49 0.45 0.55 21 13 0.95 0.48 12.772 0.000*
01-Jul-11 J.Tsonga Ad 35 23 58 0.60 0.40 18 20 0.51 0.87 7.754 0.005*
01-Jul-11 J.Tsonga Deuce 27 30 57 0.47 0.53 19 17 0.70 0.57 1.147 0.284
01-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Ad 28 13 41 0.68 0.32 25 7 0.89 0.54 6.508 0.010*
01-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 30 27 57 0.53 0.47 22 23 0.73 0.85 1.201 0.273
03-Jul-11 R.Nadal Ad 12 19 31 0.39 0.61 11 12 0.92 0.63 3.122 0.077**
03-Jul-11 R.Nadal Deuce 29 8 37 0.78 0.22 20 4 0.69 0.50 0.990 0.319
03-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Ad 14 24 38 0.37 0.63 11 13 0.79 0.54 2.263 0.132
03-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 16 27 43 0.37 0.63 11 22 0.69 0.81 0.912 0.339
25-Jun-12 R.Federer Ad 13 11 24 0.54 0.46 10 4 0.77 0.36 4.033 0.044*
25-Jun-12 R.Federer Deuce 16 12 28 0.57 0.43 14 10 0.88 0.83 0.097 0.755
25-Jun-12 A.Ramos Ad 22 8 30 0.73 0.27 8 2 0.36 0.25 0.341 0.559
25-Jun-12 A.Ramos Deuce 18 7 25 0.72 0.28 11 3 0.61 0.43 0.682 0.409
27-Jun-12 R.Federer Ad 15 9 24 0.63 0.38 10 8 0.67 0.89 1.481 0.223
27-Jun-12 R.Federer Deuce 19 9 28 0.68 0.32 17 8 0.89 0.89 0.002 0.962
27-Jun-12 F.Fognini Ad 17 10 27 0.63 0.37 10 5 0.59 0.50 0.199 0.655
27-Jun-12 F.Fognini Deuce 22 10 32 0.69 0.31 9 7 0.41 0.70 2.327 0.127
29-Jun-12 R.Federer Ad 37 25 62 0.60 0.40 26 19 0.70 0.76 0.246 0.619
29-Jun-12 R.Federer Deuce 33 39 72 0.46 0.54 26 31 0.79 0.79 0.005 0.941
29-Jun-12 J.Benneteau Ad 39 26 65 0.60 0.40 28 18 0.72 0.69 0.050 0.823
29-Jun-12 J.Benneteau Deuce 57 20 77 0.74 0.26 36 13 0.63 0.65 0.022 0.882
02-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 26 22 48 0.54 0.46 21 12 0.81 0.55 3.814 0.050**
02-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 23 29 52 0.44 0.56 16 21 0.70 0.72 0.051 0.821
02-Jul-12 X.Malisse Ad 30 20 50 0.60 0.40 21 9 0.70 0.45 3.125 0.077**
02-Jul-12 X.Malisse Deuce 44 11 55 0.80 0.20 23 7 0.52 0.64 0.458 0.498
04-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 17 10 27 0.63 0.37 12 9 0.71 0.90 1.373 0.241
04-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 10 19 29 0.34 0.66 6 15 0.60 0.79 1.177 0.277
04-Jul-12 M.Youzhny Ad 15 16 31 0.48 0.52 8 9 0.53 0.56 0.027 0.870
04-Jul-12 M.Youzhny Deuce 21 13 34 0.62 0.38 10 8 0.48 0.62 0.624 0.429
04-Jul-12 D.Ferrer Ad 33 41 74 0.45 0.55 16 33 0.48 0.80 8.371 0.003*
04-Jul-12 D.Ferrer Deuce 24 31 55 0.44 0.56 14 24 0.58 0.77 2.307 0.128
04-Jul-12 A.Murray Ad 38 27 65 0.58 0.42 34 20 0.89 0.74 2.663 0.102
04-Jul-12 A.Murray Deuce 36 29 65 0.55 0.45 24 19 0.67 0.66 0.009 0.922
06-Jul-12 A.Murray Ad 21 24 45 0.47 0.53 16 16 0.76 0.67 0.495 0.481
06-Jul-12 A.Murray Deuce 30 24 54 0.56 0.44 22 18 0.73 0.75 0.019 0.889
06-Jul-12 J.Tsonga Ad 42 17 59 0.71 0.29 27 12 0.64 0.71 0.215 0.643
06-Jul-12 J.Tsonga Deuce 35 22 57 0.61 0.39 18 17 0.51 0.77 3.807 0.051**
06-Jul-12 N.Djokovic Ad 25 20 45 0.56 0.44 13 15 0.52 0.75 2.501 0.113
06-Jul-12 N.Djokovic Deuce 30 22 52 0.58 0.42 20 18 0.67 0.82 1.481 0.223
06-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 21 20 41 0.51 0.49 17 14 0.81 0.70 0.666 0.414
06-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 22 23 45 0.49 0.51 17 19 0.77 0.83 0.200 0.654
08-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 35 25 60 0.58 0.42 22 17 0.63 0.68 0.170 0.680
08-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 22 33 55 0.40 0.60 17 27 0.77 0.82 0.170 0.679
08-Jul-12 A.Murray Ad 52 21 73 0.71 0.29 36 9 0.69 0.43 4.401 0.035*
08-Jul-12 A.Murray Deuce 53 20 73 0.73 0.27 31 14 0.58 0.70 0.814 0.367
24-Jun-13 V.Hanescu Ad 12 9 21 0.57 0.43 5 4 0.42 0.44 0.016 0.898
24-Jun-13 V.Hanescu Deuce 13 11 24 0.54 0.46 8 6 0.62 0.55 0.120 0.729
24-Jun-13 R.Federer Ad 9 11 20 0.45 0.55 8 10 0.89 0.91 0.022 0.880
24-Jun-13 R.Federer Deuce 14 11 25 0.56 0.44 13 9 0.93 0.82 0.711 0.399
24-Jun-13 R.Nadal Ad 29 17 46 0.63 0.37 18 13 0.62 0.76 1.012 0.314
24-Jun-13 R.Nadal Deuce 40 10 50 0.80 0.20 24 5 0.60 0.50 0.328 0.566
24-Jun-13 S.Darcis Ad 18 31 49 0.37 0.63 10 20 0.56 0.65 0.385 0.534
24-Jun-13 S.Darcis Deuce 20 34 54 0.37 0.63 17 22 0.85 0.65 2.585 0.107
25-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Ad 22 17 39 0.56 0.44 21 14 0.95 0.82 1.788 0.181
25-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 19 21 40 0.48 0.53 13 11 0.68 0.52 1.069 0.301
25-Jun-13 F.Mayer Ad 24 17 41 0.59 0.41 14 10 0.58 0.59 0.001 0.974
25-Jun-13 F.Mayer Deuce 28 17 45 0.62 0.38 17 14 0.61 0.82 2.311 0.128
25-Jun-13 D.Ferrer Ad 20 18 38 0.53 0.47 18 14 0.90 0.78 1.064 0.302
25-Jun-13 D.Ferrer Deuce 11 16 27 0.41 0.59 9 13 0.82 0.81 0.001 0.970
25-Jun-13 M.Alund Ad 31 15 46 0.67 0.33 22 11 0.71 0.73 0.028 0.867
25-Jun-13 M.Alund Deuce 22 14 36 0.61 0.39 10 9 0.45 0.64 1.217 0.269
25-Jun-13 A.Ramos Ad 19 6 25 0.76 0.24 13 4 0.68 0.67 0.006 0.935
25-Jun-13 A.Ramos Deuce 25 14 39 0.64 0.36 12 8 0.48 0.57 0.300 0.583
25-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Ad 8 25 33 0.24 0.76 6 21 0.75 0.84 0.330 0.565
25-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Deuce 18 12 30 0.60 0.40 14 9 0.78 0.75 0.031 0.860
26-Jun-13 J-W.Tsonga Ad 22 13 35 0.63 0.37 13 8 0.59 0.62 0.020 0.886
26-Jun-13 J-W.Tsonga Deuce 17 17 34 0.50 0.50 16 10 0.94 0.59 5.885 0.015*
26-Jun-13 E.Gulbis Ad 15 14 29 0.52 0.48 10 11 0.67 0.79 0.514 0.473
26-Jun-13 E.Gulbis Deuce 13 18 31 0.42 0.58 11 12 0.85 0.67 1.270 0.259
26-Jun-13 F.Verdasco Ad 28 13 41 0.68 0.32 24 12 0.86 0.92 0.360 0.548
26-Jun-13 F.Verdasco Deuce 22 20 42 0.52 0.48 19 15 0.86 0.75 0.877 0.348
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26-Jun-13 J.Benneteau Ad 21 26 47 0.45 0.55 14 21 0.67 0.81 1.215 0.270
26-Jun-13 J.Benneteau Deuce 27 25 52 0.52 0.48 19 14 0.70 0.56 1.156 0.282
27-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Ad 18 14 32 0.56 0.44 14 11 0.78 0.79 0.003 0.957
27-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 17 20 37 0.46 0.54 15 19 0.88 0.95 0.564 0.452
27-Jun-13 B.Reynolds Ad 16 22 38 0.42 0.58 10 12 0.63 0.55 0.240 0.623
27-Jun-13 B.Reynolds Deuce 15 12 27 0.56 0.44 13 9 0.87 0.75 0.601 0.438
27-Jun-13 R.Gasquet Ad 16 23 39 0.41 0.59 11 18 0.69 0.78 0.448 0.503
27-Jun-13 R.Gasquet Deuce 28 20 48 0.58 0.42 21 13 0.75 0.65 0.565 0.452
27-Jun-13 G.Soeda Ad 26 20 46 0.57 0.43 17 8 0.65 0.40 2.936 0.086**
27-Jun-13 G.Soeda Deuce 26 22 48 0.54 0.46 16 13 0.62 0.59 0.030 0.862
27-Jun-13 J.Levine Ad 25 16 41 0.61 0.39 14 13 0.56 0.81 2.766 0.096**
27-Jun-13 J.Levine Deuce 24 16 40 0.60 0.40 12 11 0.50 0.69 1.381 0.239
27-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Ad 7 29 36 0.19 0.81 3 24 0.43 0.83 4.788 0.028*
27-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Deuce 20 9 29 0.69 0.31 15 7 0.75 0.78 0.026 0.871
28-Jun-13 J.Melzer Ad 31 11 42 0.74 0.26 19 10 0.61 0.91 3.333 0.067**
28-Jun-13 J.Melzer Deuce 24 20 44 0.55 0.45 17 11 0.71 0.55 1.182 0.276
28-Jun-13 S.Stakhovsky Ad 17 13 30 0.57 0.43 11 8 0.65 0.62 0.032 0.858
28-Jun-13 S.Stakhovsky Deuce 17 19 36 0.47 0.53 13 13 0.76 0.68 0.290 0.590
01-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Ad 27 29 56 0.48 0.52 20 23 0.74 0.79 0.215 0.642
01-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Deuce 30 29 59 0.51 0.49 23 24 0.77 0.83 0.338 0.561
01-Jul-13 J.Melzer Ad 44 14 58 0.76 0.24 35 11 0.80 0.79 0.006 0.937
01-Jul-13 J.Melzer Deuce 27 24 51 0.53 0.47 15 18 0.56 0.75 2.104 0.146
01-Jul-13 M.Youzhny Ad 27 13 40 0.68 0.33 14 7 0.52 0.54 0.014 0.905
01-Jul-13 M.Youzhny Deuce 22 18 40 0.55 0.45 11 12 0.50 0.67 1.125 0.288
01-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 28 14 42 0.67 0.33 16 11 0.57 0.79 1.867 0.171
01-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 35 13 48 0.73 0.27 32 7 0.91 0.54 8.789 0.003*
03-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Ad 20 20 40 0.50 0.50 15 13 0.75 0.65 0.476 0.490
03-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 25 13 38 0.66 0.34 21 8 0.84 0.62 2.387 0.122
03-Jul-13 T.Berdych Ad 22 12 34 0.65 0.35 16 5 0.73 0.42 3.172 0.074**
03-Jul-13 T.Berdych Deuce 15 22 37 0.41 0.59 9 15 0.60 0.68 0.262 0.608
03-Jul-13 F.Verdasco Ad 45 21 66 0.68 0.32 30 14 0.67 0.67 0.000 0.999
03-Jul-13 F.Verdasco Deuce 29 34 63 0.46 0.54 20 21 0.69 0.62 0.357 0.550
03-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 9 39 48 0.19 0.81 7 27 0.78 0.69 0.259 0.611
03-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 32 30 62 0.52 0.48 28 17 0.88 0.57 7.397 0.006*
05-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Ad 47 27 74 0.64 0.36 37 20 0.79 0.74 0.209 0.647
05-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 60 24 84 0.71 0.29 37 20 0.62 0.83 3.690 0.054**
05-Jul-13 J.Del Potro Ad 32 46 78 0.41 0.59 19 32 0.59 0.70 0.866 0.352
05-Jul-13 J.Del Potro Deuce 45 15 60 0.75 0.25 32 12 0.71 0.80 0.455 0.500
05-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Ad 33 22 55 0.60 0.40 23 14 0.70 0.64 0.220 0.638
05-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Deuce 32 24 56 0.57 0.43 24 16 0.75 0.67 0.467 0.494
05-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 25 22 47 0.53 0.47 19 15 0.76 0.68 0.357 0.549
05-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 30 20 50 0.60 0.40 22 17 0.73 0.85 0.952 0.329
07-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Ad 28 18 46 0.61 0.39 18 8 0.64 0.44 1.755 0.185
07-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 24 19 43 0.56 0.44 13 11 0.54 0.58 0.060 0.806
07-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 27 18 45 0.60 0.40 16 13 0.59 0.72 0.792 0.373
07-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 27 19 46 0.59 0.41 17 12 0.63 0.63 0.000 0.989
23-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 17 17 34 0.50 0.50 13 12 0.76 0.71 0.151 0.697
23-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 19 17 36 0.53 0.47 17 13 0.89 0.76 1.092 0.295
23-Jun-14 R.Harrison Ad 19 17 36 0.53 0.47 13 9 0.68 0.53 0.905 0.341
23-Jun-14 R.Harrison Deuce 20 17 37 0.54 0.46 15 6 0.75 0.35 5.903 0.015*
23-Jun-14 A.Murray Ad 15 21 36 0.42 0.58 10 17 0.67 0.81 0.952 0.329
23-Jun-14 A.Murray Deuce 27 12 39 0.69 0.31 22 11 0.81 0.92 0.662 0.415
23-Jun-14 D.Goffin Ad 22 14 36 0.61 0.39 13 8 0.59 0.57 0.013 0.907
23-Jun-14 D.Goffin Deuce 25 18 43 0.58 0.42 17 12 0.68 0.67 0.008 0.926
24-Jun-14 P.Lorenzi Ad 40 6 46 0.87 0.13 22 2 0.55 0.33 0.982 0.321
24-Jun-14 P.Lorenzi Deuce 32 7 39 0.82 0.18 20 0 0.63 0.00 8.980 0.002*
24-Jun-14 R.Federer Ad 14 15 29 0.48 0.52 10 15 0.71 1.00 4.971 0.025*
24-Jun-14 R.Federer Deuce 16 14 30 0.53 0.47 13 8 0.81 0.57 2.066 0.150
24-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 17 16 33 0.52 0.48 10 14 0.59 0.88 3.417 0.064**
24-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 25 10 35 0.71 0.29 20 10 0.80 1.00 2.333 0.126
24-Jun-14 J.Sousa Ad 26 6 32 0.81 0.19 16 6 0.62 1.00 3.357 0.066**
24-Jun-14 J.Sousa Deuce 12 21 33 0.36 0.64 7 13 0.58 0.62 0.041 0.839
25-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 20 9 29 0.69 0.31 17 8 0.85 0.89 0.079 0.778
25-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 16 17 33 0.48 0.52 15 14 0.94 0.82 1.005 0.316
25-Jun-14 L.Saville Ad 26 7 33 0.79 0.21 17 4 0.65 0.57 0.162 0.687
25-Jun-14 L.Saville Deuce 24 11 35 0.69 0.31 15 7 0.63 0.64 0.004 0.948
25-Jun-14 A.Murray Ad 8 18 26 0.31 0.69 8 10 1.00 0.56 5.136 0.023*
25-Jun-14 A.Murray Deuce 10 15 25 0.40 0.60 8 12 0.80 0.80 0.000 0.999
25-Jun-14 B.Rola Ad 14 3 17 0.82 0.18 7 1 0.50 0.33 0.275 0.599
25-Jun-14 B.Rola Deuce 15 8 23 0.65 0.35 4 3 0.27 0.38 0.289 0.590
26-Jun-14 G.Muller Ad 20 14 34 0.59 0.41 14 10 0.70 0.71 0.008 0.928
26-Jun-14 G.Muller Deuce 30 12 42 0.71 0.29 20 8 0.67 0.67 0.000 0.999
26-Jun-14 R.Federer Ad 19 13 32 0.59 0.41 16 12 0.84 0.92 0.463 0.496
26-Jun-14 R.Federer Deuce 16 16 32 0.50 0.50 13 15 0.81 0.94 1.143 0.285
26-Jun-14 L.Rosol Ad 19 29 48 0.40 0.60 15 18 0.79 0.62 1.522 0.217
26-Jun-14 L.Rosol Deuce 17 34 51 0.33 0.67 15 20 0.88 0.59 4.554 0.032*
26-Jun-14 R.Nadal Ad 31 14 45 0.69 0.31 24 7 0.77 0.50 3.383 0.065**
26-Jun-14 R.Nadal Deuce 36 13 49 0.73 0.27 28 11 0.78 0.85 0.275 0.600
26-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 35 24 59 0.59 0.41 24 16 0.69 0.67 0.024 0.877
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26-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 39 29 68 0.57 0.43 28 19 0.72 0.66 0.307 0.579
26-Jun-14 Y-H.Lu Ad 32 24 56 0.57 0.43 22 13 0.69 0.54 1.244 0.264
26-Jun-14 Y-H.Lu Deuce 20 33 53 0.38 0.62 10 22 0.50 0.67 1.446 0.229
27-Jun-14 N.Djokovic Ad 20 13 33 0.61 0.39 10 10 0.50 0.77 2.392 0.121
27-Jun-14 N.Djokovic Deuce 17 17 34 0.50 0.50 14 11 0.82 0.65 1.360 0.243
27-Jun-14 G.Simon Ad 23 23 46 0.50 0.50 10 12 0.43 0.52 0.348 0.554
27-Jun-14 G.Simon Deuce 20 22 42 0.48 0.52 12 15 0.60 0.68 0.305 0.580
28-Jun-14 S.Giraldo Ad 24 13 37 0.65 0.35 13 4 0.54 0.31 1.859 0.172
28-Jun-14 S.Giraldo Deuce 21 10 31 0.68 0.32 16 7 0.76 0.70 0.136 0.712
28-Jun-14 R.Federer Ad 19 14 33 0.58 0.42 18 11 0.95 0.79 1.977 0.159
28-Jun-14 R.Federer Deuce 19 15 34 0.56 0.44 13 9 0.68 0.60 0.260 0.609
28-Jun-14 M.Kukushkin Ad 23 33 56 0.41 0.59 16 15 0.70 0.45 3.188 0.074**
28-Jun-14 M.Kukushkin Deuce 22 32 54 0.41 0.59 15 17 0.68 0.53 1.224 0.268
28-Jun-14 R.Nadal Ad 12 16 28 0.43 0.57 8 13 0.67 0.81 0.778 0.377
28-Jun-14 R.Nadal Deuce 29 9 38 0.76 0.24 21 8 0.72 0.89 1.031 0.309
30-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 18 11 29 0.62 0.38 13 10 0.72 0.91 1.453 0.228
30-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 20 9 29 0.69 0.31 15 7 0.75 0.78 0.026 0.871
30-Jun-14 D.Istomin Ad 13 14 27 0.48 0.52 7 9 0.54 0.64 0.304 0.581
30-Jun-14 D.Istomin Deuce 19 13 32 0.59 0.41 13 7 0.68 0.54 0.700 0.402
02-Jul-14 A.Murray Ad 18 16 34 0.53 0.47 11 11 0.61 0.69 0.216 0.641
02-Jul-14 A.Murray Deuce 20 15 35 0.57 0.43 13 8 0.65 0.53 0.486 0.485
02-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 17 21 38 0.45 0.55 14 13 0.82 0.62 1.910 0.166
02-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 17 20 37 0.46 0.54 12 15 0.71 0.75 0.091 0.763
02-Jul-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 34 21 55 0.62 0.38 20 17 0.59 0.81 2.887 0.089**
02-Jul-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 34 26 60 0.57 0.43 21 22 0.62 0.85 3.789 0.051**
02-Jul-14 R.Federer Ad 35 20 55 0.64 0.36 24 17 0.69 0.85 1.810 0.178
02-Jul-14 R.Federer Deuce 33 19 52 0.63 0.37 26 14 0.79 0.74 0.177 0.674
04-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Ad 35 27 62 0.56 0.44 22 18 0.63 0.67 0.097 0.755
04-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Deuce 25 37 62 0.40 0.60 18 29 0.72 0.78 0.331 0.565
04-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 23 29 52 0.44 0.56 15 21 0.65 0.72 0.312 0.576
04-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 29 19 48 0.60 0.40 20 17 0.69 0.89 2.733 0.098**
04-Jul-14 R.Federer Ad 19 14 33 0.58 0.42 16 11 0.84 0.79 0.172 0.678
04-Jul-14 R.Federer Deuce 18 18 36 0.50 0.50 12 16 0.67 0.89 2.571 0.108
04-Jul-14 M.Raonic Ad 27 10 37 0.73 0.27 19 6 0.70 0.60 0.358 0.549
04-Jul-14 M.Raonic Deuce 15 19 34 0.44 0.56 10 16 0.67 0.84 1.434 0.231
06-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Ad 35 29 64 0.55 0.45 22 20 0.63 0.69 0.262 0.608
06-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Deuce 47 28 75 0.63 0.37 36 22 0.77 0.79 0.039 0.843
06-Jul-14 R.Federer Ad 40 36 76 0.53 0.47 30 25 0.75 0.69 0.292 0.588
06-Jul-14 R.Federer Deuce 35 52 87 0.40 0.60 22 38 0.63 0.73 1.021 0.312
Sum 8,145 6,513 14,658 - - 5,689 4,579 - - 407.3 -
Mean 25.5 20.4 45.8 0.56 0.44 17.8 14.3 0.703 0.701 - -
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24-Jun-09 G.Garcia-Lopez Ad 15 11 26 16 0.77 0.875 0.066
24-Jun-09 G.Garcia-Lopez Deuce 20 11 31 19 0.907 0.957 0.97
24-Jun-09 R.Federer Ad 20 13 33 15 0.201 0.32 0.317
24-Jun-09 R.Federer Deuce 21 13 34 14 0.094 0.172 0.463
26-Jun-09 P.Kohlschreiber Ad 27 22 49 27 0.642 0.744 0.265
26-Jun-09 P.Kohlschreiber Deuce 23 25 48 22 0.156 0.236 0.438
26-Jun-09 R.Federer Ad 30 25 55 28 0.416 0.524 0.63
26-Jun-09 R.Federer Deuce 31 27 58 33 0.758 0.833 0.89
27-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Ad 24 29 53 30 0.734 0.817 0.988
27-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Deuce 16 38 54 24 0.497 0.627 0.188
27-Jun-09 J.Levine Ad 37 27 64 34 0.629 0.722 0.826
27-Jun-09 J.Levine Deuce 24 45 69 33 0.52 0.625 0.84
29-Jun-09 A.Murray Ad 39 22 61 25 0.097 0.154 0.15
29-Jun-09 A.Murray Deuce 29 37 66 34 0.498 0.597 0.532
29-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Ad 38 34 72 42 0.863 0.909 0.875
29-Jun-09 S.Wawrinka Deuce 38 38 76 29 0.007 0.014* 0.01
29-Jun-09 R.Soderling Ad 22 17 39 22 0.668 0.778 0.755
29-Jun-09 R.Soderling Deuce 14 20 34 21 0.862 0.926 0.906
29-Jun-09 R.Federer Ad 24 20 44 18 0.05 0.091 0.073
29-Jun-09 R.Federer Deuce 22 24 46 18 0.026 0.051 0.033
01-Jul-09 T.Haas Ad 20 25 45 22 0.299 0.412 0.315
01-Jul-09 T.Haas Deuce 33 21 54 29 0.702 0.793 0.755
01-Jul-09 N.Djokovic Ad 28 18 46 26 0.791 0.869 0.835
01-Jul-09 N.Djokovic Deuce 25 24 49 16 0.001 0.004* 0.002
01-Jul-09 L.Hewitt Ad 37 42 79 48 0.948 0.968 0.951
01-Jul-09 L.Hewitt Deuce 25 48 73 32 0.266 0.359 0.268
01-Jul-09 A.Roddick Ad 44 33 77 37 0.301 0.388 0.349
01-Jul-09 A.Roddick Deuce 49 25 74 31 0.172 0.247 0.223
01-Jul-09 I.Karlovic Ad 19 15 34 20 0.73 0.833 0.77
01-Jul-09 I.Karlovic Deuce 22 16 38 19 0.364 0.496 0.487
01-Jul-09 R.Federer Ad 20 15 35 13 0.023 0.051 0.028
01-Jul-09 R.Federer Deuce 28 12 40 18 0.454 0.605 0.483
03-Jul-09 T.Haas Ad 27 17 44 24 0.7 0.802 0.82
03-Jul-09 T.Haas Deuce 37 12 49 17 0.151 0.261 0.92
03-Jul-09 R.Federer Ad 25 14 39 17 0.193 0.304 0.318
03-Jul-09 R.Federer Deuce 20 18 38 22 0.695 0.8 0.171
03-Jul-09 A.Roddick Ad 29 32 61 34 0.704 0.786 0.717
03-Jul-09 A.Roddick Deuce 37 25 62 29 0.266 0.36 0.225
03-Jul-09 A.Murray Ad 45 18 63 20 0.012 0.026** 0.278
03-Jul-09 A.Murray Deuce 45 17 62 25 0.351 0.477 0.783
05-Jul-09 A.Roddick Ad 41 53 94 39 0.032 0.051 0.718
05-Jul-09 A.Roddick Deuce 73 24 97 37 0.431 0.541 0.278
05-Jul-09 R.Federer Ad 47 33 80 40 0.474 0.566 0.016
05-Jul-09 R.Federer Deuce 45 42 87 43 0.336 0.418 0.462
21-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 28 39 67 27 0.036 0.061 0.04
21-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 30 39 69 26 0.01 0.018* 0.477
21-Jun-10 A.Falla Ad 71 12 83 21 0.32 0.494 0.522
21-Jun-10 A.Falla Deuce 72 10 82 21 0.846 0.939 0.377
23-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 31 26 57 27 0.226 0.315 0.654
23-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 32 31 63 30 0.223 0.306 0.216
23-Jun-10 I.Bozoljac Ad 31 27 58 29 0.358 0.461 0.431
23-Jun-10 I.Bozoljac Deuce 38 23 61 31 0.591 0.694 0.774
25-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 17 11 28 13 0.226 0.364 0.75
25-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 17 14 31 14 0.146 0.246 0.574
25-Jun-10 A.Clement Ad 19 12 31 18 0.755 0.859 0.707
25-Jun-10 A.Clement Deuce 17 17 34 16 0.191 0.3 0.611
26-Jun-10 P.Petzschner Ad 24 46 70 33 0.495 0.601 0.049
26-Jun-10 P.Petzschner Deuce 34 44 78 38 0.333 0.421 0.014
26-Jun-10 R.Nadal Ad 34 17 51 28 0.889 0.938 0.413
26-Jun-10 R.Nadal Deuce 42 12 54 23 0.871 0.937 0.857
28-Jun-10 N.Djokovic Ad 23 27 50 19 0.017 0.034** 0.033
28-Jun-10 N.Djokovic Deuce 27 17 44 18 0.079 0.139 0.127
28-Jun-10 L.Hewitt Ad 25 24 49 30 0.876 0.926 0.89
28-Jun-10 L.Hewitt Deuce 13 32 45 21 0.645 0.77 0.714
28-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 9 17 26 11 0.156 0.286 0.195
28-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 14 16 30 9 0.002 0.008* 0.002
28-Jun-10 J.Melzer Ad 24 11 35 19 0.832 0.913 0.838
28-Jun-10 J.Melzer Deuce 27 10 37 15 0.32 0.483 0.352
30-Jun-10 R.Federer Ad 32 22 54 21 0.03 0.056 0.031
30-Jun-10 R.Federer Deuce 26 30 56 23 0.042 0.073 0.055
30-Jun-10 T.Berdych Ad 32 20 52 28 0.711 0.803 0.793
30-Jun-10 T.Berdych Deuce 26 23 49 31 0.93 0.961 0.942
30-Jun-10 R.Soderling Ad 18 22 40 27 0.967** 0.984 0.98
30-Jun-10 R.Soderling Deuce 23 23 46 25 0.559 0.672 0.637
30-Jun-10 R.Nadal Ad 19 29 48 28 0.86 0.917 0.864
30-Jun-10 R.Nadal Deuce 32 18 50 26 0.674 0.777 0.675
30-Jun-10 J.Tsonga Ad 30 34 64 27 0.053 0.086 0.062
30-Jun-10 J.Tsonga Deuce 36 27 63 28 0.129 0.191 0.171
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30-Jun-10 A.Murray Ad 38 18 56 22 0.111 0.181 0.175
30-Jun-10 A.Murray Deuce 35 20 55 33 0.962** 0.981 0.968
02-Jul-10 A.Murray Ad 11 29 40 16 0.278 0.427 0.247
02-Jul-10 A.Murray Deuce 19 25 44 20 0.168 0.257 0.29
02-Jul-10 R.Nadal Ad 12 27 39 19 0.632 0.764 0.42
02-Jul-10 R.Nadal Deuce 22 20 42 24 0.686 0.787 0.668
02-Jul-10 T.Berdych Ad 23 18 41 19 0.193 0.293 0.377
02-Jul-10 T.Berdych Deuce 20 22 42 23 0.568 0.686 0.182
02-Jul-10 N.Djokovic Ad 18 13 31 13 0.088 0.164 0.712
02-Jul-10 N.Djokovic Deuce 20 16 36 23 0.898 0.947 0.735
04-Jul-10 T.Berdych Ad 8 26 34 13 0.359 0.551 0.198
04-Jul-10 T.Berdych Deuce 6 34 40 11 0.325 0.576 0.648
04-Jul-10 R.Nadal Ad 25 10 35 18 0.825 0.913 0.142
04-Jul-10 R.Nadal Deuce 31 9 40 19 0.950** 0.982 0.934
21-Jun-11 M.Kukushkin Ad 26 13 39 20 0.665 0.786 0.467
21-Jun-11 M.Kukushkin Deuce 23 22 45 28 0.886 0.934 0.409
21-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 24 13 37 17 0.308 0.446 0.912
21-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 17 20 37 17 0.166 0.264 0.977
23-Jun-11 A.Mannarino Ad 20 10 30 16 0.687 0.818 0.343
23-Jun-11 A.Mannarino Deuce 24 10 34 19 0.923 0.967 0.212
23-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 15 16 31 16 0.359 0.502 0.836
23-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 15 16 31 13 0.072 0.137 0.279
25-Jun-11 M.Baghdatis Ad 27 22 49 28 0.744 0.828 0.538
25-Jun-11 M.Baghdatis Deuce 21 31 52 18 0.006 0.014* 0.403
25-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Ad 19 24 43 21 0.296 0.412 0.92
25-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 26 26 52 20 0.017 0.034** 0.878
25-Jun-11 D.Nalbandian Ad 21 17 38 22 0.715 0.816 0.765
25-Jun-11 D.Nalbandian Deuce 19 13 32 16 0.363 0.509 0.914
25-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 24 13 37 16 0.192 0.308 0.391
25-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 26 13 39 13 0.016 0.038** 0.211
27-Jun-11 A.Murray Ad 20 15 35 15 0.1 0.177 0.157
27-Jun-11 A.Murray Deuce 21 14 35 22 0.907 0.953 0.924
27-Jun-11 R.Gasquet Ad 20 17 37 18 0.264 0.384 0.276
27-Jun-11 R.Gasquet Deuce 19 22 41 25 0.838 0.904 0.877
27-Jun-11 M.Llodra Ad 20 13 33 19 0.74 0.845 0.842
27-Jun-11 M.Llodra Deuce 19 13 32 18 0.654 0.779 0.666
27-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Ad 11 19 30 20 0.966** 0.987 0.972
27-Jun-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 12 19 31 15 0.32 0.467 0.415
27-Jun-11 M.Youzhny Ad 42 19 61 32 0.904 0.946 0.923
27-Jun-11 M.Youzhny Deuce 36 24 60 37 0.965** 0.981 0.974
27-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 30 18 48 25 0.622 0.733 0.698
27-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 19 25 44 23 0.488 0.611 0.576
29-Jun-11 R.Nadal Ad 26 12 38 14 0.066 0.132 0.129
29-Jun-11 R.Nadal Deuce 18 11 29 15 0.475 0.633 0.597
29-Jun-11 M.Fish Ad 28 23 51 26 0.414 0.527 0.472
29-Jun-11 M.Fish Deuce 25 24 49 25 0.387 0.501 0.495
29-Jun-11 J.Tsonga Ad 44 18 62 25 0.261 0.371 0.272
29-Jun-11 J.Tsonga Deuce 40 24 64 23 0.011 0.021* 0.019
29-Jun-11 R.Federer Ad 34 22 56 23 0.07 0.116 0.092
29-Jun-11 R.Federer Deuce 30 32 62 26 0.048 0.08 0.057
01-Jul-11 R.Nadal Ad 13 22 35 19 0.664 0.786 0.769
01-Jul-11 R.Nadal Deuce 28 15 43 22 0.628 0.748 0.938
01-Jul-11 A.Murray Ad 12 36 48 16 0.085 0.163 0.471
01-Jul-11 A.Murray Deuce 22 27 49 27 0.642 0.744 0.077
01-Jul-11 J.Tsonga Ad 35 23 58 30 0.581 0.685 0.725
01-Jul-11 J.Tsonga Deuce 27 30 57 29 0.402 0.508 0.635
01-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Ad 28 13 41 15 0.059 0.116 0.116
01-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 30 27 57 29 0.402 0.508 0.711
03-Jul-11 R.Nadal Ad 12 19 31 16 0.467 0.619 0.643
03-Jul-11 R.Nadal Deuce 29 8 37 16 0.835 0.93 0.454
03-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Ad 14 24 38 17 0.219 0.337 0.076
03-Jul-11 N.Djokovic Deuce 16 27 43 18 0.117 0.195 0.475
25-Jun-12 R.Federer Ad 13 11 24 14 0.596 0.747 0.473
25-Jun-12 R.Federer Deuce 16 12 28 12 0.102 0.191 0.888
25-Jun-12 A.Ramos Ad 22 8 30 13 0.455 0.643 0.321
25-Jun-12 A.Ramos Deuce 18 7 25 13 0.766 0.892 0.125
27-Jun-12 R.Federer Ad 15 9 24 10 0.109 0.217 0.776
27-Jun-12 R.Federer Deuce 19 9 28 13 0.375 0.55 0.009
27-Jun-12 F.Fognini Ad 17 10 27 14 0.484 0.649 0.408
27-Jun-12 F.Fognini Deuce 22 10 32 15 0.458 0.623 0.025
29-Jun-12 R.Federer Ad 37 25 62 28 0.187 0.266 0.755
29-Jun-12 R.Federer Deuce 33 39 72 33 0.154 0.218 0.429
29-Jun-12 J.Benneteau Ad 39 26 65 42 0.992* 0.996 0.264
29-Jun-12 J.Benneteau Deuce 57 20 77 33 0.714 0.806 0.034
02-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 26 22 48 24 0.347 0.46 0.635
02-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 23 29 52 25 0.27 0.371 0.103
02-Jul-12 X.Malisse Ad 30 20 50 25 0.44 0.559 0.54
02-Jul-12 X.Malisse Deuce 44 11 55 21 0.792 0.893 0.841
04-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 17 10 27 14 0.484 0.649 0.458
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04-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 10 19 29 13 0.25 0.399 0.283
04-Jul-12 M.Youzhny Ad 15 16 31 20 0.865 0.929 0.48
04-Jul-12 M.Youzhny Deuce 21 13 34 23 0.977* 0.991 0.803
04-Jul-12 D.Ferrer Ad 33 41 74 52 0.999* 0.999 0.565
04-Jul-12 D.Ferrer Deuce 24 31 55 31 0.75 0.829 0.299
04-Jul-12 A.Murray Ad 38 27 65 30 0.214 0.297 0.876
04-Jul-12 A.Murray Deuce 36 29 65 31 0.253 0.34 0.986
06-Jul-12 A.Murray Ad 21 24 45 21 0.189 0.282 0.999
06-Jul-12 A.Murray Deuce 30 24 54 26 0.273 0.372 0.806
06-Jul-12 J.Tsonga Ad 42 17 59 21 0.065 0.116 0.23
06-Jul-12 J.Tsonga Deuce 35 22 57 28 0.441 0.554 0.339
06-Jul-12 N.Djokovic Ad 25 20 45 19 0.074 0.127 0.119
06-Jul-12 N.Djokovic Deuce 30 22 52 29 0.728 0.814 0.433
06-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 21 20 41 18 0.103 0.172 0.64
06-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 22 23 45 20 0.114 0.183 0.478
08-Jul-12 R.Federer Ad 35 25 60 25 0.064 0.105 0.235
08-Jul-12 R.Federer Deuce 22 33 55 25 0.205 0.294 0.348
08-Jul-12 A.Murray Ad 52 21 73 32 0.566 0.675 0.094
08-Jul-12 A.Murray Deuce 53 20 73 26 0.088 0.146 0.491
24-Jun-13 V.Hanescu Ad 12 9 21 14 0.844 0.929 0.075
24-Jun-13 V.Hanescu Deuce 13 11 24 14 0.596 0.747 0.784
24-Jun-13 R.Federer Ad 9 11 20 9 0.132 0.257 0.153
24-Jun-13 R.Federer Deuce 14 11 25 9 0.022 0.056 0.183
24-Jun-13 R.Nadal Ad 29 17 46 22 0.382 0.508 0.088
24-Jun-13 R.Nadal Deuce 40 10 50 21 0.943 0.978 0.289
24-Jun-13 S.Darcis Ad 18 31 49 28 0.876 0.929 0.625
24-Jun-13 S.Darcis Deuce 20 34 54 25 0.309 0.419 0.107
25-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Ad 22 17 39 15 0.03 0.061 0.259
25-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 19 21 40 19 0.215 0.32 0.172
25-Jun-13 F.Mayer Ad 24 17 41 17 0.075 0.133 0.994
25-Jun-13 F.Mayer Deuce 28 17 45 21 0.297 0.416 0.782
25-Jun-13 D.Ferrer Ad 20 18 38 22 0.695 0.8 0.036
25-Jun-13 D.Ferrer Deuce 11 16 27 18 0.92 0.965 0.647
25-Jun-13 M.Alund Ad 31 15 46 22 0.538 0.668 0.117
25-Jun-13 M.Alund Deuce 22 14 36 23 0.941 0.972 0.112
25-Jun-13 A.Ramos Ad 19 6 25 13 0.912 0.972 0.317
25-Jun-13 A.Ramos Deuce 25 14 39 17 0.193 0.304 0.236
25-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Ad 8 25 33 17 0.950** 0.983 0.293
25-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Deuce 18 12 30 14 0.23 0.363 0.12
26-Jun-13 J-W.Tsonga Ad 22 13 35 15 0.147 0.248 0.211
26-Jun-13 J-W.Tsonga Deuce 17 17 34 13 0.027 0.058 0.172
26-Jun-13 E.Gulbis Ad 15 14 29 19 0.873 0.935 0.392
26-Jun-13 E.Gulbis Deuce 13 18 31 16 0.411 0.56 0.201
26-Jun-13 F.Verdasco Ad 28 13 41 19 0.462 0.607 0.502
26-Jun-13 F.Verdasco Deuce 22 20 42 21 0.324 0.443 0.525
26-Jun-13 J.Benneteau Ad 21 26 47 29 0.898 0.941 0.974
26-Jun-13 J.Benneteau Deuce 27 25 52 35 0.982* 0.991 0.442
27-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Ad 18 14 32 18 0.607 0.738 0.012
27-Jun-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 17 20 37 17 0.166 0.264 0.267
27-Jun-13 B.Reynolds Ad 16 22 38 22 0.747 0.842 0.766
27-Jun-13 B.Reynolds Deuce 15 12 27 15 0.526 0.678 0.755
27-Jun-13 R.Gasquet Ad 16 23 39 23 0.811 0.888 0.974
27-Jun-13 R.Gasquet Deuce 28 20 48 23 0.29 0.401 0.216
27-Jun-13 G.Soeda Ad 26 20 46 24 0.486 0.606 0.586
27-Jun-13 G.Soeda Deuce 26 22 48 30 0.914 0.952 0.301
27-Jun-13 J.Levine Ad 25 16 41 24 0.839 0.907 0.164
27-Jun-13 J.Levine Deuce 24 16 40 22 0.667 0.778 0.592
27-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Ad 7 29 36 11 0.164 0.334 0.759
27-Jun-13 J.Del Potro Deuce 20 9 29 13 0.342 0.515 0.021
28-Jun-13 J.Melzer Ad 31 11 42 15 0.132 0.239 0.377
28-Jun-13 J.Melzer Deuce 24 20 44 23 0.461 0.583 0.408
28-Jun-13 S.Stakhovsky Ad 17 13 30 11 0.023 0.054 0.583
28-Jun-13 S.Stakhovsky Deuce 17 19 36 18 0.312 0.44 0.117
01-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Ad 27 29 56 26 0.174 0.252 0.125
01-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Deuce 30 29 59 35 0.853 0.905 0.151
01-Jul-13 J.Melzer Ad 44 14 58 24 0.676 0.794 0.985
01-Jul-13 J.Melzer Deuce 27 24 51 23 0.133 0.204 0.899
01-Jul-13 M.Youzhny Ad 27 13 40 19 0.492 0.636 0.601
01-Jul-13 M.Youzhny Deuce 22 18 40 23 0.708 0.808 0.929
01-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 28 14 42 21 0.615 0.741 0.118
01-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 35 13 48 18 0.18 0.293 0.98
03-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Ad 20 20 40 21 0.436 0.563 0.187
03-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 25 13 38 17 0.278 0.412 0.351
03-Jul-13 T.Berdych Ad 22 12 34 16 0.346 0.495 0.699
03-Jul-13 T.Berdych Deuce 15 22 37 21 0.717 0.821 0.816
03-Jul-13 F.Verdasco Ad 45 21 66 34 0.865 0.918 0.523
03-Jul-13 F.Verdasco Deuce 29 34 63 32 0.418 0.52 0.001
03-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 9 39 48 17 0.664 0.818 0.449
03-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 32 30 62 30 0.263 0.353 0.063
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05-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Ad 47 27 74 28 0.024 0.042** 0.948
05-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 60 24 84 30 0.059 0.098 0.012
05-Jul-13 J.Del Potro Ad 32 46 78 33 0.07 0.108 0.568
05-Jul-13 J.Del Potro Deuce 45 15 60 19 0.04 0.081 0.027
05-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Ad 33 22 55 27 0.399 0.511 0.175
05-Jul-13 J.Janowicz Deuce 32 24 56 27 0.297 0.399 0.84
05-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 25 22 47 20 0.073 0.123 0.205
05-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 30 20 50 20 0.05 0.09 0.266
07-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Ad 28 18 46 20 0.142 0.224 0.77
07-Jul-13 N.Djokovic Deuce 24 19 43 22 0.412 0.536 0.537
07-Jul-13 A.Murray Ad 27 18 45 23 0.487 0.611 0.981
07-Jul-13 A.Murray Deuce 27 19 46 24 0.524 0.643 0.967
23-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 17 17 34 14 0.058 0.111 0.042
23-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 19 17 36 24 0.938 0.97 0.298
23-Jun-14 R.Harrison Ad 19 17 36 18 0.312 0.44 0.128
23-Jun-14 R.Harrison Deuce 20 17 37 19 0.384 0.516 0.351
23-Jun-14 A.Murray Ad 15 21 36 17 0.243 0.363 0.748
23-Jun-14 A.Murray Deuce 27 12 39 16 0.209 0.334 0.959
23-Jun-14 D.Goffin Ad 22 14 36 17 0.282 0.413 0.589
23-Jun-14 D.Goffin Deuce 25 18 43 18 0.079 0.138 0.95
24-Jun-14 P.Lorenzi Ad 40 6 46 9 0.023 0.095 0.861
24-Jun-14 P.Lorenzi Deuce 32 7 39 13 0.502 0.715 0.668
24-Jun-14 R.Federer Ad 14 15 29 12 0.065 0.129 0.191
24-Jun-14 R.Federer Deuce 16 14 30 13 0.099 0.181 0.039
24-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 17 16 33 15 0.145 0.241 0.387
24-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 25 10 35 13 0.119 0.224 0.978
24-Jun-14 J.Sousa Ad 26 6 32 10 0.225 0.44 0.91
24-Jun-14 J.Sousa Deuce 12 21 33 14 0.144 0.248 0.386
25-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 20 9 29 18 0.965** 0.988 0.948
25-Jun-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 16 17 33 15 0.145 0.241 0.267
25-Jun-14 L.Saville Ad 26 7 33 12 0.387 0.599 0.965
25-Jun-14 L.Saville Deuce 24 11 35 15 0.262 0.407 0.272
25-Jun-14 A.Murray Ad 8 18 26 11 0.227 0.392 0.226
25-Jun-14 A.Murray Deuce 10 15 25 12 0.261 0.415 0.859
25-Jun-14 B.Rola Ad 14 3 17 6 0.344 0.693 0.774
25-Jun-14 B.Rola Deuce 15 8 23 9 0.082 0.18 0.142
26-Jun-14 G.Muller Ad 20 14 34 15 0.142 0.239 0.593
26-Jun-14 G.Muller Deuce 30 12 42 19 0.554 0.699 0.768
26-Jun-14 R.Federer Ad 19 13 32 18 0.654 0.779 0.622
26-Jun-14 R.Federer Deuce 16 16 32 11 0.009 0.024* 0.216
26-Jun-14 L.Rosol Ad 19 29 48 20 0.086 0.145 0.451
26-Jun-14 L.Rosol Deuce 17 34 51 20 0.091 0.156 0.32
26-Jun-14 R.Nadal Ad 31 14 45 27 0.985* 0.994 0.4
26-Jun-14 R.Nadal Deuce 36 13 49 24 0.897 0.949 0.748
26-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 35 24 59 30 0.502 0.609 0.897
26-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 39 29 68 40 0.904 0.94 0.519
26-Jun-14 Y-H.Lu Ad 32 24 56 24 0.087 0.139 0.803
26-Jun-14 Y-H.Lu Deuce 20 33 53 33 0.974** 0.987 0.33
27-Jun-14 N.Djokovic Ad 20 13 33 15 0.201 0.32 0.666
27-Jun-14 N.Djokovic Deuce 17 17 34 18 0.43 0.569 0.254
27-Jun-14 G.Simon Ad 23 23 46 25 0.559 0.672 0.796
27-Jun-14 G.Simon Deuce 20 22 42 26 0.866 0.922 0.558
28-Jun-14 S.Giraldo Ad 24 13 37 15 0.108 0.192 0.879
28-Jun-14 S.Giraldo Deuce 21 10 31 17 0.793 0.892 0.384
28-Jun-14 R.Federer Ad 19 14 33 15 0.171 0.278 0.489
28-Jun-14 R.Federer Deuce 19 15 34 16 0.211 0.327 0.942
28-Jun-14 M.Kukushkin Ad 23 33 56 31 0.747 0.827 0.873
28-Jun-14 M.Kukushkin Deuce 22 32 54 27 0.435 0.548 0.678
28-Jun-14 R.Nadal Ad 12 16 28 20 0.97** 0.988 0.317
28-Jun-14 R.Nadal Deuce 29 9 38 19 0.958** 0.985 0.488
30-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 18 11 29 20 0.974** 0.99 0.212
30-Jun-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 20 9 29 11 0.097 0.197 0.057
30-Jun-14 D.Istomin Ad 13 14 27 17 0.786 0.882 0.888
30-Jun-14 D.Istomin Deuce 19 13 32 19 0.779 0.873 0.475
02-Jul-14 A.Murray Ad 18 16 34 18 0.438 0.577 0.563
02-Jul-14 A.Murray Deuce 20 15 35 18 0.41 0.549 0.404
02-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 17 21 38 26 0.971** 0.987 0.923
02-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 17 20 37 19 0.384 0.516 0.986
02-Jul-14 S.Wawrinka Ad 34 21 55 19 0.007 0.015* 0.029
02-Jul-14 S.Wawrinka Deuce 34 26 60 28 0.215 0.3 0.061
02-Jul-14 R.Federer Ad 35 20 55 29 0.726 0.815 0.094
02-Jul-14 R.Federer Deuce 33 19 52 27 0.662 0.764 0.063
04-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Ad 35 27 62 28 0.149 0.218 0.435
04-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Deuce 25 37 62 29 0.266 0.36 0.381
04-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Ad 23 29 52 28 0.594 0.699 0.112
04-Jul-14 G.Dimitrov Deuce 29 19 48 27 0.781 0.86 0.074
04-Jul-14 R.Federer Ad 19 14 33 17 0.41 0.554 0.221
04-Jul-14 R.Federer Deuce 18 18 36 10 0 0.002* 0.533
04-Jul-14 M.Raonic Ad 27 10 37 15 0.32 0.483 0.516
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04-Jul-14 M.Raonic Deuce 15 19 34 13 0.031 0.065 0.546
06-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Ad 35 29 64 39 0.929 0.957 0.22
06-Jul-14 N.Djokovic Deuce 47 28 75 27 0.008 0.016* 0.527
06-Jul-14 R.Federer Ad 40 36 76 40 0.555 0.644 0.04
06-Jul-14 R.Federer Deuce 35 52 87 34 0.018 0.030** 0.399
Sum 8,145 6,513 14,658 7,004 - - -
Mean 25.5 20.4 45.8 21.9 - - -
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What is the effect of
insider trading on price efficiency?
Evidence from a betting exchange
Paolo Bizzozero, Raphael Flepp, Egon Franck
Abstract
We present evidence that insider trading substantially contributes to the
price discovery process after important news events and thus helps to create ef-
ficient markets. Live betting offers a unique opportunity to isolate and measure
the activity of traders with earlier access to information (insiders). We per-
form an event study using detailed, point-by-point data from 141 men’s singles
matches at two major professional tennis tournaments. The results show that
betting prices start updating long before the general public receives the new
information, indicating the existence of insider traders. Most importantly, the
cumulative abnormal return during the first few seconds of insider trading fol-
lowing an important event is more than 60% of the full price reaction observed
once the public receives the new information, meaning that insider trading has
a large impact on price discovery. We also show that a simple trading strategy
based on inside information can generate significant returns.
JEL Classification: G14, L83
Keywords: Market efficiency, insider trading, event study, tennis betting
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1 Introduction
In theory, the extent to which insider trading affects the efficiency of security market
prices is uncertain. One view proposes that insiders, i.e., traders with monopolistic
access to any pricing-relevant information, contribute to more efficient markets by
quickly and accurately incorporating new information into prices (Manne, 1966; Carl-
ton & Fischel, 1983). Another view proposes that the existence of insiders can cause
outsiders not to trade: as outsiders will also stop collecting information, the market
will be less informationally efficient (Fishman & Hagerty, 1992). Depending on which
effect dominates, insider trading can have an overall positive or negative effect on the
efficiency of security prices.
In the corporate world, insider trading is the practice of trading securities by corpo-
rate insiders, like top officers and directors, who have privileged access to information
about the true value of their firm’s stock. Most financial regulators further distinguish
between legal insider trading, which is based on non-material (public or nonpublic)
information, and illegal insider trading, which is based on material nonpublic in-
formation. Although no statutory definition of “materiality” is available, material
information is generally defined as information expected to significantly affect the
stock price of a company, like major acquisitions or changes in top management.
Despite a rich literature on price efficiency, direct empirical evidence on whether
and to what extent insider trading based on material information affects the efficiency
of security market prices is scarce due to its illegality in most countries and the
consequent lack of data. The vast majority of studies related to the efficiency of stock
prices show that (1) self-reported (legal) insider trades correctly predict future stock
performance, meaning that corporate insiders can gain abnormal profits (for a review,
see Lakonishok & Lee, 2001) and that (2) stock prices react fully and swiftly after
corporate news announcements.1 However, these studies do not investigate material
1For example, see Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) for stock splits announcements, Mitchell, Pulvino,
and Stafford (2004) for mergers announcements, and MacKinlay (1997) for earnings announcements.
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insider trades. The only relevant papers on the subject are those of Cornell and Sirri
(1992), Meulbroek (1992), and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997), which analyze the
market’s reaction to illegal insider trades (the data originate from criminal and civil
litigation reports) and show that insider trades lead to more rapid price discovery.2
However, Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) disputed these studies by showing, using
a refined methodology to re-analyze the data of those previous studies, that the effect
of insider trades on prices is not discernibly different from that of non-insider trades.
Thus, there is generally little and mixed evidence on the topic.
In this article, we present an analysis of unique and naturally occurring field data
that provide a rare opportunity to isolate the effect of insider trading on securities
price efficiency: live tennis betting. In this context, most betting traders follow the
match on TV or via internet score feeds and, whenever new relevant information
becomes observable, they update their bets online.3 Our analysis takes advantage
of the inevitable technical delays in the transmission of match information from the
stadium to end receivers. For example, the delay from filming to receiving a TV
broadcast is at least five seconds (Kooij, Stokking, van Brandenburg, & de Boer, 2014;
Hutchins, 2014; Brown & Yang, 2017). Due to this delay, the insider traders sitting
in the stadium benefit from a fleeting informational advantage compared to “live”-
TV, “live”-scoreboard, and other slower traders because insiders observe important
information before them. Thus, we can attribute the price update in the first five
seconds after important news events during the match to the activity of insider traders.
More specifically, we analyze the price reaction after a player wins a set.4 Winning
a set is an important step toward victory: therefore, observing in advance which
player won the set constitutes a considerable informational advantage to insiders. We
use high-frequency betting data from Betfair, one of the largest betting exchanges
2Using U.S. data, Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) analyze two specific cases of insider
trading in the stock of two takeover target firms, whereas Meulbroek (1992) analyzes 183 insider trading cases from
different firms.
3We use trader as a synonym for a bettor, gambler, or wagerer.
4The Appendix A.1 provides a short introduction to tennis scoring rules and terminology.
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worldwide, on 141 tennis men’s singles matches played at two major professional
tennis tournaments, the French Open and the Wimbledon Championships, over the
2009–2014 period. We complement this information with match data about players,
courts, winner, start and end match times. Our dataset provides us with two practical
advantages with respect to standard financial data. First and most important, our
second-by-second data allow us to determine the event time (when new information is
released) with high accuracy and thus to measure with precision the impact of insider
trading activity on prices. Second, because the players take a short break after the
end of each set (a low-information period), we do not have to deal with the problem
of confounding events.
Using event study methods, we find that the cumulative abnormal returns averaged
across the 365 event observations (CAAR) start increasing immediately after the set
events: the CAAR values at one second and five seconds following the event are 0.82%
and 3.06%, respectively, and are significant at the 1% level. Most importantly, we
show that the cumulative abnormal return during the first five insider trading seconds
following the set events—when the TV viewers and other slower traders have not yet
seen the event—accounts for more than 60% of the full price reaction observed once
the public receives the new information. Furthermore, we show that the impact of
insider trading is even larger for unanticipated news events, like tie-break set events,
when inside information is more valuable. Finally, we estimate that a simple dynamic
back-lay trading strategy implemented in the seconds after the event can yield large,
risk-free profits to insiders, varying between 5% and 7%.
In this article, we can uncover the impact of insider trading in a real-world environ-
ment. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a clear setting
for testing the question as to how insider trading influences the efficiency of price
discovery. Overall, we provide important evidence that insider traders significantly
contribute to higher price efficiency and thus market quality.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the applica-
ble literature. Section 3 describes our setting. Section 4 formulates the hypotheses and
presents the data. Section 5 outlines our empirical methodology. Section 6 presents
the results. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Literature review
The debate about the pros and cons of insider trading is important as it might influ-
ence the decision on whether and to what extent to regulate such trading in financial
markets (Leland, 1992). Researchers and regulators have examined both the fairness
and the economic implications of insider trading. Concerning the latter, which is
the focus of our article, the key issue involves the assessment of the impact of insider
trading on price efficiency. In this regard, two contradictory views have emerged. The
first view, pioneered by the work of Manne (1966) and extended by Carlton and Fis-
chel (1983), claims that trading on inside information leads to more informationally
efficient stock prices. The main argument of the supporters of insider trading is that
insider trades are informative and convey precious information about the future per-
formance of a firm and thus about its true value (Leland, 1992). Accurate stock prices
help the capital market to efficiently allocate its resources: for example, a takeover
decision is often based on a stock-price-based estimate of the target’s value.
The second view claims that insider trading leads to less informationally efficient
stock prices due to adverse selection costs (Fishman & Hagerty, 1992). In this logic,
some outsiders perceive the market to be unfair and thus might stop trading and
searching for relevant information because they anticipate that insiders still have a
superior knowledge. As a consequence, prices will be less informationally efficient and
more volatile, and market liquidity will decrease (Leland, 1992).
According to Fama (1970), asset prices are efficient if they fully reflect all available
information, public or private. Several financial studies have tested the semi-strong
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form of the EMH, which states that security prices include all relevant public informa-
tion swiftly and fully, using event study methods. The evidence is mostly supportive
because stock prices adjust rapidly, usually within a day, to announcements (for an
overview, see Fama, 1991).5 In general, event studies using stock returns face a number
of issues, including the difficulty in determining the precise event date (the moment
information is publicly disseminated), the effect of confounding events around the
event date, and the need to use an asset pricing model to evaluate the normal stock
returns.6
Other studies test the strong-form of the EMH, which states that prices include
all public and private information, by investigating whether corporate insiders can
gain abnormal profits when trading their company’ stock (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001).
Rozeff and Zaman (1988), for example, find evidence that managers profitably trade
their companies’ shares before important corporate events and gain abnormal prof-
its, suggesting that their trades are based on important information. However, these
articles mostly investigate legal insider trading, i.e., trading on non-material inside in-
formation that is self-reported by corporate insiders to the local financial authorities.7
A drawback of these studies lies in their inherent inability to precisely determine the
motivation behind these trades: for example, managers might trade their firm’s stock
for hedging, risk-sharing, or liquidity reasons (Jaffe, 1974).
Most relevant to price efficiency studies is illegal insider trading activity, i.e.,
trading on material inside information. However, corporate insiders obviously refrain
from reporting violations of the law to authorities, so the real amount of insider
trading activity cannot be determined with precision (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981).
5Some researchers have also observed a pre-announcement drift in stock prices (a so-called price run-up) and suggest
that this drift is caused by illegal insider trading on leaked material information (Mitchell et al., 2004).
6This latter issue is known as the joint hypothesis problem. Stock efficiency studies rely on some equilibrium asset
pricing models to measure any abnormal return, i.e., the expected return given the absence of a particular event like
an earnings announcement. Thus, any abnormal return observed may reflect a market inefficiency, an inaccurate
pricing model, or both (Fama, 1991).
7Corporate insiders must disclose their trades in their firms’ securities to the local financial market authorities. In the
U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) publishes monthly a list of all self-reported insider trades in
the Official Summary of Insider Transactions. Most studies are based on these SEC filings. However, the filings are
too vague to characterize the type of informational advantage held by managers (Ke, Huddart, & Petroni, 2003).
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Thus, despite the importance of the subject, the empirical evidence on the impacts of
trading on material information on price efficiency is scarce. One important exception
is the study of Meulbroek (1992), who uses information on illegal insider trading
from 183 civil cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
order to investigate the impact of these informed insider trades on the efficiency of
stock prices. She finds that insider trading cause significant movements in the prices,
thereby increasing their accuracy. Notably, Meulbroek shows that between 40% and
50% of the price adjustment following the release of inside information to the public
is caused by insider trading.
Two other studies, Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell
(1997), also show that insider trading leads to more efficient stock prices by ana-
lyzing illegal insider trades in the stock of two acquisition targets, Campbell Taggart
and Carnation, respectively. However, Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) dispute
these three previous studies on the grounds that they neglected to distinguish the
effect of insider trading from that of non-insider trading on price discovery. Using a
refined methodology, Chakravarty and McConnell re-analyze the data of those pre-
vious studies and show that the effect of insider trades on prices is not discernibly
different from that of non-insider trades.
Some authors have used the data from the betting markets to investigate the semi-
strong form of the EMH of betting prices during sports events. For example, Croxson
and Reade (2014) investigate the reaction of prices on a betting exchange to soccer
goals scored within five minutes before the half-time break. Since during half-time
there is little new information, one can test if the prices quickly adjust to the news
of the goal and stay constant thereafter (no price drift). The authors conclude that
the prices update swiftly and fully and that the betting market is semi-strong form
efficient. In contrast, Choi and Hui (2014) reject the semi-strong form of the EMH
using very similar in-play soccer data because prices overreact after surprising goals.
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Most related to our study is the work of Schnytzer and Shilony (1995), who also em-
ploy a setting in which one can reliably distinguish between the activity of two groups,
one with and one without access to inside information. Schnytzer and Shilony use the
horse pari-mutuel betting setting in Melbourne.8 Pari-mutuel betting is often offered
at the racetrack next to over one hundred standard bookmakers and also at off-track
facilities. In this setting, pari-mutuel traders at the racetrack have the advantage of
observing how the bookmaker odds change shortly before the race. For example, they
may observe that the bookmaker odds on a given horse have significantly decreased,
suggesting that many traders, some of whom may have held inside information, favor
that horse. Therefore, insiders profit from having a source of “second-hand” inside
information via the bookmakers’ odds (Schnytzer & Shilony, 1995). In contrast, as
communications to outside the stadium are prohibited by law, off-track pari-mutuel
traders are not informed about the last-minute developments and thus have an infor-
mational disadvantage. By analyzing the bets of these two isolated groups, Schnytzer
and Shilony find that insiders make larger profits and that inside information on
average correctly predicts the outcome of the race. However, their paper does not
investigate the relationship between insider trading and price efficiency.
Finally, Brown (2012) analyzes the bid-ask spreads of the bookmakers’ odds dur-
ing the 2009 Wimbledon men’s tennis final and asks whether some traders have an
advantage due to superior analytical skills or due to access to material inside infor-
mation. He observes an increase in the in-play bid-ask spreads prior to and during
public information arrival and attributes this to an increase in asymmetric informa-
tion. Brown proposes that, in the presence of insiders, the bookmakers increase the
bid-ask spread to offset losses to the informed traders. However, Brown provides no
direct evidence on the effect of insider trading on price efficiency.
8The pari-mutuel, or totalisator, is a betting system in which all the bets on the horses are pulled together in a
so-called pool. The racetrack organizers handle the process by pooling and distributing the money, thereby earning
a fee. The odds on different horses vary until the pool is closed prior to the start of the event; at that moment, the
payoff odds are determined.
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Overall, the empirical evidence on the economic effects of insider trading on market
efficiency is either little or mixed in both the classical financial markets and the betting
markets. This article contributes to closing this literature gap by providing a simpler
setting that allows us to overcome the difficulties of previous investigations.
3 Background information
To understand the analyses in this paper, we introduce the advantages of using a
betting exchange as a research laboratory and provide some important background
information on in-play tennis betting. Most importantly, we discuss how we can
distinguish between the trading activity of insider and outsider traders in our setting.
Compared to the research in standard financial markets, which mostly focuses
on stock prices, research in betting markets offers several advantages. First, whereas
equity is infinitely lived, a betting asset (a bet) is short-lived because the fundamental
value of a bet is revealed at contract expiration. Therefore, one can test how efficiently
the prices of betting assets (the odds) predict an outcome, like the winner of a match.
Second, compared to stock prices, betting odds have two attractive properties: (1) new
information has a larger impact on a bet value because a bet has a high probability
of default (Brown, 2012); (2) bet trading, especially during the match, is mainly
motivated by information about the fundamental value of a bet (Williams, 2005),
whereas stock trading is motivated by a multitude of factors beyond the information
about the fundamental value of equity, e.g., portfolio rebalancing or liquidity needs.9
Betting exchanges have several interesting features. Different from bookmakers,
exchanges provide an online market for opinions where traders bet against other
traders (without an intermediary) by offering and accepting odds under which they
are willing to buy (back) or sell (lay) a certain bet. Thus, a betting exchange works
very similarly to a classical stock exchange. In this article, we use data from one
9Uninformed or sentimental trading may occur in both markets.
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of the major online betting exchanges worldwide, Betfair. The trading volumes on
Betfair are very large: for example, 1.2 billion bets were placed on the exchange in
2014, corresponding to three million bets per day, resulting in a total matched volume
of $92 billion (Betfair, 2015). In the United Kingdom, the total revenue generated by
tennis betting is second only to that generated by soccer betting (Townend, 2016).
Betfair revolutionized the sports betting industry in 2000 when it introduced the
in-play (or live) feature, allowing traders to continuously place or accept bets as
the competition unfolds. Tennis in-play betting is very popular for several reasons.
First, trading in tennis is simpler than in other sports because there are just two
contingencies for each point: a player wins or loses it. Traders mostly follow the match
on TV, and whenever new information becomes observable, they update their bets
or place new ones (Brown & Yang, 2017). Second, liquidity, which is indispensable
for trading, is generally high. Third, points are scored frequently, and in the space
of seconds, a match can swing from a match point for one player to a match point
for the other player; thus, the constant fluctuation in the odds facilitates trading.
Finally, there are many betting opportunities because there are many tournaments
throughout the year.
In-play betting constitutes a predominant share of the total betting volume gener-
ated in tennis. In our sample of 141 matches, $2.5 billion worth of bets were placed in-
play, corresponding to 85% of the total (pre-play and in-play) volume. The maximum
in-play volume in our sample, $70.5 million, was reached during the 2013 Wimbledon
men’s semifinal between Djokovic and Del Potro.
In the following two paragraphs, we briefly illustrate the basics of in-play betting.
Fig. 1 depicts a screenshot of the in-play order book during the match between
Murray and Wawrinka taken from betfair.com on 9th June, 2017.10 The order book
presents the bets on the match winner available in the order book: these are the bets
10This match, played at the French Open, serves only as illustration and is not included in our sample.
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Figure 1
Displayed is a screenshot from betfair.com illustrating its interface. The screenshot was taken on 9th June, 2017
during the match between Murray and Wawrinka at the French Open tournament. Four hours into the game, the
total matched amount was e35 million (approximately $39 million).
previously placed by other traders and that have not yet been matched. The third
(fourth) column shows the current best back (lay) odds for each player. The available
volumes (in e) are provided below the odds. According to Fig. 1, the best odds to
bet on Murray are 2.3, and it is possible to bet up to e13,256 at this price. As the
inverse of the match odds can be interpreted as the player’s probability of winning
the match, after four hours of play, Wawrinka was perceived as slight favorite for the
victory, with a probability of roughly 57%.
The simplest way to bet on Murray is to click on 2.3 (under “Back all”) and enter
the desired stake: by doing so, the trader (the backer) enters into a contract with one
or more traders (the layers) who are taking the opposite position (against Murray)
and offering odds of 2.3.11 The backer is placing a market order, thereby matching the
outstanding orders previously placed by the layers. Assuming that the backer puts
e10 at stake, the corresponding payoff to the backer if Murray wins the match is e13
plus the initial e10 stake.12 As betting is a zero-sum game, the layer loses e13. If
the backer wishes to back Murray at the higher odds of 2.38, the backer places a limit
order, thereby offering odds higher than the current available market odds. If entered,
11Laying is an exclusive feature of betting exchanges in which layers are practically taking the role of a bookmakers
offering the odds.
12We ignore the 5% commission on winning bets collected by Betfair (no commission is paid when a loss is incurred).
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this order shows up on the “Lay all” side of the order book and can be matched by a
trader willing to lay Murray at those odds.13
In tennis betting, a trader who can obtain information about the match earlier
than others is an insider. Match information about the score or the physical and
mental status of the players is material because it will impact the prices. The fastest
way for traders to access this information is to sit directly in the stadium, which
also allows them to see special situations, such as the signs of injury or the calls for
physiotherapy assistance. As the venue where tennis is played is called the court,
insider traders are sometimes referred to as courtsiders.14
Brad Hutchins, a former tennis courtsider, wrote in his book: “If you’re working
on centre court at a Grand Slam [tennis tournament], there could be up to twenty
other traders gambling on court. [...] When courts are competitive, speed becomes
the key. [...] If everyone gambling at home is watching a television feed that is delayed
by five seconds, you have just five seconds to take advantage. That’s plenty of time
to log a point” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 28). Trading speed is essential for in-play traders,
who have large incentives to quickly update their bets to gain a profit after each point.
To trade alghorithmically, some sophisticated courtsiders transmit live score data to
remotely located computers, which then place new orders on the betting exchange
(Dickson, 2015).
In contrast, off-stadium traders (outsiders) rely on communication technologies to
stay informed about the progress of the match. The most comprehensive source of in-
formation for outsiders are TV broadcasts; they not only provide score information (as
13The terms market and limit orders are also common in the standard financial markets. For example, placing a
market order corresponds to either a buy or sell order at the current market price, whereas placing a limit order
corresponds to either a buy order at a price below the current market price or a a sell order at a price above the
current market price.
14Analogously, different terms exist for other sports, like pitchsiding in cricket and soccer. Although trading from the
stadium was generally legal under French and British laws for the 2009–2014 period covered by our sample, such
activity generally violates the terms and conditions of the ticket purchase. For example, Article 24 of the ticket
terms and conditions at Wimbledon (2017) reads: “Betting is prohibited in the Grounds at all times”, and Article
19 specifies that: “The use of photographic equipment, mobile telephones, computers, tablets or other electronic
devices, communication devices, audio-visual equipment or radios must not [...] supply or transmit data for the
purposes of betting or gambling (or assisting for these purposes).”
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internet scoreboards) but also key information like a player’s fatigue level, confidence,
or tactics. However, TV images are significantly delayed in comparison to the real
match. Betfair clearly indicates that any “transmissions described as “live” by some
broadcasters may actually be delayed” and that the “extent of any such delay may
vary, depending on the set-up through which they are receiving pictures or data.”15
Due to the large number of factors determining the length of the TV delay, accurate
estimates are difficult. Kooij et al. (2014) measure the delay in live TV broadcasts in
the Netherlands. They estimate that a minimum delay of four seconds is introduced
by the steps of encoding and modulation of the images, on top of which one should
add between one and six seconds for the transmission.16
Because Kooij et al.’s minimal delay of five seconds corresponds with the TV delay
mentioned by Brad Hutchins and by Betfair, and other information sources like inter-
net scoreboards are also delayed, we use five seconds as the cutoff for distinguishing the
insider trading period (within five seconds after the event) from the outsider trading
period (from six seconds after the event onward). In other words, the communica-
tion delays allow us to differentiate insider from outsider trading activity: any price
movement observed within five seconds following an event would reveal the presence
of insider traders, if any.
In an effort to slow down insider traders, Betfair has put in place a bet processing
delay, a so-called speed bump. The speed bump imposes a delay of five seconds
15Betfair also writes that: “Although the current score, time elapsed, video and other data provided on this site is
sourced from “live” score feeds provided by third parties, you should be aware that this data may be subject to a
time delay and/or be inaccurate. Please also be aware that other Betfair customers may have access to data that is
faster and/or more accurate than the data shown on the Betfair site. If you rely on this data to place bets, you do
so entirely at your own risk. Betfair provides this data AS IS with no warranty as to the accuracy, completeness or
timeliness of such data and accepts no responsibility for any loss (direct or indirect) suffered by you as a result of
your reliance on it.”
16Concerning the transmission of TV images, the length of the delay can greatly vary, depending on the transmitting
technologies (satellite is slower than terrestrial, while internet streaming is the slowest), the quality (high definition is
slower than standard definition), the subscription (digital is generally slower than analog TV), and the broadcaster
(which use different hardware). The delay increases with the geographical distance between the event, the local
broadcaster, and the household (Kooij et al., 2014). Fig. 1 in Kooij et al. (2014) illustrates the various steps of a TV
content delivery chain: live TV broadcasts differ from pre-recorded content (like a TV series) because they introduce
additional steps (and delays) due to the filming and transmission to the broadcaster from the event location. Besides,
as the traders on a betting exchange are dispersed all over the world and use different technologies, an attempt to
determine the actual average delay for all the traders is unrealistic.
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between the time in which a market order (a new bet) is submitted and the time in
which it is logged on the exchange and is eventually matched with outstanding orders
(Brown & Yang, 2017). This mechanism is designed to protect the slower traders by
giving them time to cancel or reduce the size of their outstanding (unmatched) orders
without any delay.17 In practice, once the market trader has entered the stake and
confirmed the order, Betfair begins a five second countdown, at the end of which the
market order is logged on the exchange; if the counterparty has not yet canceled the
outstanding bet (within five seconds), the two orders are matched; if the counterparty
has already canceled it, no transaction will take place.
However, the length of the speed bump may be inappropriate for protecting slower
traders. First, as Kooij et al. (2014) shows, the actual TV delay may be well longer
than five seconds. Besides, the traders also need some time to react and update their
bets. Second, Brown and Yang (2017) suggest that insider traders may circumvent the
speed bump by placing two limit orders, one on each player, and then timely canceling
the wrong position once the new score data come in. Since canceling a limit order
occurs without delay, insider traders can still profit from their time advantage. Dan
Dobson, a former insider trader, confirms this practice in an interview with the BBC:
“We had an automated system whereby the point data would come in and then we
would cancel any [outstanding] bets that we had in the market that we deemed were
at the wrong price [...]. Then we would place bets straight back into the market that
we deemed were now the correct price” (Cox, 2015). Clearly, such strategies (which
we illustrate with an example below) reduce the protection offered by the speed bump
to slower traders.
17However, changing the odds of a limit order is treated as placing a new market order and is subjected to the speed
bump.
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4 Research hypothesis and data
We focus on the speed of the price adjustment to new information, which is one key
aspect of market efficiency. Thus, our main null hypothesis is that insider trading
does not affect the efficiency of betting prices.
Hypothesis 1. The efficiency of price discovery is unaffected by insider trading.
The market efficiency theory (e.g., Manne, 1966; Carlton & Fischel, 1983) predicts
that because insider trading is based on new, relevant information, insiders contribute
to price discovery by rapidly incorporating information into market prices. Therefore,
the alternative hypothesis is that insider trading is directly linked to the speed of
incorporating new information into the prices of financial securities (Fernandes &
Ferreira, 2009). We test our hypothesis using event study methods, which allow us to
observe when and how the betting prices update following important informational
events. Given the minimum communication delay of five seconds, we will reject the
null hypothesis if we observe a significant price adjustment during the first five insider
trading seconds following the event.
In the following, we lay out three broad scenarios regarding the hypothetical im-
pact of insider trading on the efficiency of price discovery. Fig. 2 depicts the earliest
time at which the cumulative abnormal returns start increasing following an important
event.18 The horizontal axis represents the time elapsed (in seconds) after the event,
which takes place at time zero. In all scenarios, we assume a minimum informational
delay (for the outsiders vs. the insiders) of five seconds.
Scenario 1 depicts a situation without insiders in which all traders are, for exam-
ple, TV traders. The traders see the delayed TV images five seconds after the actual
event (time = 0) and place their market bets. After a five second delay due to the
18In Section 6, we describe the event study methodology in detail. The cumulative abnormal returns represent the
sum over a specified period after the event of the abnormal returns, i.e., the difference between the realized returns
and the expected (normal) returns. To understand Fig. 2, one must understand that the price adjustment begins
when the cumulative abnormal returns start to increase.
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Scenario 1. Without insiders.
0 5 10 time (sec)
Scenario 2. With insiders.
0 5 10 time (sec)
Scenario 3. With insiders circumventing the speed bump.
0 5 10 time (sec)
Figure 2
Displayed is the timeline of the event study under three scenarios. Time is in seconds, and zero corresponds to the
second when a player wins a set. The line indicates the assumed time pattern of the cumulative average abnormal
returns computed from the betting odds. The line should be flat until the moment at which some betting traders
receive and act upon new material information, causing the betting odds to change.
speed bump, the new orders are logged on the exchange. Thus, the price adjustment
begins, at the earliest, ten seconds following the event.
Scenario 2 depicts a situation with insiders and outsiders. If insiders observe the
event as it happens (time = 0) and place new market orders that are subjected to the
speed bump, the price adjustment begins, at the earliest, five seconds following the
event.
Scenario 3 depicts the same situation as Scenario 2, with one exception: we
assume that some sophisticated insider traders are able to circumvent the speed bump
by timely canceling their limit orders on the wrong side of the market without any
delay, as suggested by Brown and Yang (2017) and Dan Dobson. For example, insiders
observe Federer winning the set and immediately cancel their orders for “Federer to
lose” but not those on “Federer to win”. Contemporaneously, the slower traders, who
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are still unaware of the outcome of the set, will see their market orders on “Federer to
win” matched but not those on “Federer to lose”. Thus, under this scenario, the price
adjustment begins immediately following the event. If the adjustment is significant,
we will reject the null hypothesis.
Overall, the presence of insiders anticipates the start of the price adjustment by
roughly five seconds (Scenario 2 ), which corresponds to the length of the informational
delay. Furthermore, the presence of some sophisticated insiders further anticipates the
price adjustment by roughly five seconds, because those traders avoid the speed bump
(Scenario 3 ).
Our sample consists of 141 Grand Slam men’s singles matches played between
2009 and 2014 at Roland Garros (61 matches) and at Wimbledon (80 matches).19
The betting data originate from Betfair and are provided by Fracsoft, the official data
vendor. For every second during a match (1,296,688 seconds in total), we have the
best back and lay odds. The total matched volume is $2.95 billion, 85% of which is
generated in-play.
Detailed match data are provided by IBM, the official supplier of information
technology to both tennis tournaments. Beyond general information about the match,
such as players and the start and end match times, the IBM data also contain 31,018
point-level information on the score, time (exact to the second), and winner. The
score is fed into the system directly by the match umpire using a computer, whereas
other statistics are collected by analysts who attend the match and manually feed the
data into the system.
Our final merged sample consists of 31,018 observations for 141 matches. The
sample is heterogeneous, containing matches from the first stage up to the finals and
a total of 83 unique players. Table 1 provides summary statistics. The average in-play
matched volume is roughly $18 million. Usually, semifinal and final matches attract




Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: betting odds
In-play matched volume (mio $) 18.1 19.4 0.2 70.5 1,296,688
In-play order processing delay (seconds) 5 0 5 5 1,296,688
Panel B: match information
Duration (minutes) 154.7 50.1 69.9 284.8 141
Number of points 221.2 66.1 117 437 141
Number of sets 3.6 0.7 3 5 141
Number of games (in match) 35.8 10.1 20 77 141
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics for the 141 men’s singles matches in our sample. The matches
were played at the French Open and at the Wimbledon Championships between 2009 and 2014 (see Table A.1 in the
Appendix). In Panel A, we report the statistics about the bedding odds from Betfair. In Panel B, we report the
statistics about the match from IBM.
larger volumes than first-round matches, as shown by the $70.5 million matched during
the 2013 Wimbledon semifinal between Djokovic and Del Potro. Different from other
sports, the speed bump in tennis has remained fixed to five seconds over time. An
average match lasts 155 minutes and consists of 3.6 sets, 36 games, and 221 points.
We use the end of a set—when a player wins a set—as the informational event,
because it satisfies three important criteria. First, the end of a set is an important
news event because it is a pivotal moment in a match. At the French Open and at
Wimbledon, the player who first wins three sets wins the match: therefore, a player’s
probability of winning the match increases after winning a set. Second, the end of a
set is an easily observable event. Third, a 120-second break follows the end of each set.
This is advantageous because the event study results are less affected by overlapping
and confounding events in the seconds following the end of a set.20 Overall, our sample
includes 365 set events. Since the betting market is immediately closed when a player
wins the match, we exclude the last set from our analyses.21
In a further analysis, we analyze a subsample encompassing the sets won after
a tie-break (N=79). A tie-break decides the outcome of very balanced sets, and its
outcome is often unanticipated. When we compare the outcome of a tie-break with
the outcome of a set won by a large margin (e.g., six games to zero), the tie-break
20Croxson and Reade (2014) considers the 15-minute halftime break in soccer matches as a “low-information period”
because important information is rarely revealed during the break. Similarly, in tennis, little information is revealed
during the break, except when players start showing clear signs of fatigue, stress, or pain.
21At the French Open and at Wimbledon, a match is played as the best of five sets. Since we do not include the last
set when the match ends, we analyze between two and four set events per match. The “Number of sets” reported
in Table 1 corresponds, however, to the statistics for the original sample before excluding the match points.
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usually has a larger surprise component. In our sample, a tie-break lasts on average
approximately eight minutes (with a minimum of four minutes and a maximum of 17
minutes), and thus the traders have enough time to recognize the importance of the
moment and are prepared to adjust their bets.
Fig. 3 illustrates some characteristics of our two main events, the set and tie-break
events, and provides insight into our data. More specifically, it shows the evolution of
Del Potro’s odds-implied winning probability (henceforth WP) over the match when
he played against, and lost to, Djokovic at Wimbledon on 5th July, 2013.22 As the
match started, Del Potro’s WP was 15.3%.
The vertical dashed lines indicate the end of a set (excluding the last one). Djokovic
won the first set, resulting in a decrease of Del Potro’s WP from 15.3% to approxi-
mately 8%. In the second part of the second set, Del Potro won a game when Djokovic
was serving (a so-called break) resulting in a large increase in Del Potro’s WP. Al-
though Del Potro won the second set, his WP did not increase by much, perhaps
because the market had already anticipated that after a break, Del Potro would have
managed to win the second set.
The outcome of the third and fourth sets was highly uncertain and was decided
only after a tiebreak. Del Potro lost the third set, resulting in a large decrease in his
WP from 33% (at the beginning of the tiebreak) to approximately 12%. In the middle
of the fourth set, Djokovic won a game when Del Potro was serving (a break) resulting
in a large decrease in Del Potro’s WP, which reached a record low of 3%. Del Potro
won the fourth set by a small margin, resulting in a spike in his winning probability
from 4% to approximately 30%. Overall, this example makes it apparent that the
betting prices readily react to new information and that the price adjustments are
larger after tie-breaks because their outcome is more uncertain.
22In a live betting market, the price throughout the match of a betting asset, like “Del Potro to win the match”, is
represented by its in-play odds. By computing the inverse of these odds, we can derive the aggregate traders’ belief
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Figure 3
Displayed is Del Potro’s odds-implied match winning probability for his 5th July, 2013 semifinal match against Djokovic
at Wimbledon. Del Potro lost in five sets after more than four hours of play with the score: 5–7; 6–4; 7–6; 6–7; 3–6. A
total of roughly $74.8 million was bet on this match, 94% of which ($70.5 million) was placed in-play.
5 Event study methods
The aim of our event study is to measure the betting odds reaction around the re-
lease of important information and to quantify the extent to which insider trading
affects this reaction. Assuming rationality in the marketplace, security prices should
immediately reflect all available information (Fama, 1970).
We follow the classical methodology presented by MacKinlay (1997). Fig. 4
summarizes the timeline of the baseline event study. We define the moment when a
player wins a set or a tie-break as the event time (τ=0). We account for the possibility
that some traders may anticipate the outcome of the point or that the umpire may









Displayed is the timeline of the baseline event study, where τ represents the time (in seconds) during a match. The
news event takes place at τ=0. The estimation window length is L1=8, and the event window length is L2=17.
seconds before the event.23 Thus, the event window spans from τ1=−2 to τ2=14 and
lasts seventeen seconds (L2=17).
The estimation window does not begin immediately after the end of the previous
point (roughly at τ=−20) to avoid informational spillovers from the previous point.
According to the ITF rules, the time between two consecutive points should be 20
seconds—in our sample, the median elapsed time is 22 seconds. Furthermore, as
the event and estimation window should not overlap, the estimation window ends
at τ1=−3, one second before the start of the event window at τ2=−2. Thus, the
estimation window spans from τ0=−10 to τ1=−3 and lasts eight seconds (L1=8).24
Because we want to analyze the reaction of the odds on the player who won the
set, we consider only the odds of the set and tie-break winner. For each second τ of
a match, we compute the average mid-odds from the best back (backτ ) and sell odds





The mid-price, which is expressed in decimal odds, can range from a minimum to 1.01
to a maximum of 1000. Then we derive the implied winning probability as follows
by taking the inverse of the the mid-price (WPτ =
1
midτ
), which approaches 99%
23The International Tennis Federation (ITF), the governing body of tennis, requires the umpires to “timely and
accurately” enter the points in their computers throughout the match.
24In a robustness check, we also test an alternative estimation windows lasting 15 seconds, from τ0=−17 to τ1=−3
jointly with an alternative event windows lasting 19 seconds, from τ2=−2 to τ3=17. The results, which we present
in Table A.3 in the Appendix, are similar.
124
when the mid-price approaches 1.01. Finally, we compute the actual returns from the




− 1 . (2)
When a player wins the set or tie-break, the odds should adjust downward, causing
the odds-implied winning probability to increase and resulting in a positive return.
The drawback of any event study methodology is that the economic interpretation
of the results clearly depends on the underlying assumptions used to estimate normal
returns and for statistical testing. The null hypothesis that the average abnormal
returns are zero implicitly includes a test of whether the model used for measuring
normal returns is correct (MacKinlay, 1997). Since for tennis matches there is no
asset valuation model to measure abnormal returns, the logical alternative is to use
the mean return over the estimation window as an estimate for the normal return.26
We estimate the normal return by calculating the arithmetic mean of the returns








where L1 is the estimation window length. We then compute the abnormal returns (or
prediction errors) for each event j by subtracting the normal returns from the actual
returns over the event window: ARjτ = Rjτ − R̄jτ . Under the null hypothesis, the
abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed with a zero conditional mean
and conditional variance σ2(ARj). It can be assumed that σ
2
ARj
= σ2ǫj , where σ
2
ǫj




−1). However, this approach
results in negative returns when a player wins the set and thus offers a less intuitive interpretation.
26As a robustness check, we assume that the betting prices would not change and that the normal returns would be
zero over the event window for all set events. The results are similar.
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is estimated by computing the sample variance of the returns over the estimation







(Rjτ − R̄j)2 . (4)
Therefore, the null distribution of the abnormal returns is ARjτ ∼ N(0, σ̂2ǫj ).
Then, we aggregate the abnormal returns along two dimensions. First, we aggre-
gate the returns along the event dimension to generate the average abnormal returns
AARτ . To do so, for every second τ in the event window, we average the abnormal













Second, we aggregate along the time dimension the average abnormal returns to com-
pute the cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR(τ2,τ3). We do so by summing










σ̂2(AARτ ) . (6)
Under the assumption that returns are independent and identically normally dis-




H0∼ N(0, 1) , (7)








Fig. 5 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) and the corre-
sponding 95% confidence interval over the event window for the 365 set events.27 We
observe a significant positive reaction in the betting odds in the first seconds imme-
diately following the set event. Most importantly, during the first five insider trading
seconds the CAAR is 3.06% and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore,
some sophisticated insider traders are able to circumvent the speed bump by timely
canceling—without any delay—their limit orders on the wrong side of the market, as
described in Scenario 3.
The pattern displayed in Fig. 5 shows that new information is fully incorporated
into the betting odds within six to seven seconds, after which the CAAR stabilizes
around 5%. Thus, insider trading accounts for more than 60% of the full price re-
action observed once the public receives the information about the set winner. This
result shows that insider trading substantially contributes to “speeding up” the price
discovery process, which contrasts with Hypothesis 1. This result is also in line with
that of Meulbroek (1992), who finds, using illegal insider trading SEC data, that the
price adjustment caused by insider traders accounts for between 40 and 50% of the
total price adjustment.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows an average abnormal return (AAR) of 1.44%, the largest
over the event window, at second six. Apparently, insider traders not only cancel the
wrong outstanding limit orders but also immediately place new market orders (which
undergo the five-second speed-bump) at the price that they deem correct to increase
their profits. Finally, by slowing down insider traders, the speed bump somewhat
lengthens the price discovery process by five seconds.
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Figure 5
Displayed is the cumulative abnormal return averaged across the 365 event observations from second −2 to second
14. The event date (τ=0) is when a player wins the set. The realized returns are computed from the changes in the
odds-implied winning probability of the player who won the set. The abnormal return is calculated using the constant
mean return model.
Fig. 6 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) and the corre-
sponding 95% confidence interval over the event window for the 79 tie-break events
(i.e., sets won at the tie-break).28 Overall, the CAAR pattern is similar to that
displayed in Fig. 5, with three main differences: first, the total adjustment of ap-
proximately 8.8% is significantly larger than for the set events (roughly 5%). This is
due to the importance of winning a tie-break in a balanced match and the difficulty
of predicting its outcome. Second, the largest average abnormal return (AAR) of
3.18% now takes place at τ=3, perhaps indicating that the insiders trade even faster
or speculate to gain a edge over other traders during pivotal moments. Third, insider
trading during the first five seconds causes around 80% of the full price reaction, which
is larger than for the set events.
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Figure 6
Displayed is the cumulative abnormal return averaged across the 79 event observations from second −2 to second
14. The event date (τ=0) is when a player wins the set in the tie-break. The realized returns are computed from
the changes in the odds-implied winning probability of the player who won the tie-break. The abnormal return is
calculated using the constant mean return model.
Taken together, both the results displayed in Fig. 5 and 6 show that the effi-
ciency of price discovery is affected by insider trading, which contradicts Hypothesis
1. Furthermore, the tie-break results show that the impact of insider traders on price
discovery is even larger during important moments, when inside information is more
valuable.
6.2 Trading strategy
By knowing before others in which direction the betting odds will move, an insider
may adopt a dynamic back-lay trading strategy to earn a profit by first backing the
player who wins a set and later laying that same player. In order to earn a positive
return, the trader must lay only when the lay odds have shortened and are lower than
the previous back odds. By taking both sides, betting for and against the same player,
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the insider trader locks in a guaranteed profit regardless of the final outcome of the
match.
More precisely, if Player 1 (P1) wins a set, the insider should back P1 at the
higher (back) odds of 2.0 before the market moves. In the following seconds, the
market reacts to the new information, and the odds for P1 decrease to reflect the
increase in his probability of winning the match. If the lay odds are later lower than
2.0, say 1.5, the insider lays P1, thereby closing the trading strategy. By staking a
certain amount on both sides of the market, the trader can lock in a risk-free profit,
regardless of whether P1 wins or loses the match.29
As an illustration, consider the following strategy: backing $1 at odds of 2.0 just
after a set event and laying $1.33 at odds of 1.50 some seconds later on P1. In a
so-called balanced back-lay trading, the net return is 31% regardless of the outcome:
if P1 wins the match, the back-bet payoff is $1 and the lay-bet payoff is $–0.67,
yielding a gross profit of $0.33 (or a net profit of $0.31 after deducting the 5% Betfair
commission); if P1 loses the match, the back-bet payoff is $–1 and the lay-bet payoff
is $1.33, yielding exactly the same profit.30
We assess the total return that an insider trader could have earned by using the
back–lay trading strategy when available for the set and tie-break events. Specifically,
we assume that the insider trader backs the player who wins the set and lays the same
player after exactly five seconds. For simplicity, we ignore of the speed bump and
assume that the new market orders are immediately matched.
As we explained before, such a trading strategy yields a positive profit only if the
back price is higher than the lay price and yields a larger profit when the back-lay
difference is larger. This is more often the case in balanced sets (and matches) than
in unbalanced ones. In an unbalanced set, when a player has a large advantage, the
29Hedging a trade by taking the opposite position on the same player is a strategy called “greening up”. The name
derives from the fact that by dynamically backing and laying the same player correctly, the trader makes a positive
profit (indicated by a green number on the trading software) regardless of the outcome.
30The precise lay dollar amount yielding a balanced trade is computed by multiplying the back amount by the back
odds and dividing by the lay odds.
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odds usually move either by a small amount or not at all after the end of a set because
the traders anticipate its outcome. To be the most profitable, this trading strategy is
applied to balanced matches where the odds are around 1.5 and 2.0 so that the odds
fluctuate more after an event.
We can identify 64 set (17.5% of all set events) and 31 tie-break events (39.2% of
all tie-break events) that satisfy the condition in which the lay odds at second five are
lower than the back odds at second zero. On average, we find than an insider using
the dynamic back-lay trading strategy described above would earn a 5.32% return on
set events and 5.97% on tie-break events (both returns are statistically significant at
the 1% level). By putting $100 at stake, the insider could earn between $5 and $6
without taking any risk.
In a further analysis, we consider only the trading opportunities during the semi-
finals and the finals. We identify 22 trading opportunities for the set events, yielding
6.78%, and eight trading opportunities for the tie-break events, yielding 6.41%. As ex-
pected, the trading profits are larger because these matches are usually more balanced
and the liquidity is higher.
Overall, these results are important as they show that in such situations insiders
can make significant profits without taking any risk. Moreover, insiders can make
even larger profits by, for example, waiting more than five seconds to close the trade
and lay at even lower odds, or by taking some risks by stacking a larger amount
on the back-bet than on the lay-bet on the winning player (an unbalanced trade).
However, one should not forget that insiders not only have to cover their travel, stay,
and entrance costs but also have to deal with the stadium security agents.
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7 Concluding remarks
In most financial markets, trading on material information by corporate insiders is
against the law. Thus, the evidence on the extent to which this important form of
trading aids the price discovery is, at best, scarce. We attempt to fill this gap in the
literature by using a previously unexplored setting: in-play tennis betting. Due to
inevitable communication delays, betting traders in the stadium have an informational
advantage because they can observe material information about the match before
other traders, such as TV traders. Thus, this setting offers an unique opportunity to
distinguish the in-play trading activity of insiders from that of outsiders.
Our event study analyses of 365 set events from 141 men’s singles matches at two
major professional tennis tournaments show that the betting prices rapidly adjust
in the first five insider trading seconds following important moments—the end of
sets and tie-breaks—when outsiders have not yet received the information. Most
importantly, we show that the cumulative abnormal return during the insider trading
seconds following an important event is between 60% and 80% of the full price reaction
observed once the public receives the new information. Thus, the price discovery is
largely affected by insider trading. We also show that the the impact of insider trading
is even larger for unanticipated news events, like tie-break set events, when inside
information is more valuable. Finally, we estimate that a simple dynamic back-lay
strategy implemented in the first seconds after the event yields large risk-free trading
profits to insiders ranging between 5% and 7%.
Our results are important, as they provide empirical evidence on the advantages
of insider trading in terms of its contribution to price efficiency. Insider traders have
large incentives to rapidly integrate the new information into the market. At the
same time, as betting on a betting exchange is a zero-sum game, one could also
discuss how the insider activity disadvantages the slower traders. Although Betfair
has put a speed bump in place in an effort to protect these slower traders, our data
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suggest that sophisticated insiders have developed strategies to circumvent it. Further
research should determine if slower traders adopt more passive trading strategies or
even stop trading when they anticipate that they cannot compete with insiders on
speed. Overall, when debating the effects of insider trading on a betting exchange as
well as on any financial market, these adverse selection costs to slower traders should




This appendix introduces the basic rules of tennis and its jargon. These rules are spe-
cific to Grand Slam tournaments and can be found on the website of the International
Tennis Federation. At the beginning of the match, a coin toss decides which player
starts serving in the first game. Player 1 begins the match by serving in the first game
of the first set—player 2 is the receiver. A player wins a point, sometimes referred to
as point game, if the opponent cannot return the ball. A game is won when one player
wins four points with a two-point difference, or when there is a two-point difference
after a deuce, i.e., a score of 40–40 (3 points to 3 points in a game). A player has a
gamepoint if he needs one more point to win the game: if this player is the receiver,
the situation is called a breakpoint. A break (of service) happens when the receiver
wins the game.
The players alternate serving every game, and they change ends after every odd-
numbered game. A set is won when a player either wins six games with a two-game
difference, or, in the case of a tie-break, when the score for one player is 7:6. A player
has a setpoint if he needs one more point to win a set: if this player is the receiver,
he has a breakpoint to win the set.
The tie-break begins when the game score is tied at 6:6 and is played until one
player wins seven points with a two-point difference, or until there is a two-point
difference when the point score is 6:6. At Grand Slam tournaments, a tennis match
is played as the best of five sets, meaning that the first player winning three sets wins
the match. The fifth set does not have a tie-break; the set (and match) is won when
one player wins two more games than the other player.
134
Table A.1
List of the matches included in our sample.
Player 1 Player 2 Date Stage Player 1 Player 2 Date Stage
French Open: Wimbledon (cont.):
R.Gasquet R.Stepanek 23-May-2011 1 A.Roddick A.Murray 3-Jul-2009 6
A.Clement M.Berrer 26-May-2011 2 A.Roddick R.Federer 5-Jul-2009 7
J.Tipsarevic R.Federer 27-May-2011 3 R.Federer A.Falla 21-Jun-2010 1
S.Darcis G.Monfils 27-May-2011 3 R.Federer I.Bozoljac 23-Jun-2010 2
R.Gasquet N.Djokovic 29-May-2011 4 R.Federer A.Clement 25-Jun-2010 3
G.Simon R.Soderling 30-May-2011 4 P.Petzschner R.Nadal 26-Jun-2010 3
G.Monfils R.Federer 31-May-2011 5 N.Djokovic L.Hewitt 28-Jun-2010 4
A.Murray J.Chela 1-Jun-2011 5 R.Federer J.Melzer 28-Jun-2010 4
R.Nadal R.Soderling 1-Jun-2011 5 R.Federer T.Berdych 30-Jun-2010 5
R.Federer N.Djokovic 3-Jun-2011 6 R.Soderling R.Nadal 30-Jun-2010 5
R.Nadal A.Murray 3-Jun-2011 6 J.Tsonga A.Murray 30-Jun-2010 5
R.Nadal R.Federer 5-Jun-2011 7 A.Murray R.Nadal 2-Jul-2010 6
M.Llodra G.Garcia-Lopez 28-May-2012 1 T.Berdych N.Djokovic 2-Jul-2010 6
I.Sijsling G.Muller 27-May-2012 1 T.Berdych R.Nadal 4-Jul-2010 7
M.Berrer J.Melzer 27-May-2012 1 M.Kukushkin R.Federer 21-Jun-2011 1
R.Federer A.Ungur 30-May-2012 2 A.Mannarino R.Federer 23-Jun-2011 2
J.Del Potro M.Cilic 1-Jun-2012 3 M.Baghdatis N.Djokovic 25-Jun-2011 3
F.Fognini Jw.Tsonga 1-Jun-2012 3 D.Nalbandian R.Federer 25-Jun-2011 3
G.Simon S.Wawrinka 1-Jun-2012 3 A.Murray R.Gasquet 27-Jun-2011 4
J.Monaco R.Nadal 4-Jun-2012 4 M.Llodra N.Djokovic 27-Jun-2011 4
J.Tipsarevic N.Almagro 4-Jun-2012 4 M.Youzhny R.Federer 27-Jun-2011 4
R.Federer D.Goffin 3-Jun-2012 4 R.Nadal M.Fish 29-Jun-2011 5
N.Djokovic A.Seppi 3-Jun-2012 4 J.Tsonga R.Federer 29-Jun-2011 5
N.Almagro R.Nadal 6-Jun-2012 5 R.Nadal A.Murray 1-Jul-2011 6
D.Ferrer A.Murray 6-Jun-2012 5 J.Tsonga N.Djokovic 1-Jul-2011 6
R.Federer J.Del Potro 5-Jun-2012 5 R.Nadal N.Djokovic 3-Jul-2011 7
N.Djokovic J.Tsonga 5-Jun-2012 5 R.Federer A.Ramos 25-Jun-2012 1
D.Ferrer R.Nadal 8-Jun-2012 6 R.Federer F.Fognini 27-Jun-2012 2
N.Djokovic R.Federer 8-Jun-2012 6 R.Federer J.Benneteau 29-Jun-2012 3
M.Raonic M.Llodra 29-May-2013 2 R.Federer X.Malisse 2-Jul-2012 4
G.Monfils E.Gulbis 29-May-2013 2 R.Federer M.Youzhny 4-Jul-2012 5
M.Przysiezny R.Gasquet 31-May-2013 2 D.Ferrer A.Murray 4-Jul-2012 5
N.Djokovic G.Pella 30-May-2013 2 A.Murray J.Tsonga 6-Jul-2012 6
V.Troicki M.Cilic 31-May-2013 3 N.Djokovic R.Federer 6-Jul-2012 6
N.Davydenko R.Gasquet 1-Jun-2013 3 R.Federer A.Murray 8-Jul-2012 7
T.Haas J.Isner 1-Jun-2013 3 V.Hanescu R.Federer 24-Jun-2013 1
K.Anderson D.Ferrer 2-Jun-2013 4 R.Nadal S.Darcis 24-Jun-2013 1
R.Nadal K.Nishikori 3-Jun-2013 4 N.Djokovic F.Mayer 25-Jun-2013 1
J.Tsonga R.Federer 4-Jun-2013 5 D.Ferrer M.Alund 25-Jun-2013 1
T.Robredo D.Ferrer 4-Jun-2013 5 A.Ramos J.Del Potro 25-Jun-2013 1
R.Nadal S.Wawrinka 5-Jun-2013 5 J.Tsonga E.Gulbis 26-Jun-2013 2
N.Djokovic T.Haas 5-Jun-2013 5 F.Verdasco J.Benneteau 26-Jun-2013 2
D.Ferrer Jw.Tsonga 7-Jun-2013 6 N.Djokovic B.Reynolds 27-Jun-2013 2
N.Djokovic R.Nadal 7-Jun-2013 6 R.Gasquet G.Soeda 27-Jun-2013 2
R.Nadal D.Ferrer 9-Jun-2013 7 J.Levine J.Del Potro 27-Jun-2013 2
V.Estrella Burgos J.Janowicz 25-May-2014 1 J.Melzer S.Stakhovsky 28-Jun-2013 3
A.Dolgopolov A.Ramos 25-May-2014 1 J.Janowicz J.Melzer 1-Jul-2013 4
G.Elias D.Schwartzman 25-May-2014 1 M.Youzhny A.Murray 1-Jul-2013 4
R.Gasquet B.Tomic 27-May-2014 1 N.Djokovic T.Berdych 3-Jul-2013 5
G.Monfils V.Hanescu 27-May-2014 1 F.Verdasco A.Murray 3-Jul-2013 5
I.Karlovic K.Anderson 31-May-2014 3 N.Djokovic J.Del Potro 5-Jul-2013 6
E.Gulbis R.Federer 1-Jun-2014 4 J.Janowicz A.Murray 5-Jul-2013 6
T.Berdych J.Isner 1-Jun-2014 4 N.Djokovic A.Murray 7-Jul-2013 7
G.Garcia-Lopez G.Monfils 2-Jun-2014 4 G.Dimitrov R.Harrison 23-Jun-2014 1
M.Raonic N.Djokovic 3-Jun-2014 5 A.Murray D.Goffin 23-Jun-2014 1
T.Berdych E.Gulbis 3-Jun-2014 5 P.Lorenzi R.Federer 24-Jun-2014 1
G.Monfils A.Murray 4-Jun-2014 5 S.Wawrinka J.Sousa 24-Jun-2014 1
R.Nadal D.Ferrer 4-Jun-2014 5 G.Dimitrov L.Saville 25-Jun-2014 2
E.Gulbis N.Djokovic 6-Jun-2014 6 A.Murray B.Rola 25-Jun-2014 2
R.Nadal A.Murray 6-Jun-2014 6 G.Muller R.Federer 26-Jun-2014 2
R.Nadal N.Djokovic 8-Jun-2014 7 L.Rosol R.Nadal 26-Jun-2014 2
Wimbledon: S.Wawrinka Y-H.Lu 26-Jun-2014 2
G.Garcia-Lopez R.Federer 24-Jun-2009 2 N.Djokovic G.Simon 27-Jun-2014 3
P.Kohlschreiber R.Federer 26-Jun-2009 3 S.Giraldo R.Federer 28-Jun-2014 3
S.Wawrinka J.Levine 27-Jun-2009 3 M.Kukushkin R.Nadal 28-Jun-2014 3
A.Murray S.Wawrinka 29-Jun-2009 4 S.Wawrinka D.Istomin 30-Jun-2014 3
R.Soderling R.Federer 29-Jun-2009 4 A.Murray G.Dimitrov 2-Jul-2014 5
T.Haas N.Djokovic 1-Jul-2009 5 S.Wawrinka R.Federer 2-Jul-2014 5
L.Hewitt A.Roddick 1-Jul-2009 5 N.Djokovic G.Dimitrov 4-Jul-2014 6
I.Karlovic R.Federer 1-Jul-2009 5 R.Federer M.Raonic 4-Jul-2014 6
T.Haas R.Federer 3-Jul-2009 6 N.Djokovic R.Federer 6-Jul-2014 7
Notes: The table lists all 141 matches played at the French Open (Roland Garros) and at the Wimbledon Champi-




Event study results (baseline).
Panel A: set events (N=365)
Time (τ) AAR t-statistic (θ1) p-value CAAR t-statistic (θ2) p-value
–2 0.14% 1.05 0.293 0.14% 1.05 0.293
–1 0.23% 1.76 0.077 0.37% 1.99 0.046
0 0.17% 1.29 0.194 0.54% 2.37 0.017
1 0.28% 2.11 0.034 0.82% 3.11 0.001
2 0.45% 3.45 0.000 1.27% 4.33 0.000
3 1.00% 7.66 0.000 2.27% 7.08 0.000
4 0.34% 2.61 0.008 2.61% 7.54 0.000
5 0.45% 3.41 0.000 3.06% 8.26 0.000
6 1.44% 11.03 0.000 4.50% 11.46 0.000
7 0.35% 2.66 0.007 4.85% 11.72 0.000
8 0.01% 0.07 0.941 4.86% 11.19 0.000
9 0.00% -0.02 1.023 4.86% 10.71 0.000
10 0.20% 1.49 0.134 5.05% 10.7 0.000
11 0.01% 0.05 0.958 5.06% 10.33 0.000
12 0.16% 1.25 0.209 5.22% 10.3 0.000
13 -0.06% -0.47 1.365 5.16% 9.86 0.000
14 -0.12% -0.93 1.649 5.04% 9.33 0.000
Panel B: tie-break events (N=79)
Time (τ) AAR t-statistic (θ1) p-value CAAR t-statistic (θ2) p-value
–2 -0.13% -0.37 1.289 -0.13% -0.37 1.289
–1 0.63% 0.97 0.082 0.49% 0.97 0.334
0 0.43% 1.47 0.24 0.92% 1.47 0.143
1 0.93% 2.55 0.01 1.85% 2.55 0.011
2 0.80% 3.26 0.028 2.65% 3.26 0.001
3 3.18% 6.56 0.000 5.82% 6.56 0.000
4 0.66% 6.76 0.068 6.48% 6.76 0.000
5 0.70% 7.00 0.054 7.18% 7.00 0.000
6 0.63% 7.18 0.081 7.81% 7.18 0.000
7 1.24% 7.89 0.000 9.05% 7.89 0.000
8 -0.25% 7.32 1.509 8.80% 7.32 0.000
9 -0.27% 6.79 1.537 8.53% 6.79 0.000
10 0.89% 7.20 0.014 9.42% 7.20 0.000
11 -0.27% 6.74 1.538 9.15% 6.74 0.000
12 -0.26% 6.33 1.526 8.89% 6.33 0.000
13 -0.06% 6.09 1.121 8.84% 6.09 0.000
14 -0.01% 5.90 1.028 8.82% 5.90 0.000
Notes: The table reports the average abnormal returns (AAR) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)
over the event window. In the baseline analysis, the event window spans from τ1=−2 to τ2=14 and lasts 17 seconds
(L2=17) whereas the estimation window spans from τ0=−10 to τ1=−3 and lasts eight seconds (L1=8).
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Table A.3
Event study results (robustness check).
Panel A: set events (N=365)
Time (τ) AAR t-statistic (θ1) p-value CAAR t-statistic (θ2) p-value
–2 0.09% 0.29 0.775 0.09% 0.29 0.775
–1 0.19% 0.57 0.567 0.28% 0.61 0.544
0 0.12% 0.38 0.700 0.40% 0.72 0.473
1 0.23% 0.72 0.474 0.63% 0.98 0.327
2 0.41% 1.26 0.209 1.04% 1.44 0.150
3 0.96% 2.96 0.003 2.00% 2.52 0.012
4 0.30% 0.92 0.359 2.30% 2.68 0.007
5 0.40% 1.24 0.215 2.70% 2.94 0.003
6 1.40% 4.32 0.000 4.10% 4.22 0.000
7 0.30% 0.94 0.349 4.40% 4.30 0.000
8 -0.04% -0.11 1.088 4.36% 4.06 0.000
9 -0.05% -0.15 1.120 4.32% 3.85 0.000
10 0.15% 0.47 0.641 4.47% 3.82 0.000
11 -0.04% -0.12 1.094 4.43% 3.65 0.000
12 0.12% 0.37 0.713 4.55% 3.62 0.000
13 -0.11% -0.33 1.260 4.44% 3.43 0.001
14 -0.17% -0.52 1.395 4.27% 3.20 0.001
15 1.06% 3.26 0.001 5.33% 3.88 0.000
16 -0.09% -0.29 1.225 5.24% 3.71 0.000
17 -0.11% -0.33 1.255 5.13% 3.54 0.000
Panel B: tie-break events (N=79)
Time (τ) AAR t-statistic (θ1) p-value CAAR t-statistic (θ2) p-value
–2 0.06% 0.16 0.876 0.06% 0.16 0.876
–1 0.83% 2.04 0.042 0.89% 1.55 0.121
0 0.62% 1.54 0.124 1.51% 2.15 0.031
1 1.13% 2.78 0.006 2.64% 3.25 0.001
2 0.99% 2.45 0.014 3.63% 4.01 0.000
3 3.38% 8.32 0.000 7.01% 7.05 0.000
4 0.86% 2.12 0.034 7.87% 7.33 0.000
5 0.89% 2.20 0.028 8.76% 7.64 0.000
6 0.83% 2.05 0.041 9.59% 7.88 0.000
7 1.43% 3.53 0.000 11.03% 8.59 0.000
8 -0.05% -0.13 1.103 10.97% 8.16 0.000
9 -0.07% -0.17 1.135 10.91% 7.76 0.000
10 1.08% 2.67 0.008 11.99% 8.19 0.000
11 -0.07% -0.17 1.135 11.92% 7.85 0.000
12 -0.06% -0.15 1.122 11.86% 7.55 0.000
13 0.14% 0.35 0.726 12.00% 7.39 0.000
14 0.18% 0.45 0.649 12.18% 7.28 0.000
15 0.15% 12.19 0.000 12.33% 7.95 0.000
16 -0.14% -0.34 1.267 12.19% 7.61 0.000
17 -0.10% -0.24 1.188 12.09% 7.31 0.000
Notes: The table reports the average abnormal returns (AAR) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)
over the event window. In the robustness analysis, the event window spans from τ1=−2 to τ2=17 and lasts 19 seconds
(L2 = 19) whereas the estimation window spans from τ0=−17 to τ1=−3 and lasts 15 seconds (L1=15).
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